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In the contemporary era policy-making is increasingly being shaped by non-domestic 
influences and actors. The mobility of policy ideas and mechanisms across time and space provides a 
challenge: How best to conceptualise the routes and modes of travelling whereby ideas and 
instruments are transported from one location to another? Conceptual tools originally designed in 
public policy circles - such as lesson-drawing, modelling, policy diffusion, policy transfer and 
convergence - have more recently been introduced into criminological enquiries regarding the 
convergence of criminal justice policies. 
This thesis applies the conceptual framework of policy transfer (referring to conscious efforts 
on the part of social agencies to export-import lessons from one locale to another) to the field of 
policing with a specific emphasis on South African police reform after 1990. The central focus ofthis 
enquiry is the interplay between novel, often externally derived, ideas and practices with a national 
police force at a time of immense political transition. Selective aspects of South African police reform 
are explored with specific emphasis on how, in what way, and to what extent, local reform efforts have 
been influenced by global notions and practices of' good policing.' Three institutional conduits for 
reformist policing ideas are considered. In the first instance, the contribution of policing scholars, a 
knowledge-based community of some importance, to debates on the pathways for police reform are 
discussed with an emphasis on the theoretical and normative assumptions that have guided their 
analyses of a policing ethos and system beyond Apartheid. Secondly, the role of an interim policy 
mechanism, the National Police Board (created in terms of a peace agreement signed in 1991) in 
setting an agenda for police reform is considered. Thirdly, the discussion profiles the international 
development community as a constituency of importance in recent police reform efforts. The latter 
exploration proceeds through a case study method. Three distinct examples of donor aid in support of ~ 
institutional reform are described with particular reference to the paradigms invoked, the cultural 
entrepreneurs and policy networks involved, and the contextual factors that facilitated and/or ," 
constrained reformist efforts. 
A wide range of data collection methods were utilised during the course of the research. A 
I iterature review of contemporary debates on policy transfer, police and security sector reform in both 
mature and emerging democracies was undertaken. Furthermore, a wide range of primary 
documentary sources and various official policy documents were consulted. Face to face interviews 
with members of various policy constituencies also provided source material. Lastly, participant 
observation of policy structures and field notes compiled during evaluative research of a number of 
donor assisted projects provided contextual observations of importance to the analysis. 
This enquiry supports the conclusion that there is growing convergence in the language and 
practices associated with democratic police reform. Yet the di lemmas of policy transfer from North to 
South - particularly (although not exclusively) in the context of aid packages - are often 
underestimated. Local experiments suggest that whilst policy transfers can facilitate policy change, 
policies transferred all too easily become victims of domestic cOlltingencies. Empirical enquiries into 
the context, processes and outcomes associated with reformist interventions are necessary to sharpen 
our understanding of how exactly policy travels and to what local effect. Recent reform activity aimed 
at the South African Police illustrates the extent to which policy communities situated at the local, 
national and transnational level do not exist in isolation but rather stand in a complex and interactive 
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The Reform of Policing in South Africa after 1990: 
Policy Diffusion and Policy Transfer 
1.1 Introduction 
At the time of Union in 1910, the four territories that comprised the future South 
Africa had all developed institutionalised public policing in a variety of forms. With the 
passage of the South African Police Act of 1912, the shape of a unified police 
organisation was laid down, and formally created in 1913. The new force conceded little 
to provincial autonomy, and from the beginning formed a militaristic and centralised 
organisation that future leaders of the South African state would often call upon to 
maintain the racial order. Its destiny was tied to the Ministers of Justice (and later, from 
the 1960s onwards, to a Minister of Police) responsive to a mainly white electorate. The 
political exigencies forced upon policing by the dictates of white domination moulded the 
institutional character of the police in a direction that almost consistently tended towards 
a deepening of police power and the erosion of civil liberties, especially for the 
subordinate majority. From 1976 to 1989, the state faced an almost continuous state of 
virtual civil war. At the end of the 1980s the public potice was a highly politicised 
institution geared toward the protection of state security and pitifully under-developed for 
the task that lay ahead. It would confront a new political dispensation and an 
increasingly demanding crime environment with a long entrenched (and deserved) 
reputation of 'brutality, corruption and ineptitude' (Rauch, 2000: 1). 
A decisive break in the twentieth century history of the public pol ice as an 
appendix of the racial state occurred in 1990, as South Africa entered an era of political 
liberalisation. This phase was guided by a multi-party peace agreement (the National 
Peace Accord [NPA] of 1991) which put in place various interim mechanisms of 
oversight over the police. Democratic elections were held in April 1994 and a 
constitutional order came into existence shortly thereafter under the guardianship of a 
Government of National Unity (GNU). From then onwards reform of the police 
institution was to form one critical part of a much broader programme of radical 
transformation of the state machinery as a whole. 
The transformation of the police was guided by a number of policy frameworks. 
Critical in this regard were the Interim Constitution of 1993, the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) of 1994, and various administrative guidelines for 
transforming the public civil service. These measures amounted to a radical shift in 
political mission, service standards and operational practices of the public police. The 
rationalisation and amalgamation of eleven officially separate police administrations 
resulted in the formation of one central structure, the South African Police Service 
(SAPS). 
The Interim and Final Constitutions of the Republic of South Africa created a 
legal order under which the police were to be restrained by the norms of accountability 
and legality in line with liberal constitutionalism. These basic laws laid down the 
objectives of the SAPS: to prevent crime; combat crime; investigate crime; maintain .. / 
public order; protect and secure the inhabitants of South Africa and their property, and to ., 
uphold and enforce the law. The South African Police Services Act of 1995 specified that 
the SAPS had to be impartial, effective, responsible, an equal opportunity employer, and 
co-operative with the public and other state organs. Reform measures since 1994 
embraced an extremely wide agenda, and objectives at times shifted in response to 
conditions on the ground. Just how much the reforms contributed to a more effective 
police force remains a highly contentious matter. The 1995 Act was notable for its 
confirmation of the centralised and national character of the South African Police (SAP). 
Two contentious issues regarding the police arrangement for the future related to the 
national versus the regional divide, as well as the degree of political control to be exerted 
in a constitutional democracy. Political expediency and compromises dictated the 
decisions on this front (Rauch, 200 I). The SAPS retained a centralised police 
organisation controlled from headquarters in Pretoria. The SAPS thus remained a very 
hierarchical organisation, bearing the imprint of decades of organisational sedimentation. 
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In every significant respect the highest-ranking police official, the National 
Commissioner, retained overriding powers. The provincial arms of the SAPS, as before 
1994, operated largely as administrative agents of the national headquarters. It was within 
this context that reform of the police - a generally accepted goal in most political circles 
- was undertaken. 
1.2 Reform from within and without 
Reform of the SAP in the post-1990 period has by no means been a purely 
indigenous development. Local police reform has drawn much of its inspiration from the 
outside. Not only have ideas current in the international policing fraternity and scholarly 
circles been imported, foreign policing experts and practitioners too have participated 
extensively in the reform process itself. The importation of foreign policing ideas into the 
South African context is not, of course, a recent development. After all, the politics of 
colonialism and the development of a settler economy created the very conditions within 
which generic ideas and practices associated with the model of colonial policing were 
imported (Brogden, 1987) and adapted to the local exigencies'of modern South Africa. 
In the context of South Africa's own post-colonial transition a new dynamic for 
modelling police reform on international practices emerged. Like many other transitional 
societies at the time, South Africa came to look North for ideas, principles, practices and 
instruments associated with democratic policing. In the post-Cold War environment the 
democratic model was widely diffused. As Bayley (2001) has noted, by the mid-1990s 
the principles associated with the democratic policing regime had become globalised. 
Whether this diffusion extends much beyond the level of discourse and rhetoric remains 
an open question, in South Africa as elsewhere. On the face of it, it seems likely that 
international ideas interact with the local context and undergo mutation in the process. 
More often than not, the result may be a hybridisation of the original ideas. It is against 
this background that this thesis proceeds to explore the trajectory of South African police 
reform with a specific emphasis on how, in what way, and to what extent local reform 
efforts were influenced by the' international factor .' 
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In order to examine the international contribution to the reform of the SAP, this 
discussion focuses on three examples in which international influence and participation 
played an important if not decisive role in reforming aspects of South African policing. 
Each comprised critical conduits for international ideas in the post-1990 phase of South 
African police reform. In focusing on these case studies, this discussion aims to add both 
historical detail and analytical insight to our understanding of recent South African 
policing reform as a variation on the theme of policy transfer and policy diffusion. 
Furthermore, by applying the conceptual framework for understanding policy transfers -
developed in the context of western industrial societies - to a transitional society, this 
exploration intends to engage with the cross-cultural applicability of mainstream 
conceptualisation(s) of the phenomenon of policy transfer. 
The contention of this thesis is that all three case studies yield insights into the 
way in which the 'cultural and conceptual resources' (Sparks & Newburn, 2002: 108) 
relevant to local police reform have been borrowed, adapted, consolidated and/or 
sabotaged from one locale to another. The case studies also provide considerable 
information regarding the political sponsors, cultural entrepreneurs and policy networks 
involved in the process of borrowing. In this examination of the conduits of foreign ideas ' 
and practices, reference will be made to the kind of situational factors and contextual 
exigencies that may support or undermine the increasing approximation of local policing 
policies to some international norm. 
Description and analysis of the processes involved in the reform of local policing 
take us squarely into contemporary debates on policy diffusion, policy transfer and policy 
convergence. The concept of, and literature on, policy transfer provides a useful 
analytical framework for putting recent developments in South African police reform into 
broader perspective. In order to argue the case for an analysis of the international 
influences on local police reform through the analytical prism of policy transfer, some 
discussion of the relevant literature and its heuristic value is warranted. 
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1.3 Examining South African Police reform through the lens of policy transfer 
and policy convergence 
Practices associated with the exchange of ideas or the modelling (Karstedt, 2002) 
of policies and systems of one jurisdiction on another are not new. Political and scholarly 
interest in the processes underlying policy convergence and policy transfer is, however, 
more recent. The academic debate on policy convergence and policy transfer only took 
off in the 1990s. Initially, the most important contributions came from the disciplines of 
International Relations and Political Studies. In a seminal article published in 1991, the 
political scientist, Colin Bennett, attempted to instil some analytical rigor into the then-
fuzzy debates on policy convergence. Convergence was meant to refer to the trend 
towards increasing similarity in social policies (in areas such as welfare, health and 
security) across different political jurisdictions. Setting out to 'identify the most common 
structural and procedural variables associated with findings of (public) policy 
convergence' (217), Bennett was of the opinion that the nature and causes of convergence 
were more complicated than most assumed. To do justice to that complexity, substantive 
empirical investigations were required to map 'the transnational sources of domestic 
policy and politics ... ' (Bennett, 1991 :218). 
Policy convergence, as he pointed out, could take different forms. For example, it 
might involve a standardisation (conversion) of policy goals, policy content, policy 
instruments or policy outcomes, or a convergence of policy styles. Furthermore, 
convergence itself could be a function of different processes. On this score, the author 
identified four qualitatively different avenues through which convergence could be 
achieved. Emulation, or imitation, involved the 'utilization of evidence about a 
programme or programmes from overseas and a drawing of lessons from that experience' 
(Ibid:221). Elite networking again referred to the sharing of ideas within policy 
communities. Thirdly, convergence could also be achieved through the harmonisation of 
policy. In this regard the deliberate and co-operative attempts of authoritative 
intergovernmental agencies were particularly critical. Lastly, and in contrast to the spirit 
of co-operation and voluntarism implied in the previous three processes, convergence 
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might also be the result of imposition or penetration of policy frameworks by one regime 
upon a less powerful one. 
Since Bennett's earlier engagement, the debate has taken off in a variety of 
directions (Rose, 1991; Haas, 1992; Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; 2000; Stone, 1999; 2000a; 
2000b). Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), for example, came to argue in favour of the concept 
of policy transfer rather than policy convergence. The former concept, they thought, was 
analytically more robust than the rather descriptive concepts of policy diffusion and 
convergence. Policy transfer was defined as a 'process in which knowledge about 
policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting .... is 
used in the development of polices, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in 
another political setting' (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000:5). 
Whilst policy transfer can hardly be described as only a contemporary 
phenomenon, it has experienced a rapid growth in recent decades . The reasons for the 
growth in policy transfer have been diverse: global economic forces, the expansion of 
communication technology, and the formative influences of international and ,' 
transnational organisations in the contemporary area, to name but three factors. 
In developing a conceptual framework for analysing actual processes of policy 
transfer, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) identified a whole range of issues that would require 
systematic analysis in empirical investigations. Included in these are the following 
questions: 
(I) What causes policy transfer, and what kinds of motivations may drive 
the process? 
(2) What is being transferred - is it policy content, instruments, ideologies, 
ideas, attitudes or positive/negative lessons? 
(3) Who are the key actors involved in the process? A diverse number of 
role players could potentially be involved. Actors, for example, may 
range from governmental officials, bureaucrats, consultants, research 
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institutions, think tanks', Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), 
transnational corporations and/or supranational institutions. 
(4) What kinds of contextual factors facilitate or inhibit the transfer of 
policies? Stated differently, under what kinds of conditions do policy 
transfers lead to policy success and/or failure? 
More recently, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) have woven a wide range of variables 
into a 'Policy Transfer Framework' with a view to assisting empirical research. This 
framework elucidates many factors of importance in a more grounded discussion of 
policy transfer. In particular, it notes that policy transfer may take place voluntarily or 
may be subject to coercion (to various degrees). Policy may be adopted more or less 
freely or be imposed from the outside by some external agency. The policy process is 
comprised of different phases, ranging from agenda setting to actual policymaking and 
policy implementation. Each of these discrete processe~ is subject to a range of influences 
that collectively make for either successful policy transfer or policy failure. 
1.4 Policy convergence in recent criminological debate 
Issues of policy convergence, diffusion and transfer have also been invoked, 
either implicitly or explicitly, In recent criminological debate. For example, 
criminological discussions on growing similarities in crime control discourse and penal 
practices in western societies, as found in the work of David Garland (1996; 2000; 200 \) 
implicitly appeal to notions of policy convergence and diffusion. The authoritative nature 
of Garland's contribution and the impact of his ideas on the community of criminological 
scholars warrant a more detailed discussion of his work. 
In a seminal article published in 1996, Garland focused attention on the growing 
similarities in penal policies pursued in the United States of America (USA) and the 
I See in this regard the analysis of Stone (2000b) regarding the role of think-tanks in policy transfers. Here 
think-tanks are defined as 'independent, or private, policy research organizations.' The 'supply and 
demand' forces that shape the role of these institutions are also discussed (p.IS3) . 
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United Kingdom (UK). Three specific aspects were highlighted in his discussion. In both 
societies, he argued, crime had increased substantially. Rates of property crime, in 
particular, escalated dramatically. As a consequence, crime is increasingly viewed as an 
inescapable fact of modern co-existence, a 'normal feature of everyday life' and an 
everyday 'risk.' Secondly, there was growing recognition of the constraints on the state 
to really 'do' something about crime. The erosion of the myth of the state's monopoly 
over crime control, and its limited capacity to contain or resolve the crime dilemma, had 
given rise to a third similarity in outlook and practice: the appeal to market mechanisms 
and for 'popular involvement' in crime prevention. With the market expanding into the 
crime complex, at the same time 'responsible citizens' were being called upon to 
participate in the governance of their own security. Notions of community safety and 
community policing reflected the salience of active citizenship in the new cnme 
environment. Criminal justice policy, noted Garland (1996), increasingly exhibited a 
contradictory character - on the 'soft' end of the crime equation there was an attempt to 
define deviance out of the system with restorative justice principles and diversion 
practices in mind . On the 'hard' end of the crime equation however, the state periodically 
reasserted its authority over penal policy in a strong-armed, punitive fashion. As 
politicians talk of a war on crime, harsher sentences had become the order of the day: 
We thus have an official criminology which is increasingly dualistic, increasingly 
polarized, and increasingly ambivalent. There is a criminology of the self, that 
characterizes offenders as rational consumers, just like us; and there is a 
criminology of the other, of the threatening outcast, the fearsome stranger, the 
excluded and the embittered. (p.461) ... State sovereignty over crime has thus been 
simultaneously denied and symbolically reasserted (p.462). 
In terms of Garland's argument, the causes underlying growing similarities In 
crime policy and criminal justice discourse and practice between the USA and the UK are 
located in structural dynamics. At the core of such convergence lies the social and 
cultural conditions associated with the rise of late modern societies. In subsequent work 
Garland (200 I) further elaborated on the growing similarities in penal pol icy as a 
function of comparable economic, social and cultural changes associated with 'late 
modernity.' 
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Garland's core ideas have found considerable resonance in the work of others. 
His ideas are mirrored in Jock Young's (1999) exposition of the changes induced by the 
rise of what he calls the exclusive society, as well as Ian Taylor's (1999) description of 
the market society. Both offer structural accounts of the malaise besetting late modern 
societies and its impact on the nature of sociality, patterns of social regulation and on 
policy responses to crime. Both emphasise how similarities, inter alia, in contemporary 
labour markets, in the associated political rule (neo-liberalism) and in cultural values 
(through the rise of moral individualism) have driven crime control and penal policies in 
increasingly analogous and punitive directions.2 
The relevance of the arguments briefly referred to above lies not so much in the 
detail as in the conclusion that growing policy convergence in the field of crime control is 
a consequence of broad structural forces. The latter collectively shape the punitive 
disposition in crime policy that characterises the exclusive/market society of the new 
millennium. In this view policy convergence is the outcome of broad and sweeping 
social trends in economic and political organisation, rather than a consequence of 
conscious policy transfers by particular institutional actors. 
More recently, the issue of policy convergence has become articulated in much 
more explicit terms in criminological discussions. In an issue of the prestigious journal 
Criminal Justice, two leading British criminologists, Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn 
(2002a), put the issue squarely on the table by posing a (deceptively) simple question: 
'How does crime policy travel' from one location to another? For them, policy transfer is 
analytically distinct from convergence and diffusion. Policy transfer in the area of crime 
control, they argue, has been much neglected. They too reiterate that the movement of 
ideas across time and space is not new. Under conditions of globalisation however, policy 
transfer is more readily evident. In their view, a substantive answer to the question of 
how 'crime policy travels' would require empirically grounded investigations into 
2 A third example from the quarters of sociological scholarship, of a more conservative leaning, is to be 
found in the work of the American sociologist, Francis Fukuyama (1999) who emphasises the 
disintegration of the nuclear family and its impact on the decline in social solidarity, community cohesion 
and trust. 
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processes underlying transfer as well as the political actors and policy entrepreneurs 
involved. The challenge for such investigations was to supplement structural explanations 
with agency-led perspectives. This view concurs with that of Evans and Davies' 
(1999:361) who suggest that 'policy transfer should be examined through a structure and 
agency approach' at three levels, namely the global/transnational level, the macro-level 
and the inter-organisational level. 
The literature on policy transfer has largely been concerned with the consensual 
transfer of ideas between western democracies. Policy transfer, however, does not happen 
in one direction only. The unidirectional depiction of transfer from centre to periphery or 
from North to South has been problematised in recent years (Karstedt 2002). As Nedley 
(2000) puts it: ' (B)y failing to acknowledge that policy entrepreneurs in the North may 
have something to learn from successful programmes already underway in the South, 
policy transfer analysis is fundamentally flawed' (p.l). For Mareen Cain (2000) the 
notion of 'interactive globalisation' captures the 'possibility of mutual and reciprocal 
learning' (p.250). Furthermore the concept of 'path dependency' (Karstedt, 2002) has 
been invoked to emphasise the importance of local political culture as an intervening, 
variable that shape the outcome of policy transfer from one locale to another (Melossi, ./ 
2004). Policy transfer does not necessarily lead to policy convergence. On the contrary, 
the persistence of 'national and local divergences' combined with the 'contradictions of 
contemporary reform' (as in the field of youth justice) may 'preclude any aspiration for 
the delivery of a universal and consensual product' (Muncie, 2005 :35). 
Detailed empirical engagements with aspects of criminal justice policy transfer, 
such as those provided by Jones and Newburn (2002b; 2005), have furthermore alerted us 
to the need for distinguishing between levels of policy. Here the distinction between 
substantive elements of policy (content, instruments and practices) and the more 
symbolic elements of policy involving style and rhetoric are particularly useful for 
purposes of analysing 'concrete outputs of the policy process' (Jones & Newburn, 
2005:70). Furthermore, the distinction between voluntary and coercive transfers3 is an 
3 See in this regard the discussion by Nedley (2000) . 
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important one for understanding the political circumstances within which transfer and/or 
lesson-drawing is situated. This distinction is all the more relevant in the case of policy 
transfers involving developing societies and/or new democracies where 'conditionalities' 
so routinely accompany developmental assistance from North to South. 
The agencies involved in transfer, as Stone (1999; 2000a; 2000b) has noted, may 
comprise of individuals, networks, organisations or transnational policy communities.4 In 
recent years, the influence of transnational think tanks and collaborative policy networks 
have grown steadily. Think tanks in particular ' are a key set of agents for exporting 
lessons' (Stone, 200 I :356) given their 'propensity for lesson-drawing that aids cross-
national policy transfers of ideas, practices and policy programmes' (p.339). 
It is against this background of an appreciation of the complexities involved in 
policy transfer that the challenges for research are being formulated. In short, the 
challenge for research is to track the actors involved in exchanges, the policy networks 
implicated, the interests served, and the outcomes achieved in the conscious transfer of 
policies from one locale to another. Detailed investigations of the motivations and 
influences underpinning transfer will contribute to a much more nuanced understanding 
of the mobility of policy ideas across time and space. 
1.5 Transferring criminological ideas into the South African context 
The formative influences of western ideas on South African crime policy and 
debates have been recognised in a small number of scholarly commentaries on the 
development of South African criminology. Van Zyl Smit has produced pioneering, 
historically informed contextualisations of these influences (Van Zyl Smit, 1989; 1990; 
1999). More recently Van Zy! Smit and Van def Spuy (2004: 184) put the practice of 
borrowing of ideas from abroad in a broader time frame as follows: 
4 The distinction between policy communities, knowledge or epistemic communities (Haas, 1992) and 
policy transfer networks (Evans & Davies, 1999) is useful. 
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Criminological ideas have long been imported into South Africa. Both Afrikaner 
Nationalists in the 1930s and aspiring radical supporters of majority rule in the 
1970s and 1980s turned to the grand criminological theories of their time. Thus 
the overtly racist criminological ideas that were widely available internationally in 
the 1930s were used to underpin the Afrikaner Nationalist school of 
criminology ... Similarly, an affinity with the ideas of what one may loosely call 
critical or radical criminology flourished among a small of group intellectuals in 
the 1970s and 1980s. In the climate of political change in the early 1990s this 
criminology, supplemented by communitarian idealism and feminism, was given 
considerable publicity and appeared to be growing in influence. 
Recent explorations of the relationship between South African criminology and 
the radical tradition of European criminology - from late Apartheid to the period of 
political transition - is to be found in the work of Dixon (2001; 2004a; 2004b). In his 
work the challenges confronting critical criminology for a democratic South Africa are 
considered in some detail through the lens of Jock Young's Exclusive Societies (Dixon, 
2001). In subsequent work, Dixon takes his cue from Cain (2000) in arguing that one 
needs to conceive of the process whereby criminological ideas are exchanged as 
characterised by 'interactive globalisation' rather than a simple one-way transfer of ideas 
from North to South. One example of such interactive globalisation, ie of the adoption 
and adaptation to local exigencies of the model of community policing, is to be found in: 
Dixon's (2004b) critical commentary on the development of community policing through 
different political phases and its' indigenisation' in South Africa. 
South African experiences of criminal justice reform after the advent of 
democratic constitutionalism demonstrate the extent to which reform has been shaped by 
a combination of international policy regimes and local influences and exigencies. 
Substantive developments attest to the mixture of international and local influences in 
areas such as youth justice and child rights (Sloth-Nielsen, 2003); organised crime 
(Standing, 2004); crime prevention (Dixon, 2004d); victims' rights (Davis & Snyman 
(eds), 2005); restorative justice (Skelton, 2002); sector policing (Dixon & Rauch, 2004) 
and prison privatisation (Berg, 2003). For each of these areas one can trace the interplay 
between transnational, regional and local influences and interest groups. 
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Having recognised that issues relating to policy transfer and convergence arise 
across many substantive areas in criminal justice, it needs to be noted that this thesis is 
exclusively concerned with select aspects of policy transfer and convergence in the area 
of policing. Given this particular institutional focus, of what relevance is the broader 
criminological discussion on policy transfer for understanding contemporary shifts in 
policing? It is with this question in mind that the discussion now turns to a consideration 
of the ways in which issues of policy convergence and transfer have been introduced into 
policing debates. 
1.6 Converging toward a common policing future? 
In the field of policing studies, interest in policy convergence amongst police 
institutions and policing experts worldwide has emanated from two rather distinct 
quarters. Mainstream analyses of contemporary shifts in policing in post-industrial 
societies have a fair amount to say about the march toward a common policing future. 
Secondly, issues of policy convergence are also very much implicated in the more 
practically orientated discussions on how best to affect police reform in transitional 
societies and post-conflict settings. A more detailed consideration of these two sources is -
provided below. 
1. 6.1 Late modernity and the fragmentation of policing 
One leading example of mainstream commentaries on qualitative shifts in the 
organisation of policing is to be found in Bayley and Shearing's (1996) review of the 
changes in policing that confront Western industrial societies. In this article it is argued 
that the restructuring of policing is itself driven by the confluence of broader social 
factors, such as the rise of mass private property, the rampant commodification of 
security,S the contraction of the role of government vis-a.-vis the provision of security, 
growing public fear of crime, and the rise of cultural individualism. To capture the 
5 Which has approximated nothing short of a 'quiet' revolution according to Shearing and Stenning (1980). 
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dramatic changes in security, Bayley and Shearing invoke the concept of the 
'pluralisation,6 of policing. Building on earlier work by Shearing relating to the impact 
of privatisation - through the market and through communities - on the state's (shrinking) 
share in the governance of security, this review takes a more composite view of future 
developments. For Bayley and Shearing (1996) the pluralisation of policing beyond the 
state constitutes a watershed in the evolution of law enforcement. 7 
Within the 'plural, networked' world (Loader, 2000:324) of contemporary 
policing, the division of policing labour between state, market and civil society is 
complex. In response to this reality of 'nodal networks,' recent research has come to 
focus on the nature of the inter-relationships between different providers (Shearing & 
Wood, 2003). These relationships may vary from co-operative alliances, to more or less 
peaceful co-existence, to competitive and even hostile contestations over turf. A further 
feature of the current debate is the focus on normative concerns. Here the impact of 
diversification and the commodification of security on the actual delivery of accessible, 
appropriate and effective security to citizens is critical (Loader, 1999; Kempa & 
Shearing, 2002). Such concerns are particularly pertinent in emerging democracies where / 
the state's capacity to deliver security is much more limited than in established 
democracies. 
Other discussions of the challenges confronting the governance of securitl in the 
'postmodern era' (Sheptycki, 1997) and in 'risk-based societies' (Ericson & Haggerty, 
1997; De Lint, 1999) continue to emphasise the homogenising effects of structural 
6 In subsequent work they have opted for the concept of 'multilateralisation' to refer to the multiplicity of 
auspices under which security is governed. In exploring further the impact of such multilateralisation, 
Bayley and Shearing (2001) note that in the new age, there is a crucial distinction to be made between the 
auspices under which security is organised and the actual providers of such security. 
7 Others have taken issue with the depiction of a 'watershed' or 'a qualitative break' in the history of 
policing. Jones and Newburn (2002c) for example have warned of the dangers of overdramatising current 
trends (p .130). 
8 The challenges confronting the governance of security more specifically need to be understood against the 
background of shifts in governance more generally. See Mbabazi, MacLean and Shaw (2002) for a 
discussion of the need for moving beyond a state-centric approach to governance. 
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conditions characteristic of post-industrial societies. So too the effects of transnational 
crime, particularly of an organised nature, on policing systems and methodologies have 
been explored. Sheptycki (1998 :493), for example, regards the 'transnationalizaton of 
clandestine markets' as a crucial factor in new age policing. In a world where crime 
knows no borders and where illegal enterprises pursue business interests across frontiers, 
the challenges confronting law enforcement agencies are increasingly similar. Faced 
with criminal predation of an organised nature, the argument goes, law enforcement 
agencies need to consolidate their resources, build co-operative alliances, standardise 
policy frameworks and harmonise operational procedures in the 'war' on organised 
cnme. Such a view suggests that the transnationalisation of lucrative illicit enterprises 
(such as drugs, illegal weapons, and the sex trade in human beings) creates fertile 
conditions for cross-societal police exchanges in best practices and cross-national lesson 
drawing. At both the international and supra-national level a variety of organisations, 
situated beyond, below and above the state, are coming to playa larger role.9 
1.6.2 Policing in transitional societies 
The second source for discllssions on policy transfer and policy convergence is 
that. of transitional policing. In the post-Cold War environment the challenges 
confronting the democratisation of former authoritarian police institutions in emerging 
democracies have acquired great importance (Neild, 1999; Call & William, 2001). A 
new wave of global assistance efforts has contributed to growing interest in the politics 
and technical practicalities involved in reforming police agencies in difficult social 
settings (Bayley, 1995). The concern with practical lessons is evident in David Bayley's 
(2001) reflections on Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It? 
In this publ ication the author extracts general lessons from the trials and errors of recent 
developmental interventions aimed at the reform of police organisations in new 
democracies. 
9 For a discussion of the social propellers of, and the salient features associated with, transnational policing 
in its Eurostate mould, see Walker (2003). 
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In other policy circles the institutional net has been cast wider than the police by 
focusing on the challenges confronting security sector refonn. Key participants in this 
debate include developmental agencies that have come to see security sector reform as 
crucial for the prospects of democratic consolidation in transitional states (Winkler, 
2002). Viewed from a security sector angle, the reform of the public police agency is 
part and parcel of wider systemic efforts to democratise the security sector. The historical 
dominance of military institutions and the underdevelopment of civilian police agencies 
in many parts of the world constitute part of the cultural background. The potential for, 
and difficulties confronting, developmental efforts aimed at aligning security sectors to 
democratic principles have been a feature of such debates. Comparative analysis of the 
chequered history of police reform initiatives in new democracies - such as those 
provided by Ziegler and Neild (2002) and Caparini and Marenin (2004) - have 
contributed in no small measure to the spirit of pragmatism that now prevails. Underlying 
this pragmatism is the realisation that policies are not transferred in the abstract, nor are 
they transported into social vacuums. The shuttling of ideas, recipes, mechanisms and 
cultural habits of mind invariably takes place under particular social conditions upon 
which a wide range of social agencies exert their respective influences. 
Finally, a further source of ideas on transitional policing is also emerging from the 
field of peace-building and peacekeeping operations in post~conflict settings. In contexts 
such as Bosnia, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
organisations like the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) agency are intimately 
involved in restructuring policing organisations in 'collapsed states' (Holm & Eide, 
2000). From such field engagements, a series of lessons have also been forthcoming on 
which future efforts aimed at policy transfer and implementation can be built with the 
view to maximising the effects for institution building. 
The literature on political transitions and transitional policing is beginning to 
generate the kind of empirical data from which insight into the nature, process and 
consequences of policy transfer and policy convergence can be gleaned . The climate of 
political transition itself, as Brocklehurst et at. (2000) conclude in their review of 
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comparisons between Northern Ireland and South Africa, 'shapes and facilitates lesson 
drawing' in public policy. As they put it: 
Lesson drawing in transition may thus be part of a broader strategy of attempting 
to remove uncertainty in a complex and fast moving environment.. .. One reason 
why lesson drawing is particularly useful in times of transition is that it often 
enables policy makers to remove themselves from their own scene ... Secondly 
where issues are particularly sensitive, for example, policing a divided society, it 
enables players to discuss reforms by alluding to the exporter environment and its 
parallels without using the highly charged identities and issues of the potential 
importer country. This has certainly been the case in recent exchanges between 
the SAPS and the RUC 10 on the subject of Change Management (Ibid : 15). 
One of the most explicit engagements with the diffusion of policing policies 
across national borders is to be found in a recent paper on the topic of 'transnational 
policy regimes' (Marenin, 2005). Not much has been written about the actual processes 
whereby such regimes are created and sustained in particular locales. On this score 
Marenin (2005) argues that various players, actors and regime communities participate in 
the moulding of international policing regimes. These actors may be local or foreign and 
can be drawn from a variety of institutional orbits: governmental structures, the market, 
civil society (NGO's) or police institutions. To explore the social composition of regime 
communities more empirically, the author identifies five different communities that are 
actively involved in the shaping of policing regimes. These communities include scholars 
and research institutions, policy outfits and think-tanks, transnational policy-makers, 
NGOs and private consultancy firms, and finally, professional police agencies. 
Collectively each of these communities participates in the 'shuttling of ideas' from one 
region to another, across borders, at training locations and conference venues. As he puts 
it in an earlier paper: 
The dissemination of democratic policing norms and practices has occurred in 
numerous ways, and has been done by all regime communities. Methods range 
from appeals to professional states, quid pro quo negotiations, salesmanship, 
semi-coercive persuasion, and straightforward imposition (Marenin, 2003a:20). 
10 RUC refers to the Royal Ulster Constabulary. 
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Marenin's (2005) analysis helps to set the pace for more substantive engagements with 
processes and agencies involved in the dissemination of ideas and practices relevant to an 
understanding of policy transfer in the field of security in the contemporary era. 
In conclusion, recent engagements with the concept of policy transfer in political 
science, public administration, criminology and policing studies hold considerable 
potential for addressing the following question: How does police policy travel and to 
what effect? It is with this question in mind that we turn to a consideration of South 
African police reform for the period 1990 onwards as one case study of a broader process 
of 'interactive globalisation' (Cain, 2000; Dixon, 2004b) through which 'transnational 
policing regimes' (Marenin, 2003a; 2005) emerge, 'policy transfers' (Dolowitz & Marsh, 
2000; Jones & Newburn, 2002a; 2002b; 2005) are mediated, reciprocal' lesson-drawing' 
CHamber, 2003) is facilitated and 'policy convergence' (Bennett, 1991) mayor may not 
be effected. In its substantive exploration of certain aspects of policy transfers in the 
field of policing, this thesis hopes to build and expand on other recent contributions in 
this area. But before doing so, some broader contextualisation is called for. 
1.7 South African police reform in retrospect: local pressures and international " 
influences 
The history of the public police in South Africa is testimony to the intimate 
connection between local pressures and international influences. The tradition of 
repressive policing was moulded by the consecutive influences of colonial conquest, the 
peculiarly racial dynamics that shaped industrialisation, and the emergence of a virulent 
form of ethnic politics. From the 1960s onwards, international condemnation bestowed a 
pariah status on South Africa. During the height of state repression the international 
community more generally, and the anti-Apartheid movement more particularly, 
continued to exert influence through a moral condemnation and political isolation of the 
Apartheid state. During this period NGOs active in the monitoring of state abuse and 
support to the disenfranchised could rely on international support. 
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With open political rapprochement underway from February 1990 onwards, the 
history of internationalisation changed direction from political exclusion to constructive 
engagement. Local efforts toward political liberalisation were met with generous 
international support. In a short space of time a dramatic re-insertion of South Africa into 
the international community was effected. One institutional recipient that stood to benefit 
from international support and assistance was the public police institution. 
Much has been written over the past fifteen years about South African police 
reform in the context of post-Apartheid reconstruction. More recently, South Africa has 
also emerged as a pivotal case study in comparative assessments of security sector reform 
in post-conflict situations. In such circles South African experiments are projected as a 
source of inspiration to others grappling with the strategic frameworks for democratising 
the armed formations of former authoritarian regimes. To illustrate the point, one 
example will suffice. [n a publication edited by two leading international scholars in the 
security sector field, South Africa is singled out as 'providing especially comprehensive 
blueprints for security sector transformation' to its African neighbours (Cawthra & 
Luckham, 2003:xi) [t is with this observation in mind that the question as to the formative 
role of international influences vis-a.-vis local pressures comes to the fore. 
The contribution of the international community to the project of local police 
reform is generally acknowledged. The role of international exchange and assistance in 
the reform of the public police, however, has not been the subject of much substantive 
empirical enquiry. A few exceptions are worth noting. The first is Brogden and 
Shearing's (1993) earlier normative injunction against what they described as a tendency 
toward a neo-colonial importation of international models for local police reform. At the 
time they insisted that local knowledge and indigenous practices of social ordering had to 
guide the process of reconstituting the field of policing. A second engagement with the 
internationalisation of local police reform focused more explicitly on the role of the 
foreign developmental community. On this score, Van der Spuy (2000) described core 
features of developmental assistance in aid of police reform for the period 1994 to 1998 
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and identified shifts in the objectives of such assistance over a period of time. II Shifts in 
the priorities for, and objectives of, developmental assistance, she noted, were the result 
of a rather complex interaction between locally driven policy agendas and international 
pressures. However, the details of the processes underlying transfer and convergence 
remained unexplored in her paper. 
1.8 Political context, police reform and international-local exchanges 
This thesis attempts to fill a gap in the local policing literature by exploring 
(selectively) through the utilisation of three case studies, the interchange between local 
initiatives and international influences in the process of the reform of the South African 
police. The analysis of these case studies requires at least some reference to the broader 
context in which foreign and local personnel pursued their reform goals. 
In the early years of political liberalisation a lively interchange arose among local 
elites and foreign counterparts on a wide range of matters pertaining to state 
reconstruction. Such exchanges became more formalised in the run up to the democratic 
elections of 1994. Various interriational fact finding missions were undertaken from 
1990 onwards. Reports produced by such missions were transmitted to the international 
community. For example, in 1990, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) brought 
out a report on violence in Natal and police complicity in it. At the invitation of a local 
network - Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) - the ICJ undertook another visit to South 
Africa in March 1992 and expanded its enquiry into violence and its impact on a peaceful 
settlement. In 1991, Africa Watch of Human Rights Watch published a report titled The 
Killings in South Africa: The Role of the Security Forces and the Response of the State 
(Africa Watch, 1991). It found that there was abundant evidence that the state is 
implicated in the past six years of so-called "black on black" violence and favoured 
Inkatha supporters (p.2). The Dutch Violence Observation Mission (1993) to the Vaal 
II Three shifts were identified: In the first phase assistance was geared toward the legitimation of the 
public police; the second phase refocused attention on capacity-building of the law enforcement machinery 
in response to a crime epidemic. In the third phase assistance had more focused concern with making 
effective 'war' on organised crime in specialist divisions of the secudy establishment. 
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Triangle in South Africa, which again worked in close collaboration with a local network 
(Peace Action), published its report Violence in the Vaal in early 1993 .12 The focus of 
the inquiry was the role of the police in violence in the urban area to the south of 
Johannesburg. The delegation comprised of three Dutch police unions and had as part of 
its objective to provide support to the Police and Prison Officers' Civil Rights Union 
(POPCRU), the then illegal trade union formation active amongst black police officers 
and prison warders. In its recommendations it focused on the need for non-partisan and 
neutral policing, and recommended the creation of effective internal disciplinary 
procedures. Such reports, combined with Amnesty International's annual focus on human 
rights abuses, brought concerted political pressure to bear on the conduct of security 
forces in the early phase of political liberalisation. 
The utilisation of foreign expertise with direct relevance to reform of the policing 
mandate became a feature of the time. Its most explicit utilisation was in the Goldstone 
Commission of Inquiry's investigation into the future regulation of public demonstrations 
(See Heymann, 1992). With regards to this contentious matter, both academic and police 
expertise were deployed to formulate recommendations relevant to a future democratic 
dispensation. The importance of such policy developments in the terrain of public order 
policing can hardly be underestimated. The International Panel provided new terms of 
reference for public order policing based on a triangulated vision of shared responsibility 
between the central state, local autho~ities and the organisers of protest. This issue is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. The guidelines developed by the International 
Panel formed the basis for new legislation in the field of public order policing. Following 
on from this development was the subsequent creation of a training programme for 
'marshals' aimed at building community capacity to regulate public demonstrations . The 
utilisation of foreign policing expertise was again a feature of this training initiative. 
Lastly, there was the Waddington (1992) investigation, under the auspices of the 
Goldstone Commission, into the events surrounding the Boipatong massacre in July 1992 
in which forty-two people were killed. There were persistent rumours that the police had 
12 This was a joint initiative undertaken by Dutch police unions, the Association of senior police, and the 
Anti-Apartheid Movement in the Netherlands. 
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had a hand in the lethal conflict between Inkatha and the African National Congress 
(ANC) supporters. The utilisation of British policing expertise to investigate such 
allegations of police complicity was itself necessitated by widespread public distrust in 
the local police. As such the Waddington Inquiry constituted a confidence-building 
strategy of some significance in the divided context of the time. 13 
The opening up of political space under the National Peace Accord (NPA), the 
key agreement in the transitional process, provided further opportunities for direct field 
engagement in policing on which others also capitalised. fn the run up to the first 
democratic elections, international involvement in security extended to international 
monitoring as a direct response to the adoption of Resolution 772 by the United Nations 
Security Council (17 August 1992). Various observer missions were deployed under the 
auspices of the European Union (EU), the Commonwealth, and the United Nations (UN). 
fn some of the missions, police experts played a pivotal role . To varying degrees such 
international monitors interacted with local police contingents as they went on their daily 
business of regulating 'order' in the fractious environment of the time. The police 
observers became important conduits of democratic policing principles in the day-to-day / 
practical engagement with locai police on the ground. 
United Nations observers were to be deployed in South Africa in support of the 
work of NPA structures. The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Mission to South 
Africa (1993a), Violence in South A/rica, raised general impressions around the 
debilitating impact of violence on the prospects for successful negotiations, considered 
the role of Peace Accord Structures, and noted the need for reform of the criminal justice 
system and the police institution. Lastly, there was the initiative to build a peacekeeping 
force that also relied on international policing expertise . This experiment, however, failed 
and the peacekeeping force was disbanded shortly after its inception (Anglin, 1995). 
13 Waddington ' s (1992) report found no convincing evidence of police complicity but he painted a dismal 
picture of a police organisation ill equipped to investigate crime according to basic professional standards . 
[n this regard he came to a damning conclusion about the state of police accountability : '[f these obvious 
failures (of the investigation process) are in any way representative, then they suggest that the SAP is an 
unaccountable police force ... ' [and] that 'systems do not exist for either internal or external accountability' 
(p.43-44). 
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After 1994, developmental assistance in aid of institutional reform of the police 
expanded significantly, creating many opportunities for close interaction and an exchange 
of policing ideas, operational methods and institutional systems. Developmental aid was 
brought to bear on a wide front. It targeted many layers of the police organisation . And to 
varying degrees it brought political credibility, financial assistance, modem technology 
and technical expertise to the police agency. Aid had a wide range of objectives in mind: 
bestowing credibility on reformist efforts; changing mind-sets and cultural habits; 
modernising systems; professional ising conduct; and providing institutional hardware. 
By the late 1990s a more regional approach to policing reform emerged, with South 
Africa in a position to play a key role in reform of police agencies in the Southern 
African region . The creation of transnational institutions within the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) region - of which the Southern African Regional 
Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO) and the Interpol Sub-Bureau are 
two important examples - also facilitated a more regional approach to the development of 
policing policy. In the latter structures police elites themselves emerged as important 
channels for the diffusion of ideas and systems responsive to the crime demands of the 
region. 
This brief discussion provides a background against which institutional conduits 
of democratic policing ideas and modem policing practices could be identified. 
International policing experts and observers, local policy elites, NGOs (both local and 
international), academics, development agencies, consultants, private industry and others 
were all active in the debate. An exhaustive analysis of all these influences is hardly 
feasible in a work of this nature. For the purpose of this thesis, the following three case 
studies were selected, for a variety of reasons to be later elucidated. 
1.9 Three case studies: scholars, policy entrepreneurs, and the international 
development community 
Chapter 2 first turns to a consideration of the role of the community of policing 
scholars - both local and international - in the conceptualisation of police reform and on 
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the application of competing models for the practical project of police restructuring. In 
the discussion it is noted that, in the space of a decade and a half, policing studies in 
South Africa have grown quite spectacularly. The field now generates a steady stream of 
commentaries, policy proposals, conference papers, research reports and peer-reviewed 
scholarly publications on a wide range of issues. The situation prevailing at present - both 
in terms of the depth and breadth of policing studies - stands in sharp contrast to the past. 
In this review of the policing literature, four models of policing reform are identified as 
relevant to a consideration of the competing ways in which the agenda for police reform, 
both conceptually and normatively, were constructed. Through a consideration of a 
number of core texts that appeared since the late 1980s, the interplay between foreign and 
local scholars in setting a framework for post-Apartheid police reform is illustrated. 
Furthermore, South African experiences attest to the policy relevance of intellectual ideas 
as a function of the collaborative networks that have long existed between academics and 
political elites . 
The second structure of importance for this discussion is an interim policy 
mechanism, the National Police Board, which was created in terms of the NPA in 1992, 
finaily dissolving in December 1994. Cast in the mould of a national policy advisory 
structure consisting of civilian and police representatives, the Board focused its 
deliberations on a number of strategic priorities relevant to the quest for policy reform. 
Such priorities included: the restructuring of police training; the creation of mechanisms 
of oversight and revising the police complaints systems; adopting the doctrine of, and 
creating practices associated with, community policing. In the early period of political 
reform, the Board constituted a forum through which new policing concepts from both 
international and local sources flowed, receiving at least a polite audience from the senior 
police officials present, and sometimes leading to significant innovations in practice. In 
doing so the Board assisted in setting the agenda for police reform in specific ways. Over 
a short space of time it forged for itself an institutional identity and relied for political 
credibility on the access it enjoyed both to inner-ANC political circles, NPA structures, 
and established civil society organisations, as well as reformist fragments of the police 
elite. During its short existence the Board contributed towards the institutionalisation of 
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the principle of international assistance in the reform of the police organisation. It 
exploited the opportunities for exchanging ideas in the international market place, 
emulated foreign models, and utilised foreign expertise. 
Chapter 3 of the thesis undertakes a critical review of the activities and broader 
role of the Police Board (a hitherto neglected institution within the police reform 
literature) . The review attempts to demonstrate the intimate reliance on international 
policing ideas and practices by local policy elites as a way of mobilising support for, and 
directing energies toward, the reform of the former authoritarian police institution. 
Innovative strategies based on elite networking also proved successful for setting the 
agenda of police reform. This chapter describes the context in which it operated and the 
constraints, both infrastructural and social, with which it had to contend. It considers in 
some detail the various ways in which the Board capitalised on whatever opportunities 
for debating policy priorities in the area of police reform. Part of the success of the Board 
can be ascribed to it being an institutional cog in much larger social machinery that had 
the radical reform of the repressive police institution at heart. In a way the Board acted 
as a location within which diverse views - drawn from different interest communities 
such as the scholarly, political, civil society and practitioners - could be considered. 
Specifically, the Board was instrumental in formulating the policy terms of reference for 
police accountability, police training and strategic planning. Such police frameworks 
facilitated to a greater or lesser degree the agenda for actual reform that the new policing 
elite came to pursue after April 1994. 
A third conduit for internationally acclaimed models and ideas regarding crime 
and its control involves the international development community. In the post-Cold War 
environment in particular, developmental agencies have come to constitute an important 
channel for liberal ideas about the governance of security, and the democratisation of 
policing in post-conflict environments. Chapters 4 to 7 of the thesis deal with this aspect. 
In chapter 4 the discussion takes stock of the contemporary debates on good governance 
and security sector reform, and the role of developmental agencies in transferring ideas, 
mechanisms and operational know-how to police agencies in developing contexts and in 
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post-conflict settings. The concepts of good governance and security sector reform are 
probed and the conceptual and political controversies outlined. The discussion then 
moves on to take a look at developmental efforts in the area of police reform in South 
Africa. 
Against this broad background the discussion then focuses to a consideration of 
select examples of donor involvement in South African police reform. Three case studies 
of donor aid to the SAP are discussed in some detail: donor assistance in aid of the 
reform of basic training of police recruits as a point of leverage for affecting cultural 
change within a former paramilitary police organisation (Chapter 5); donor assistance 
aimed at improving safety and security (Chapter 6) and law enforcement capacity through 
a multi-levelled intervention in the Eastern Cape; and donor assistance for improvement 
of 'service delivery' within the police organisation informed by the paradigm of 
managerial ism and the spirit of public sector reform (Chapter 7). This sample of donor-
assisted policing projects is analysed so as to arrive at a number of observations regarding 
the role of the foreign development sector in the processes of policy transfer and policy 
diffusion. In each of the case studies, the discussion identifies the conceptual terms of ' 
reference which guided each project, the actors involved, the networks mobilised, the 
respective motivations and interests at play, and the obstacles negotiated along the way of 
organisational reform. 
1.10 Conclusion 
Western scholars have noted growing similarities in criminal justice discourse, policy, 
and practices in the era of late modernity. Such similarities, it has been argued, have 
been forged through structural processes associated with post-industrialism and/or late 
modernity. More recently there has been recognition of the need to complement such 
structural analyses of policy convergence with empirical investigations into the actual 
politics and logistics of transfer, emulation, modelling and lesson drawing. This 
recognition has contributed to an exploration of the role of social agencies in the 
'shuttling' of ideas (Marenin, 2005) from one locale to another. It is this conceptual 
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framework that will be overlaid on the recent history of South African police reform. 
Through this superimposition, the interaction between local and international ideas will 
be explored in an attempt to respond to a challenge raised by Jones and Newburn 
(2002a), that what is required is much more nuanced policy histories aimed at examining 
institutional conduits for reformist policing ideas, the conceptual paradigms utilised, the 
strategies invoked, and the social alliances created in pursuit of policy reform. Such 
explorations are necessary in order to arrive at an understanding of the relationship 
between agency and structure in policy making (Jones & Newburn, 2002a). 
Consideration will be given to a wide range of situational factors that shape the outcomes 
of any particular set of reformist endeavours. Whether local policing policies and 
operational practices will approximate 'global best practices' thus remains an open 
question rather than a foregone conclusion. 
1.11 A note on the methodology employed in this study 
The data collection methods on which this thesis relies were diverse and, in some 
regards, eclectic. The eclecticism was a function of the fact that research was conducted 
over a period of ten years and involved a variety of projects in which I participated in 
different capacities. For example: In some instances my primary role was that of detached 
researcher interested in gathering factual knowledge about practices of 'monitoring' 
police in action and the role of external agencies in this regard. As a consultant I was paid 
to undertake evaluations of donor-funded projects such as the Basic Level Training Pilot 
Programme (BL TPP). As a participating member of an interim policy mechanism, the 
National Police Board, which was designed to provide advice on policing matters in the 
early period of political transition, I kept a diary of my observations during the monthly 
meetings of the Board in the hope that I could utilise those observations for research 
purposes at some later point. 
In compiling this thesis I thus put old research to new use, drawing rather freely 
on the research findings that I had accumulated during the course of a decade and that 
formed the basis of a number of project evaluation reports to funding agencies. This may 
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records included minutes of monthly meetings, submissions of the various sub-
groups of the Police Board, security briefings by the SAP to members of the 
Board, as well as letters of correspondence between the Board and various other 
structures (Minister of Police, National Peace Structures and NGOs). Such 
documentary material provided the factual data from which detailed observations 
about the activities of the Board, as interim policy mechanism involved in debates 
on police reform, could be formulated. 
The minutes and submissions of other structures such as the Police Policy Group 
(PPG) also proved useful for purposes of reconstructing the role of networks 
which develop in the space where academic debates begin to inform advocacy on 
future police arrangement. The PPG comprised a small think tank with a political 
allegiance to the ANC, and it utilised its research expertise to inform policy 
debates in ANC circles. It helped to create a forum for debate in ANC circles, 
disseminated information on critical areas of reform, and helped frame strategic 
questions for policy. As such it played an agenda-setting and networking role in 
an admittedly small but influential circle of the ANC. 
Other documentary sources utilised during the course of this research included 
policy documents that emanated from the SAP, the SAPS, the Ministry of Safety 
and Security, a number of crime policies, as well as parliamentary debates on the 
challenges confronting the public police agency. 
For the three examples (Chapter 5, 6 and 7) of donor assisted projects profiled in 
this thesis, project-specific documents constituted a further critical source of 
information. The negotiation of access to such primary documents often proved to 
be time-consuming and frustrating. In some instances access to documentation 
was secured as part of a contractual involvement in the evaluation of donor-
funded projects. Unlimited access to all documentation of the support structures 
involved in the restructuring of basic police training, for example, was secured by 
the Training Evaluation Group (of which I was a member) with the backing of the 
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British Development Division South Africa. Access to documentary material 
relevant to Chapters 6 and 7 was negotiated directly with the research division of 
the SAPS. In the latter instance however, the permission granted for access was 
more restricted, and excluded some interim-reports, for example. Again, each 
chapter contains reference to the documentary material utilised, the constraints on 
access and issues relating to confidentiality. 
lnterviews: Face to face interviews were conducted with members of policy 
constituencies involved in policy reform during the course of different research 
projects. So, for example, the transcriptions of interviews conducted with 
international monitors and police advisors attached to a number of monitoring 
structures in the run-up to the first democratic elections in 1994, were re-
examined during the course of writing up this thesis. In addition, transcriptions of 
interviews with aid agencies and recipients of aid in the criminal justice system 
compiled during 1998-9 and again in 2002-3, again served as background material 
for understanding the context within which lesson drawing, elite networking, and 
policy transfer may take place. 
The observations recorded during a focus-group interview in 1995 with a group of 
eighteen international advisors involved in the BLTPP of 1995, too served as 
background material for analysing, from b0th structural and agency-led 
perspectives, aspects of transfer, emulation, and copying in the process of 
restructuring basic police training. 
During the process of writing up the thesis l conducted a number of further 
interviews with key actors in policy formation and implementation. These 
meetings included face to face interviews with five ex-members of the Police 
Board; two members of the civilian policy elite who occupied central positions in 
the newly established Ministry of Safety and Security shortly after its formation in 
1994; and five project managers who had intimate knowledge of the 
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implementation of the sample of three donor assisted projects discussed in this 
thesis. 
Participant observation and field notes: The description of the role of the National 
Police Board also relied on participant observations conducted during my stint as 
a civilian member of the Board between 1993 and 1994. At the time, I kept some 
field notes on the nature of social interaction between members and groupings 
within the Board, the contentious issues which arose during the course of the 
Board's existence, the unfolding of administrative relations, and the impact of 
political processes on the tone and substance of the Board's proceedings. Almost 
ten years after their compilation, the notes helped to put the formalised record of 
proceedings found in the institutional minutes and submissions into a more 
interactive context. Regular attendance of meetings of the Multi-Implementation 
Team (MIT), and strategic planning sessions of structures such as the Field 
Training Advisors involved in the implementation of a new curriculum for Basic 
Level Training, also served as a social laboratory for reflecting on the micro-
politics of police-to-police developmental assistance. 
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Chapter 2 
Conceptual Paradigms for Police Reform in South Africa: 
Scholarly Debates, 1980-2005 
2.1 Introduction 
During South Africa's recent political transition, local opinion benefited from an 
unprecedented exposure to international policing debates. There were many sources contributing 
to a lively exchange of policing ideas. So, for example, the deployment of international monitors 
(amongst who were police advisors) provided one avenue for the diffusion of concepts and 
practical know-how to the project of police reform. Following hard on the heels of these 
personnel were a number of international policing scholars who participated - often in 
collaborative fashion - with local researchers in a wide range of conferences, workshops, policy 
forums, and/or community-based projects. All of these activities contributed in one way or the 
other to the setting of the agenda for police reform in South Africa. 
Of particular relevance to this chapter is the way in which one particular 'regime 
community,' ie the community of scholars, brought various theoretical models and policy ideas 
to bear on the debate, and the actual business of police reform in the 1990s. The conscious 
diffusion of intellectual ideas on police reform took on an interactive format involving both 
local-to-international and international-to-Iocal borrowing and exchange. This chapter identifies 
the different paradigms in terms of which policing reform became conceptualised. Four 
paradigms or models of police reform are identified: the colonial model, the liberal-democratic 
model, the governance model, and the transitional model. In the discussion below, the defining 
features of each paradigm and its main proponents will be outlined, and the policy implications 
for the reform of the Apartheid police highlighted. But before doing so, some brief discussion of 
the field of police studies prior to the 1990s is necessary, as it set the scene for oppositional ideas 
to emerge once political transition provided new spaces for intellectual exchanges about the 
future of pol icing. 
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2.2 Background to the new South African policing studies: From police science to 
critical policing studies 
2.2.1 Police science: conservative police studies and international isolation 
Fifteen years ago, one could count the number of serious academic writings on the SAP 
on the fingers of one and a half hands. This dearth of critical analysis and empirical engagement 
was a function of a number of factors. First, the conceptual parameters within which 'police 
science' (as it became labelled) developed at tertiary institutions, such as the University of South 
Africa (UNISA), were extremely narrow. With a captive audience of police practitioners readily 
at hand, police science occupied itself either with abstract concepts divorced from the reality of 
the South African context (for instance, 'the police role in society'), or with issues of narrow 
technical relevance to the police institution. Altogether absent from its concerns was a socio-
political contextualisation of policing under apartheid. 
Until the mid-1980s, academic engagement with the police institution and its role in 
South African society was confined to a group of mostly Afrikaner academics, located at the 
Universities of Pretoria and South Africa. There was a very concrete reason for this situation. 
Ambitious police officials gained promotion in large part by passing accredited examinations. 
For officers, a university degree was particularly desirable. Long accustomed to servicing the 
needs of the upper, largely white, ranks of the civil service, the Universities of South Africa 
(UNISA) and Pretoria respectively offered tailor-made correspondence and extra-mural courses 
in criminology and 'police science' for police officials unable to enrol as full-time students. 
Particularly prominent in this were academics at UNISA's Department of Police Science, where 
Professor T J van Heerden was a leading figure in the institutionalisation of police science as an 
academic discipline. His Inleiding tat die Palisiekunde (1976) was, in the author's own words in 
the preface to the English version (Van Heerden, 1986), 'the first scientific publication on pol ice 
science to appear in South Africa.' Influenced on the one hand by the American tradition of 
police science, the work also embodied the apolitical, positivistic style of exposition so 
characteristic of criminology offered at Afrikaans-medium universities at the time. Little contact 
with South African reality was made in chapters that ranged from the evolution of policing in 
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general to traffic control. Tailored to the concerns of police practitioners, this version of police 
science existed largely in a social vacuum. In the highly politicised context of the time, it was a 
travesty of science (Scharf, 1990). Nor did a voluminous 'history' of the police compiled by 
Dippenaar (1988) as a commemorative album in celebration of the 75 th anniversary of the SAP, 
satisfy the demands for a balanced historical analysis of the evolution of policing in twentieth 
century South Africa. Written from the vantage point of an insider socialised in the discourse of 
state security, Dippenaar's history amounted to no more than an ethnocentric and self-
congratulatory account of the evolution of the SAP (Van der Spuy, 1990). 
Another factor of importance in the underdevelopment of policing studies was the issue of 
limited research access. Under apartheid, access to the institutions of coercive rule - such as the 
police and prisons - was curtailed by various exclusionary rules (Slab bert, 1985). The scope for 
academic inquiry was thus severely restricted. But for those with ties to the regime, it was 
possible to negotiate access on the basis of ethnic solidarity - a situation that encouraged the 
growth of a neutered and one-sided research enterprise, and the proliferation of service courses 
aimed at police professionals. In combination, political restrictions on conducting research, and 
sharp ideological polarisation within the academic community, as well as the international 
isolation of academia before the mid-1980s, inhibited the development of an indigenous tradition 
of policing studies true to the criteria of balanced academic enquiry. 
With the regime crisis of the mid-1980s, matters began to change. And from the early 
1990s onwards, the growth of policing studies has been fuelled by the imperatives of political 
transition. The opportunity to set the agenda for police reform has acted as a stimulus for a wider 
debate on the future of policing more generally. 
2.2.2 Borrowing from abroad: The rise of critical policing studies in the 1980s 
A direct engagement with the political relationships between police, state and society in 
the settler colony eventually emerged from writers opposed to the racial status quo so readily 
accepted by the police scientists. During the 1980s a group of academics, legal activists and 
paralegal service providers, adhering more or less to a tradition of critical scholarship, began to 
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turn their attention to the police of the apartheid state. Drawing on the broad framework for a 
critical criminology, first explicated in Davis and Slabbert's (1985) Crime and Power in South 
Africa, the core ideas revolved around the political economy of crime generally, and the coercive 
instrumentality of the police as the guardians of white interests in the racial oligarchy more 
specifically. 
These early critical commentators entered the debate under conditions of heated political 
contestation, as successive states of emergency were declared from 1985 onwards, and additional 
powers bestowed on the security forces to quell growing resistance from opponents of apartheid. 
On the country's borders and inside the townships, the police were deployed as the first line of 
defence of state security as never before. In this period of the country's history they became, 
very visibly, the storm troopers of the racial state. It was within this context then that the politics 
and logistics of policing an embattled state became a subject of local academic debate. Two 
examples of a new critical literature on the police stand out: the special edition of the law 
journal, Acta Juridica, published in 1989, and the collection of essays edited by Hansson and 
Van Zyl Smit entitled Towards Justice? Crime and State Control in South Africa that appeared 
in 1990. Both the legal and criminological analyses contained in these volumes sought to expose 
state lawlessness and the abuse of power through police action. Together these works marked an 
important phase in the diversification of local policing studies, borrowing ideas in particular 
from the influential British school of critical criminology and the emerging branch of critical 
police studies (Hall et al., 1978). 
A number of themes were central in the critical police studies of this period. First was the 
emphasis in both publications on the politicisation of policing from the late 1970s onwards. 
Though a full account of the slide to highly repressive policing beyond the rule of law dating 
back to the 1950s has still to be written, this trend was not new. But the pace of change certainly 
increased after the Soweto uprisings of 1976. From that date onwards, the SAP came to operate 
more and more on the model of 'high' political policing, so prominent a feature of police 
behaviour in other authoritarian contexts (Brodeur, 1983). Explorations of the habits of mind 
operative within the police subculture in the context of grand Apartheid captured ~the 
ethnocentric worldview of the uniformed men (Van der Spuy, 1990). This emphasis on the 
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inherently political role and repressive dynamics of policing was a distinctive feature of local 
debates at the time. As such, the critical perspective stood in sharp contrast to the apolitical 
approach characteristic of Afrikaner police science. 
A second feature of policing captured in several detailed descriptive studies was the 
paramilitary style of public order policing. Examination of the operational strategies underlying 
public order policing yielded crucial insights into the coercive methods of crowd control used by 
the SAP in the late 1980s (Haysom, 1989). The routine use of lethal force (Haysom, 1987; 
Hansson, 1989), encouraged by a legally permissive regime, also underlined the degeneration of 
an institution supposedly committed to the protection of the community at large. Despite 
limitations on direct access to the police organisation, journalists and academics also began to 
breach the curtain of official denial with examinations of the subcultural dynamics of police 
violence. On this score, Steytler's (1990) exploration of the militarist ethos~hat shaped cop 
culture (and its side effects) deserves particular mention. Other valiant attempts (Haysom, 1990; 
Laurence, 1990) were also made to bring to light the activities of state-sanctioned hit squads, 
whose existence was widely rumoured throughout the late 1980s, although conclusive proof of 
their involvement in maintaining minority rule had to await the political breakthroughs of the 
1990s (see Coleman, 1998). But .state terror had other faces too, and the torture of political 
detainees became the subject of a detailed investigation by a team of researchers based at the 
University of Cape Town (UCT) (Foster, Davis & Sandler, 1987). The publication of their 
findings provoked harsh governmental criticism. 
A third characteristic of policing highlighted in this early phase of research was the 
increasing reliance by the state on agencies other than the public police for the purposes of 'order 
maintenance.' A number of publications focused on growth in the subcontracting of state 
repression through the use of shadow forces. So, for example, inquiries into state-sponsored 
vigilantism (Haysom, 1986; 1990; Fine, 1989; Black Sash, 1988; Catholic Institute of 
International Relations, 1988) examined the role of a variety of surrogate forces in fomenting 
violence amongst political opponents of the apartheid regime. These accounts captured the extent 
to which the dirty work of the white state was increasingly being carried out by black quasi-
mercenary formations. These case studies also provided telling examples of the extent to which 
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the apartheid state was prepared to forfeit its monopoly over the deployment of coercive force in 
order to protect state security. 14 
Thus, in that last convulsive phase of ethnic rule, the emerging discipline of policing 
studies engaged in rich descriptive terms with the crisis of social control in a dying political 
order and the repressive mechanisms (both within and outside state) spawned in the process. 
From this account it should be clear that the substantive concerns of critical policing studies on 
the left (repressive policing, state-sponsored terror and the systemic use of torture) had little in 
common with the topics pursued in police science on the right. The ideological fault line ran 
wide and deep, marking out those sympathetic to the police from their often outspoken critics. 
Much like the wider field of criminology, the study of police and policing bore the imprint of 
political division and ideological cleavage. 
2.3 Apartheid policing: Colonialism of a (special) type? 
Necessary corrective to the apolitical certainties of police science though it was, critical 
opposition to developments in policing under grand apartheid often lacked both historical depth 
and a proper appreciation of comparative context. To take the second of these points first, the 
SAP were not alone in their penchant for the truncheon (or, in the case of riot police in the later 
years of apartheid, the indigenous sjambok 1\ and it was not only in South Africa that the 
political leadership of an embattled or unpopular minority regime were using and abusing their 
police to cling to power and enforce a fragile civil peace. Appropriately enough, one of the first 
writers to argue this was John Brewer (1990) of Queen's University in Belfast, who drew 
attention to common patterns in the policing of ethnically 'divided societies' such as Israel, 
Northern Ireland and South Africa. In this seminal piece, Brewer succeeded in extrapolating 
generic features of policing and of the police institution in divided societies. As we shall see in a 
moment, Brewer's work was only the first of many comparative studies of policing in 
14 [n later years, this reliance by the state on a range of coercive formations to buttress Apartheid rule, was taken as 
long-standing local proof of the international trend (from the 1990s onwards) toward diversification in the policing 
field . 
I; A horsewhip . 
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communally divided societies. The upshot of Brewer's political analysis was to make reform of 
the police institution dependent on a political dissolution of ethnic sectarianism and social strife. 
Brewer's identification of structural features of policing under conditions of an ethnic autocracy 
provided an obvious agenda for reform of the police organisation to suit the imperatives of a 
non-racial constitutional order. 
To those with a longer historical view of policing, apartheid police practice was but one, 
albeit distinctive, example of a broader phenomenon referred to in one influential body of 
analysis as 'colonial policing' (Brogden, 1987). This colonial model was seen as a direct 
outcome of the need for imperial powers to impose order on recalcitrant subject popUlations 
across the colonised world in the first half of the twentieth century. The salient feature of this 
model was centralised paramilitary police formations, for which 'normal' policing was 
subsidiary to the task of controlling the subordinate masses beyond the magic circle of the 
colonisers. With internal security and the maintenance of public order as their core functions, 
crime control was relegated to the margins of the police mandate. Perceived by the 'natives' as 
an alien force representing the political authority of the colonial power, police-community 
relations were distinctly adversarial. In terms of both structure and function, the colonial model 
was considered the antithesis of the kind of democratic policing prevalent in the mature 
metropolitan democracies, with its normative emphasis on the rule of law and policing by social 
consent. 
By the early 1990s, many observers saw the coming democratic transition in South Africa 
as a natural opportunity to abolish colonial rule and the militarism inherent in neo-colonial 
apartheid policing by refashioning the SAP into a community-friendly organisation enjoying 
popular legitimacy. For this endeavour, the philosophy of community policing based on a 
partnership agreement between the police and the people appeared especially attractive. To 
embrace a constitutional future, nothing short of a switch from a para-military, repressive police 
force to a civilian and community-orientated police service was required. 16 
16 Some of the brighter hopes however, rested on rather facile assumptions about the ease with which a repressive 
bureaucracy like the SAP could be reformed. Local scholars were not alone in underestimating the complexities of 
the process for, even in international circles, the colonial dimension of policing was ill understood. The difficulties 
of crafting consensual policing principles on the institutional and cultural relics of a paramilitary model of policing 
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The straightforward depiction of Apartheid policing as colonial proved politically 
popular. That is despite some warnings from intellectual quarters that, as the South African 
experience amounted to 'colonialism of a special type,' a historical appraisal of policing in this 
colony should reveal that its history 'is unique' (Brogden, 1989:2). The warnings of Mike 
Brogden, the British policing scholar were, however, not heeded. In much the same vein, 
Annette Seegers' (1991) depiction of twentieth century South African policing history as the 
(uneasy) co-existence and articulation of three models of policing (authoritarian, totalitarian and 
liberal) in one state failed to inform the discussion on the challenges confronting police reform in 
the post-colony. 
With regards to the emergence of a historically substantive narrative on policing, two 
publications that appeared in the early 1990s attempted to put policing in South Africa in a more 
respectable historical perspective than was hitherto the case. John Brewer's Black and Blue: 
Policing in South Africa (1994) contained a thick historical account of the making of twentieth 
century South African policing. In this work he took issue, with the conventional critical 
depiction of it as a more or less undiluted form of colonial policing. According to Brewer, both 
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the dynamics of settler colonialism, and the particular brand of racial rule pursued under 
apartheid, rendered police-state relations more varied than has been recognised by most 
commentators. By adopting an historical perspective, Brewer was also able to capture the 
contradictory pressures of repression and reform to which the police institution had been subject 
long before the 1990s. In addition, Brewer (1994:344) also directly engaged with the 'relative 
autonomy' of the SAP vis-a-vis the state and considered the implications for police reform. The 
subtleties of his argument were again lost in the optimism of the political moment. 17 
Compared to the breadth of Brewer's historical analysis, Gavin Cawthra's Policing South 
were indeed underestimated. An appreciation of the challenges confronting police reform in post-colonial Africa 
only emerged towards the tail end of the 1990s, and only then when many of the taken-for-granted assumptions 
about colonial policing, its unilinearity and uniformity, were carefully scrutinised and found , in some respects, to be 
wanting (Hills, 1996; Cole, \999). And so it came that the model of colonial policing had considerable rhetorical 
appeal but lacked, on closer scrutiny, theoretical substance. 
17 Although it suffers from a lack of detailed archival research that subsequent scholars will surely wish to make 
good, Brewer's account remains the most authoritative twentieth century history of the police in South Africa 
available. 
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Africa: The SAP and the Transition from Apartheid (1993) offered a more focused account of the 
post-1976 period of regime politics. Here the impact of the rounter-insurgency war (both on the 
borders and inside the townships) on the security establishment is considered, and the slide from 
legalised repression to extra-legal suppression documented in some detail. Cawthra's description 
of the 'nexus of forces' on which the maintenance of' law and order' came to depend in the late 
1970s and 1980s emphasised both the diversity and the fragmented nature of the machinery of 
social contro\.'8 Looking forward to a new democratic era, he anticipated that the fortunes of 
police reform would be shaped by broader societal changes and concluded that: 
[I]n the end the successful transformation of policing in South Africa will entail not 
merely changes to the police force and to the way it interacts with society, but to the 
political, social and economic conditions which are the poisonous legacy of apartheid 
(Cawthra, 1993:204). . 
In touching in this way on the challenges facing reform of South African policing, 
Cawthra followed the lead provided by Brewer (1993-: 197), who had also insisted on an 
appreciation of what he called the 'structural cap(s)' on police reform. Unfortunately, however, 
such caveats - realistic as they were - failed to gain much of an audience amidst the euphoria 
surrounding the impending introduction of majority rule. As the stream of policy statements 
intended to direct the restructuring of the apartheid state grew into a flood, arguments about the 
structural constraints on police reform and the formative impact of broader social conditions on 
its trajectory were all too easily ignored. As a consequence, far too little attention was paid to the 
financial, political and social obstacles to sweeping reform of the police organisation. Only later 
were the challenges that the South African situation posed to police reform properly appreciated. 
The depiction of South African policing under Apartheid as essentially approximating the 
model of colonial policing proved politically attractive. On the one hand it resonated with the 
visible features of policing as partisan and essentially paramilitary, the overt reliance on force, its 
systemic inclination toward abuse of police power, and the mentality of siege so characteristic of 
its cop culture. In the context of political transition, the sharp juxtaposition of the colonial past 
18 This 'nexus of forces' included the SAP, specialist police divisions such as the security branch and riot squads, 
homeland police forces, a number of black and white auxiliary formations, the private security industry, and a wide 
range of self-help agencies and vigi lante groupings operating under the command of local strongmen. 
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and the liberal future of the armed formations under a constitutional democracy suited the 
demands for an altogether new approach. 
2.4 Liberal democracy and the model of community policing 
The unbanning of the liberation movem~nts in 1990 marked a turning point in South 
African politics and its system of policing. In a remarkable speech by the then South African 
President F W de Klerk to an audience of its highest ranking officials, the SAP were instructed to 
take on a totally new role (Cawthra, 1993: 131). No longer the ring of steel surrounding a 
beleaguered state, the force was to break free of its past, embrace new democratic principles of 
accountability, impartiality and respect for human rights, and reorient its institutional objectives 
to prioritise the fight against crime and the protection of citizen security. Academic observers 
were quick to elaborate on the implications of this change in direction. Scholarly works 
published in this period heralded the new phase in policing studies that was to accompany the 
transition to constitutional rule. Characteristic of this new phase became its almost unquestioning 
reliance on the liberal democratic model of policing - with particular reference to British 
traditions. 
The first example of this new genre was a volume entitled Policing the Conflict in South 
Africa edited by Mathews, Heymann and Mathews, published in 1993. It consisted of an eclectic 
mix of papers delivered at a groundbreaking conference held the previous year and attended by 
both international and local representatives, to address the 'contentious, if not explosive' issue of 
policing in South Africa (Ibid: I). A newfound receptivity in local debates to international 
influences and ideas was very much in evidence throughout the volume. For comparative insight, 
the conference drew on recent developments in police reform in the UK, the USA and (closer to 
home) in Namibia. During the two days of deliberations recorded by Mathews, Heymann and 
Mathews (1993), the emphasis was on key principles. Appropriate policies to guide police 
reform in the future and general issues relating to the role, structure, control, accountabi lity and 
composition of the police organisation were all carefully considered. From such discussions it 
became apparent that the model of liberal-democratic policing was destined to exert a persuasive 
influence over police reform. Two principles of the liberal-democratic model were emphasised: 
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policing in terms of the 'rule of law', and 'policing by consent.,19 As a consequence, discussions 
on police reform focused on the principles and structures of oversight and accountability on the 
one hand, and the desirability of institutional ising a community-orientated form of policing on 
the other. 
A retrospective assessment of these discussions on police reform in the period 1990-95 
reveals a comfortable consensus on the critical features of the post-apartheid police. One typical 
example of the conventional template for police reform, put forward during these years, is the 
American scholar, Ron Weitzer's (1993) commentary on Transforming the South African Police. 
Like much of the literature of the time Weitzer insisted on the necessity for change in the role, 
orientation and structure of the police to be achieved by revamping the organisation's mission 
and subcultural ethos, redesigning its mechanisms of accountability, and attending to police-
community relations. 
Across the international-national divide, a broader social consensus was emerging around 
the agenda for police reform in South Africa: instilling the principles of human rights, oversight 
and community-responsive pol icing. Proof of the salience of these principles is to be found in 'its 
legal institutionalisation in the Interim Constitution of 1993 and thereafter in the Police Services 
Act of 1995. 
A specific feature of policing debates on either side of the 1994 elections was the extent 
to which the notion of community policing enjoyed widespread support. Its distinctive features 
and political virtues were discussed from the podiums of academic conferences, various policy 
bosberade and regional workshops alike. One of the most substantive of academic explorations 
of the model of community policing and its suitability to local context was to be found in an 
appraisal by Marais (1992a). Beyond the surface appearance of consensus, different 
constituencies of course understood community policing in very different ways. These 
differences ranged from state- to civil-centred notions of community policing (Dixon, 2004c). 
But an essential part of the attractiveness of the concept lay in its elasticity of meaning - allowing 
different parties to congregate under its banner. At the time of South African experiments in 
19 See in this regard the recent review of Bowling el at. (2004) on policing refonn and human rights. 
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constructing the future model of policing, the doctrine of community policing enjoyed near 
hegemonic status in Anglo-Saxon policing circles. The latter was the very reference group to 
which reform-minded South Africans were looking for both intellectual and political inspiration 
in crafting policing arrangements in a new political order. By the mid-1990s the model of 
community policing, with its emphasis on social partnerships and organisational decentralisation, 
had become a commodity for import with detailed instructions for implementation. 
In the transitional context of South Africa, the symbolic appeal of community-based 
policing was obvious enough. Here at least was an approach that recognised the virtues of 
policing rooted in the 'organic community' of 'the people.' Its normative desirability and 
institutional effectiveness seemed unquestionable (Wood & Font, forthcoming). Clearly it was 
the diametrical opposite of the colonial legacy of policing imposed and controlled by a sectarian 
minority from above. A more critical disposition towards community policing, and the 
philosophy of communitarianism on which it relies, only developed towards the end of the 1990s 
(PeIser, 1999; Peiser, Schnetler & Louw, 2002). A more recent analysis has argued that 
community policing as a doctrine and as a practice in South Africa has been a matter of 
contestation, involving successive distinct phases (Dixon, 2004c). With the benefit of hindsight, 
it is clear that the symbolic appeal of community policing often obscured the fractious nature of 
communities, as well as the lack of institutional capacity within the police at the time to embrace 
the spirit of community policing. In practice the issue of the locus of control (state or 
community) in experiments regarding community policing has been shaped, as Dixon (2004c) 
recently demonstrated, by the ebb and flow of political circumstances and competing interests. 
2.5 The governance of security model 
Amidst growing consensus about the central features of the post-colonial policing system 
and the transfer to South Africa of Western policing models and arrangements, two critical 
voices stood out. The text of relevance here, Policing for a New South Africa (\ 993), was co-
written by two international policing scholars, Mike Brogden and Clifford Shearing, and echoed 
many of the concerns of other writings on the legacy of South Africa's system of policing. Here 
too the emphasis fell on the permissiveness of the legal regime under which the Apartheid police 
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operated; the limitations embedded within its system of political accountability; the systemic 
predisposition to use of violence; the impact of Christian fundamentalism and nationalist 
ideology on police culture, and the resort to surrogate policing agencies to buttress racial rule. In 
its depiction of the future of policing, however, PoliCing fur a New South Africa broke quite 
decisively with the prevailing consensus. And it did so in very explicit terms by raising concerns 
about the centrality of the liberal democratic model of policing and the conventional cloning 
approach to police reform being advocated by various salesmen. 'The West', they retorted, did 
not necessarily know best (Brogden & Shearing, 1993:9). On the contrary, the project of police 
reform had to be conceived in dramatically different terms. 
There were two aspects to this argument. In this first instance, Shearing in particular had 
long argued that international shifts in governance necessitated that the role of the police itself 
had to be reconceptualised. A 'problem-solving' approach had to replace the outdated conception 
of policing as primarily concerned with 'bandit catching.' This particular point was developed 
further in various popular publications distributed under the auspices of the Community Peace 
Foundation of which Shearing was at the time the Director. Furthermore, these two authors 
argued that mere modernisation of the public police was altogether inadequate, indeed passe. 
After all, the structural shifts in policing internationally demanded a dramatic re-
conceptualisation of the terrain policing, its form, content and objectives. The drift toward 
privatisation in the provision of security services, and the resulting pluralisation of policing on 
the ground, had ramifications for the role and responsibilities of the public police.2o In the light 
of such changes, the authors argued, a much broader agenda for the reform of policing as 
opposed to the mere reform of the public police was required (Brogden & Shearing, 1993). The 
broader agenda had to aim at the joint articulation of different sources (public, private and 
20 A further source of the diversification of policing emanated from marh.et forces (Bayley & Shearing, 200 I). Like 
elsewhere in the developed world, the state's role vis-a-vis the provision of security has been augmented by other 
than public agencies. So for example, the private sector had since the 1970s emerged as a key provider of a wide 
range of security services. A consideration of the role of the private sector in the provision of security in South 
Africa introduced a fourth theme into the literature of this first period in the development of policing studies, namely 
the commodi fication of security. Here one contribution in particular is worth noting. In a pioneering investigation 
into private contract policing in South Africa, Grant (1989) captured the extent to which the provision of security 
was becoming commercialised by the late 19805. As a consequence, an increasingly complex division of policing 
labour between the state and private companies was well underway even as state repression reached its height in the 
late 1980s. However, the implications of such diversification for the project of police reform only came to be 
considered much later in the debate. 
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community-based). This was all the more imperative in the South African context where in the , 
face of a hostile and uncaring state, a tradition of self-reliance in the provision of security has 
long taken root amongst the communities of the disenfranchised. 
Against this historical background, Brogden and Shearing (1993) were particularly 
critical of the unreflective reliance in South African debates on the importation of western police 
models to local problems on the one hand, and the missionary impulse on the part of 
developmental agencies to export ready made solutions - hatched in the streets of London and 
Amsterdam - to the policing frontier of the post-colonial periphery. 
In setting the agenda for reform of the field of 'governance of security' more broadly, as 
opposed to the reform of the public police institution more narrowly, Brogden and Shearing 
(1993) favoured a 'dual system of policing'(p.166). This dual system was to be based on a 
creative mix of state provision and home grown indigenous practices of self-policing. The dual 
system of policing contained a much more radical interpretation of community-based policing as 
policing by, and on behalf of, communities. In putting flesh on the skeleton of this proposal, the 
authors drew on some novel suggestions first put forward in 1992 by an International Panel 'of 
Experts, convened on the request of Justice Goldstone, to draft recommendations for the policin'g 
of mass demonstrations. These suggestions later became enshrined in the Regulation of 
Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. The regulatory framework put in place under the terms of this piece 
of legislation gave administrative content to three broad principles. First, the regulation of public 
demonstrations required a collective responsibility to be shared through 'triangles of safety' 
comprised of a demonstration's organisers, the appropriate local authority, and the public police. 
This principle in turn was rooted in a notion of policing as 'everyone's business', as opposed to 
the exclusive prerogative of the public state. Second, ordinary citizens exercising their right of 
protest should be recruited and trained as marshals so as to help fulfil a regulatory function. 
Through this second principle the desirability of 'bottom-up,' lay participation in the regulation 
of order was thus accentuated. A third and last principle on which the recommendations of the 
International Panel relied was that, for the purposes of maintaining public order in the future, the 
police should attempt to playa specialist and minimalist role, specifically with regards to the 
deployment of coercive force. All three of these principles guided the conceptual vision of 
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policing for a new South Africa. 
By challenging the idea of a separate professional police force as an adequate guardian of 
social order, Brogden and Shearing (1993) introduced to South Africa conceptions of policing 
and society that were beginning to catch on in Western crilT'inological circles. Here, the critical 
analysis of the relationship between the 'police' and broader notions of 'policing' problematised 
the narrow institutional focus on the public police to the exclusion of other agencies. Rejecting a 
'back-to-basics' reform of a dysfunctional public police, the work of these two writers has 
remained a focus for debates on alternative policing and social control mechanisms in the new 
South Africa. In the period of reconstruction, however, various factors conspired to dilute the 
broader orientation so carefully theorised in the work of Shearing and his colleagues in favour of 
a much narrower state-centred approach to police reform in South Africa (Shaw & Shearing, 
1998). It is in the fervour of state and police reconstruction that the demand for policy relevance 
would push policing debates into very practical and applied directions. In the process, the more 
conceptual dimensions of the debate were forfeited - at least in the policy circles of criminal 
justice practitioners. 
The ideas developed in the 1993 publication laid the foundations for much of Shearing's 
(200 I a; 200 I b) subsequent development of the governance paradigm in policing. In conclusion, 
South African debates around the governance model of policing have evolved from cautious 
beginnings to a sweeping analytical tool that also engages with the practicalities of future 
policing in very particular ways. Some aspects of the model have guided the reform of South 
African policing, particularly in the contested terrain of public order policing. For the rest, the 
governance model remains to exist on the fringe of the actual business of state-centred police 
reform as pursued over the past decade. 
2.6 State and police reconstruction: the application of conceptual models 
From 1992 onwards, new political space opened up .in civil society after the signing of 
the Peace Accord and the creation of structures such as Local Dispute Resolution Committees 
and the Police Board. Within the state too, new bodies were created to devise and recommend 
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reforms, including the Interim Advisory Committee (lAC) to the newly renamed Ministry of 
Safety and Security, and then, after 1994, the Civilian Secretariat and various departmental task 
teams. Over time a small cadre of researchers-cum-advisors came to wield considerable 
influence over the policy frameworks being devised for constitutional policing. Practical issues 
of critical relevance to the project of police reform dominated the research and policy agenda of 
local commentators? I By the late 1990s, spiralling official crime rates, growing public anxiety 
about safety and security issues, and a good deal of party-political posturing on crime control all 
added to the pressure for feasible police reform. Insufficient attention to the budgetary 
implications of the policy changes envisaged as part of the reform process also contributed to a 
sharp disjuncture between the theory of reform and its implementation. The consequence of all 
these factors was a growing divergence between the visionary hopes of the immediate post-
election period, and the reality of the new policing order that took shape in the second half of the 
1990s. 
The reform agenda itself was also subject to change. For example, by the time South 
Africa's second administration came to office in 1999, the earlier emphasis on legitimacy and 
accountability had given way to a more focused campaign for police effectiveness in the 'battle 
against crime' (Rauch, 2002a). Meanwhile, inside the police bureaucracy, there was a new 
managerialist emphasis on economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The marginalisation of 
civilian oversight structures, such as the civilian secretariat in the Department of Safety and 
Security, and the dilution of early commitments to community participation in policing at local 
level that became evident after 1998, were striking evidence of this trend. Thus, toward the latter 
part of the 1990s, the agenda for institutional reform increasingly tipped in favour of a 
technically orientated modernisation of bureaucratic systems and procedures. It was within this 
situation of complicated and messy institutional realignments that policing research at the turn of 
the century was obliged to operate. 
At the local level policing researchers soon became embroiled In the reality of police 
21 Such concerns ranged from the integration of homeland police forces (Marais, 1992b) to the restructuring of basic 
police training (Rauch, 1992c), the integration of paramilitary formations into state structures (Marks, 1995), the 
creation of mechanisms of police oversight and accountability (Haysom, 1993a), and the institutionalisation of new 
styles of community policing (Jagwanth, 1994; Marais, 1993 ; Rakgoadi, 1995). 
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reform. A review of the prominent research concerns of the period suggests a number of 
distinctive features. The first is the explosion of research interest in policing after 1994, and the 
enormous diversity of the issues that were to receive attention. A second characteristic of this 
period is the overwhelming emphasis on policy-orientated or applied research in the post-1995 
years. This research was driven by an ameliorative desire to boost institutional capacity for crime 
control and crime prevention. For researchers, the demand for 'cutting edge' work with a clear 
practical appl ication meant engaging with the organisational priorities and operational needs of 
criminal justice agencies struggling to contain, let alone resolve, the effects of criminal 
predation. The third distinctive feature of this phase is that police-related research came to draw 
on a burgeoning body of crime data. Both the quality and quantity of crime information 
improved, as the systems and procedures for generating official crime statistics were revamped, 
and alternative methods of data collection (such as victim crime surveys) were employed. The 
wider availability of such crime data led to a much greater appreciation of the complicated crime 
realities facing both the new South African police and its public. As a consequence, the socially 
decontextualised work on police reform, characteristic of earlier periods, gave way to more 
situationally grounded analyses. This weaving together of crime and policing is poignantly 
illustrated in the title of a book by Mark Shaw (2002a), Crime and Policing in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa. 
2.7 Policing in transitional contexts 
Even before 1994, appeals for ' relevance' had pushed some policing research in an 
increasingly administrative direction . Close partnerships with government and implementing 
agencies made for research that could be utilised in support of the development and 
implementation of policy. But by 2000 there were signs that both the social conditions and the 
framework of professional relations within which research is undertaken were changing. 'Policy 
fatigue' tempered the fervour with which some researchers first approached hands-on 
involvement in the work of state reconstruction. A cooling of relations between the police and 
some of the major research institutions also occurred, and there were signs of a growing 
disillusionment with the whole project of policing reform. An early but telling example of this 
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disillusionment is to be found in a commentary on the trajectory of policing reform dating back 
to 1998: 
The central feature of the policing reform process in South Africa is that it has abandoned 
the framework established to guide it and in so doing has lost sight of the fact that a 
fundamental premise of reform was to reduce the insecurity of poor communities through 
creating local policing networks in which the police were not the centre. Policing reform 
designed to improve the security of the whole community has become a police reform 
process that has business and the middle classes as its principal focus (Shaw & Shearing, 
1998: 11). 
It was at this juncture that South African debates on policing began to draw more heavily 
on the burgeoning literature that concerns itself with the wider dilemmas associated with what 
has become known as 'transitional' policing. In the process, a more explicitly normative 
engagement with issues of access, equity and accountability seems to be in the offing. This 
development brings us to a fourth model of policing which, for the sake of convenience, can be 
referred to as the transitional model. 
In the early years of the new century, the mood of debates on pol ice reform has changed 
from creative optimism tinged with a more cautious pragmatism, to a brooding pessimism about 
the challenges ahead. Evidence emerging from other post-authoritarian settings suggests that 
South African experiences concerning the intractability of policing reform (both in its state and 
non-state modalities) are not unique. Comparative analysis of experiments in police reform from 
Latin America to Eastern Europe points to a remarkable number of structural commonalities 
associated with 'transitional' policing, though the concept itself continues to be used in a rather 
loose kind of way. Increasingly, references to the dilemmas confronting 'transitional' policing 
all over the globe are part and parcel of local policing studies. Here scholars and practitioners 
can draw on at least two significant sources. In recent years, international development agencies 
have come to accept first, that' good governance' is integral to social reform in the 'developing' 
world, and second, that 'good policing' is an important aspect of 'good governance.' These 
perceptions have led them to look for examples of best practice in policing to inform the 
assistance given to police In 'developing,' 'transitional' and 'post-conflict' societies. One 
example of this kind of work is a recent publication by Ziegler and Neild (2002), which reflects a 
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serious and penetrating comparative analysis of the chequered history of police reform initiatives 
in new democracies. Entitled From Peace to Governance, this report captures the contradictory 
nature of the process thus: 
The paradox of post-conflict police reforms is that these settings offer both unparalleled 
opportunities to re-conceptualize and to reshape policing institutions and doctrines, and 
deeply hostile environments for the implementation of ambitious reform plans (Ziegler & 
Neild, 2002:3). 
A second source of ideas on 'transitional' policing is also currently emerging from the· 
field of peace building and peacekeeping in the aftermath of civil war. In the course of their work 
in contexts such as Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi, and the ORC, organisations like the UNCIVPOL 
agency are gaining invaluable experience in restructuring policing organisations in 'collapsed 
states' (Holm & Eide, 2000). For students of 'transitional' policing, work in such difficult 
settings also provides important insights into the micro-politics of police reconstruction in 
societies like South Africa, where the state remains relatively powerful but clearly incapable of 
fully meeting the security needs of all its citizens. 
/ 
Local observers have begun to note that the path of police reform in other 'transitional' 
contexts sketched above resonates with South African experiences. In recent years, South 
African policing scholars have been quick to draw both insight and consolation from other 
transitional experiments. Recent work by Mark Shaw (200 I b; 2001 c; 200 I d; 2002a; 2002b), 
which extrapolates from experiences in Northern Ireland, Latin America and Eastern Europe, 
exemplifies the new comparative sensitivities that (some) local commentators currently exhibit 
in their assessments of policing reform in South Africa. This has resulted in a re-emphasis on the 
constraints and competing 'policy dilemmas' confronting police reform. Five policy dilemmas 
are outlined by Shaw (2002b), including the need for balancing institutional transformation with 
actual crime-fighting capacity; balancing the need for centralised control versus the devolution of 
policing; long-term crime-preventive and short-term crime-control responses; and 
institutional ising a human rights culture versus cnme fighting effectiveness. These policy 
dilemmas seem to do no more than reiterate - with the benefit of hindsight - John Brewer's 
(1993) earl ier prognosis regarding the 'structural caps' on change in post-authoritarian contexts. 
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The current reality, as Shaw (2002a: I 10, my emphasis) soberly observes, is that South Africa has 
'developed a parallel system of policing.' And one cannot help but note that this parallel system 
(one for the rich, the other for the poor) stands in sharp contrast to the grand vision of a 'dual 
system of policing' based on a delicate intermeshing of state and civil capacity originally 
advocated by Brogden and Shearing (1993). 
In contrast to the optimism of the mid-1990s regarding a radical break between past and 
future, the trajectory of policing reform is now sketched in less dramatic terms. Far from 
breaking free of the past, South African policing staggers into the future carrying the corpse of 
the old order on its shoulders. The new rhetoric of transformation emanating from the upper 
echelons of the SAPS does not altogether hide the disconcerting continuities with the past. 
Brutality, corruption, and incompetence continue to characterise the new force. Confusing the 
picture still further are numerous self-help social control initiatives. For the most part vigorously 
repressed by the Nationalist Party prior to the 1980s, and then co-opted when politically 
opportune, these non-police agents have once again undergone a revival, competing to offer 
deprived communities a range of policing functions. There is a partial difference: some do it with 
state blessing, as in the case of Community Police Forums (CPF's), and others with benign NGO 
mentorship, as with the Peace Committees of the Community Peace Programme (CPP). But that 
is by no means always the case, and bottoni-up 'community policing' has returned with a 
vengeance in the new South Africa (Harris, 2001) . In addition, the rampant commodification of 
security continues apace, rendering policing a private good rather than a public right (Loader 
&Walker, 2001). 
In the current wave of policing research, the bland descriptive accounts of the mixed 
economy of security characteristic of earlier periods have given way to much more detailed 
investigations of relational issues to do with the competition between state, market and civil 
society (Tshehla, 2002). The contraction of public police activity on the one hand, and the 
growth of the commercial security industry and the unregulated expansion of non-state self-help 
activities on the other, raise ethical and legal issues that are only now beginning to receive proper 
attention. As Shearlng and Kempa (200 I) lament, the governance of security in the socially 
stratified world of the new South Africa continues to reproduce the injustices of the past. Issues 
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of equity and democratic accountability remain far from settled, just as much as those of capacity 
and competence. As one recent commentator has observed : 
In 1994 South Africa officially abandoned apartheid and embraced democratic 
constitutionalism. Seven years later the prevalence of non-state policing permits the 
continuance of authoritarian values and practices; divides communities on the basis of 
their ability to secure alternative policing for a failing state provision; and nurtures the 
view that the rule of law is more of an obstacle to maintaining social order than as an 
effective guarantee of it. With a state monopoly of policing being a non-viable option for 
a country with limited public resources like South Africa, some other way must be sought 
to ensure that a public good like policing becomes accountable, consistent and humane 
(Baker, 2002 :51). 
These remarks raise several points . The first relates to the role of the state in the 
maintenance of social order. In a world of ' networked nodal governance ' (Shearing & Kempa, 
2001:206) advocates of bottom-up lay participation often end up marginal ising the state. 
Whether intentional or not, this is something that neither ' weak' nor ' collapsed' states can afford 
(Goldsmith, 2002). Bringing the state squarely back into our discussions on social regulation 
requires, as Goldsmith (2002) suggests, that issues of institutional capacity are properly 
addressed rather than glossed over. Thus, in a post-colonial context where institutional 
underdevelopment is the norm, issues of capacity need to be brought into the foreground of 
thinking on the institutional transformation of the police. There are encouraging signs that some 
have taken up the challenge to factor into our policing mantras for the future the character and 
capacity of the state itself (Dupont, Grabosky & Shearing, 2003). The third issue raised by Baker 
confronts our assumptions about the democratic instincts located within ' communities .' 
Authoritarian tendencies and coercive inclinations are not the prerogative of states alone. As 
recent anthropological research on non-state mechanisms of ordering illustrates (Buur, 2002), 
self-help groups flex their muscles in oppressive ways too. Nor is the rough justice of the mob 
and other more organised social formations always entirely distinct from state action for, as 
Huggins (2000) suggests in the Brazilian context, it often masks official complicity in anti-crime 
repression. The dangers of too idealised a depiction of 'community' are all too obvious. 
But what is to be done to resolve the dilemmas that continue to confront the delivery of 
citizen security in emerging democracies? In a number of recent articles, Shearing and associates 
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(Shearing & Kempa, 2001; Kempa & Shearing, 2002; Shearing with McCarthy, 2002) have 
reiterated the need to bring both state and non-state mechanisms of policing under a common 
regulatory framework that protects the liberal principles of due process. Overcoming the current 
'security deficit' will require innovative strategies involving both top-down and bottom-up 
experiments m social ordering (Kempa & Shearing, 2002:45). The problem with such 
prescriptions is that they require at least a modicum of competence at the centre and an 
abundance of resources (preferably mobilised by some benign NGO) at the grass roots. 
Unfortunately, neither can be taken for granted. 
2.8 Conclusion 
Over the past fifteen years South African policing studies have grown dramatically . One 
feature of the debate has been the lively interchange between local and international scholars and 
researchers, prompted by the insertion after 1990 of South Africa into the international political 
community. Scholarly networks of exchange and collaboration also benefited from this process. 
For those interested in crafting policy frameworks for police reform, the South African case 
study holds considerable appeal. It is in this context that the debate on models and principles 'of 
policing developed in various ways : by looking back into the past (the colonial model) so as fo 
construct an alternative vision of the future; by looking to particular quarters of the developed 
world for models to import (through 'cloning' of the consensual model); or by putting 
transitional experiments to comparative use in identifying the complex challenges facing 
institutional reform of formerly authoritarian police forces in high crime contexts. This 
discussion has highl ighted four models of relevance. The neat juxtaposition of earlier years, 
between the colonial and liberal model of policing, seems to have given way to an understanding 
that the complexity of the actual process of reform is better served by the identification of broad 
principles underlying democratic policing, rather than neat modular prescriptions to be imported 
into local contexts . The wisdom of this approach is evident in David Bayley's (1999 :5) comment 
that there are two features - responsiveness both downward and upward , and 'accountability to 
multiple external audiences' - that are essential to democratic policing. How these principles are 
to be institutionalised will depend on local history and context. Lessons learnt during South 
African experiments over the past decade and a half seem to provide support for the wisdom of 
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Bayley's cautious realism. 
The discussion has outlined the ways in which local and international scholars interested 
in the fortunes of South African policing came to engage - consciously and reflectively - with 
democratic policing ideas. Political liberalisation provided new opportunities for engagement to 
scholars long accustomed to the restrictive research conditions which prevailed under Apartheid. 
A strong local tradition of policy-relevant research ensured that intellectual debates engaged with 
pressing political concerns confronting the reconstruction of the public police agency on the one 
hand, and the governance of security on the other. As state reconstruction got underway, the 
opportunities for intellectual debate and policy engagement multiplied. The diffusion of 
intellectual ideas and research findings into practitioner circles was given additional momentum 
as researchers and academics became part-time consultants or full-time advisors to the new 
policing elite. The growth in stature and credibility of research organisations and think tanks 
with a particular interest and expertise in safety and security also provided opportunities for 
socially responsive engagements with policing. Aspects of the evolving interchange between the 
academic community of policing scholars, policy elites, and police practitioners is examined in 
greater detail in the following Chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
The National Police Board, 1992-1994: 
Setting the Agenda for Police Reform 
3.1 Introduction 
Following agreement in terms of the National Peace Accord22 (NPA), the Police Board 
was created in July 1992. It was constituted as one small cog in a larger system for the civilian 
oversight of policing that evolved in the early phase of the political transition. During its short 
existence the Board considered some major issues of policy, relevant to the reform of the 
authoritarian police institution. Although devoid of any real power, the Police Board accrued a .. 
measure of symbolic authority and political clout. In this regard its organisational linkage to the 
NPA institutions, and the access it enjoyed to anti-Apartheid NGOs, proved critical. It seems fair 
to say that the Police .Board acted as one of the channels to senior police management and the 
political leadership for the dissemination of reformist ideas and strategies that at the time were 
emanating from a wide range of constituencies.23 The Board provided a forum in which 
discussions between senior police officials and civilians on a future police dispensation could 
take place. An analysis of the tone and substance of these conversations about the restructuring 
of authoritarian policing provide some insight into the politics of reform as played out in this 
institutional mechanism. Through its deliberations, the Board helped shape some of the terms of 
reference and operational practices for a public police agency suited to the demands of a 
constitutional democracy. As such, the Police Board can be viewed as one transitional 
mechanism that participated in a process whereby ideas and practices associated with democratic 
22 The National Peace Accord was signed on 14 September 1991. It constituted a key agreement which created terms 
of reference for signatories in the run up to the democratic elections of 1994. The National Peace Secretariat was 
established on 8 November 1991 . Its main function was to establish and co-ordinate regional and local peace 
committees. On 4 November 1992 the Internal Peace Institutions Act, No. /35 of 1992, came into operation. 
23 Such as Peace Accord structures, NGOs, the scholarly community (both local and international), international 
police practitioners, and developmental agencies . 
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policing were brought to bear on the South African context. An analysis of the deliberations of 
the Police Board yields insight into the social actors involved in a process of policy diffusion, 
emulation, and modelling. 
This chapter provides an account of the Police Board, from its formation in June 1992 to 
its dissolution in November 1994. In the ensuing discussion the social context within which the 
Police Board was created is described, and the imperatives for institutional change within the 
police organisation considered. Thereafter the discussion shifts to its social composition and the 
institutional terms of reference that guided the Board's work. A description of the primary policy 
concerns and working methodologies is followed by a discussion of the impact of the Board on 
the reform of a formerly authoritarian police institution. 
For purposes of developing a social history of the Board, this discussion relies on 
documentary material such as Minutes of Police Board meetings and various submissions tabled 
by each of the Subcommittees during the course of the Board's existence. In addition, I draw on 
personal recollections of my role as participant in, and observer of, the inner workings of the 
Board. A series of field notes compiled during 1992 and 1993, and relating to the Board's 
activities, also provided impressionistic details on the contexts within which the Board 
conducted its work, the moods that prevailed, and the kinds of issues around which the Board's 
activities centred. Finally, for purposes of a retrospective assessment of the contribution of the 
Police Board, a small number of interviews were conducted with ex-members of the Board 
during the last quarter of2003.24 
3.2 Social context 
In February 1990, President de Klerk set in motion a political process that would result in 
a negotiated transition toward democratic, constitutional rule. In his speech of 2 February, he 
lifted the ban on the liberation movements and pledged to release Nelson Mandela and other 
political prisoners (Cawthra, 1993). Formal bilateral talks between the Government and the ANC 
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commenced shortly thereafter. The Groote Schuur Minute on the freedom of political prisoners 
and the return of exiles was signed in May 1990. In August 1990, the Pretoria Minute followed. 
In terms of the latter, the ANC suspended the armed struggle. Signatories to the Minute agreed, 
in principle, to joint monitoring and control of the SAP and other security forces. 
Despite the forging of key political agreements, however, political violence continued to 
escalate. A number of interest groups involving church, business, and political leaders, attempted 
to convene national peace meetings. In April 1991, President de Klerk agreed to a peace summit. 
The plan was rejected by both the ANC and the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSA TU), who argued in favour of an independently convened peace conference that 'needs to 
... reach multi-lateral binding agreements with obligations on all parties to act in accordance with 
these agreements' (Gastrow, 1995:23). Despite opposition, the de Klerk peace meeting took 
place. A facilitating committee, consisting of church and business representatives, was appointed 
to organise a second peace summit that would involve all parties. This summit took place in June 
and was attended by about 120 individuals representing 20 organisations. Key recommendations 
emerged from the discussions. They included the necessity for developing 'a code of conduct for 
political organizations, a code of conduct for security forces, socio-economic development and 
reconstruction, as well as enforcement mechanisms that would include a commission and peace 
secretariats' (Gastrow, 1995 :31). An organising committee was tasked with the responsibility of 
convening an inclusive forum that would aim at reaching binding agreements. Five working 
groups were established to draft consensual documents on a core number of issues.25 The 
working groups convened behind closed doors. Their deliberations were collated into the NPA 
and tabled at the National Peace Convention of September 14, 1991.26 
24 Interviews included the following former Generals: lohan van der Merwe, Pretoria, 3 September 2003; Louwtjie 
Malan, Pretoria, 3 September 2003; Generallohan Ie Roux, Pretoria, 4 September 2003. 
25 The five working groups were: Group 1: Code of conduct for political parties; Group 2: Code of conduct for 
security forces; Group 3: Socio-economic development; Group 4: Implementation and Monitoring; Group 5: 
Process, secretariat and media. Each working group had representation from the three major political groups (the 
National Party (NP), ANC and Inkatha,) as well as a church and business leader from the initial preparatory 
committee. 
26 Only the three white right-wing parties were absent from the proceedings. 
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The NP A, which has been described as 'one of the few truly consensual documents to 
have emerged in South Africa' (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1993a:24), was signed by 27 
political, government, and trade union leaders. Designed as a conflict resolution mechanism, the 
NPA had three objectives: the elimination of political violence, the promotion of democracy, and 
the facilitation of reconstruction and development (Gastrow, 1995). On paper at least, agreement 
now existed with regards to the basic principles that would guide the process of political 
negotiation toward a multi-party democracy. The Peace Accord itself set out a vision for a 
democratic and peaceful South Africa, and articulated a code of conduct for political parties as 
well as for the armed forces. 
Shortly after the signing of the NPA, the focus shifted to multi-party negotiations. In the 
process, political energies were diverted away from the implementation of the Accord (Ibid:47). 
Formal negotiations started in December 1991 with an all party Convention for a Democratic 
South Africa (CODESA). It produced agreement on the principles to guide the political process, 
and an endorsement of an electoral system based on proportional representation and a bill of 
rights (Sommer, 1996). In July 1992 a massacre of residents at Boipatong, south of 
Johannesburg, which left 29 dead, led to the withdrawal of the ANC from the negotiating foruin. 
The ANC launched a campaign of rolling mass action. (These events are also discussed in 
Chapter 6, Section 6.2) By mid-1992 CODESA had collapsed. Behind the scenes, however, 
secret bilateral talks continued between the government and the ANC and resulted in an 
agreement for power sharing. By March 1993 CODESA II was on track. This time around 
participants were well aware of 'the costs of another failure' (Atkinson, 1994: 13). A resolution 
for a two-phase transition was reached. Broad agreement also existed on the creation of a multi-
party Transitional Executive Council (TEC). This council and its various substructures were to 
include representatives from different political parties. Once established, the TEC and its sub-
councils assumed 'executive powers in the areas of finance, policing, defence, intelligence, and 
local government' (Gastrow, 1995:97). In December 1993 a democratic interim constitution was 
enacted. Four months later, in April 1994, general elections were held. With the election of a 
Government of National Unity (GNU), 84 years of minority racial rule in South Africa came to 
an end. 
58 
3.3 Political negotiations and police reform 
The challenge of reforming highly militarised police agencies, with low levels of 
legitimacy and ineffective systems of accountability were manifest in both · societies 
[South Africa and Northern Ireland] as events pushed them towards political compromise 
(Shaw,2001c:25). 
The transition to democracy, through a 'pacted agreement' between political elites, 
provides the context for a consideration of the impact of negotiation on police reform in South 
Africa (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997). More particularly, it also provides a political 
background to a consideration of the role of a transitional policy mechanism, the Police Board, 
created in terms of a provision contained in the NPA in the restructuring of the SAP between 
1992 and 1994. Before proceeding both to describe and to evaluate the role of the Board on 
police policy reform, some comments on the impact of political negotiations on the 
reorganisation of the security forces seem warranted. 
Issues related to the governance of the armed forces featured in the political negotiations 
of the post-1990 period. At CODESA various sub:'councils were created to deal with a range of 
political issues. Negotiations around policing took place within the Law and Order, Stability and 
Security Sub-Council. According to Shaw (1994), these negotiations were characterised by 
neither depth nor breadth. In his view, three factors in particular militated against more 
substantive engagements on a future police dispensation. In ANC circles, policy discussions on 
security sector reform focused on the mnitary rather than the police. The ANC's interest in 
integrating the armed wings of the liberation movements into the South African Defence Force 
(SAD F) decisively tipped the scale in favour of policy investment in the military rather than the 
police. Secondly, at the time of the initial negotiations, the ANC also lacked a clear police policy 
framework. As a consequence, it came to rely predominantly on policy inputs from academics 
sympathetic to the mass democratic struggle. 27 Lastly, at the time political negotiations were 
underway, the SAP had already secured some reformist momentum from within. As a 
27 In late 1991 for example, a Police Policy Group (PPG) was established under the chair of Prof. Nicholas (Fink) 
Haysom. This forum sought ways of engaging the ANC elite in discussions with the view to developing an agenda 
for the reform of the public police. 
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consequence, political agreement about the future role and shape of the police organisation was 
more readily forthcoming than initially anticipated. Different emphases, however, were evident 
in the discussions about a future police dispensation. While the ANC stressed the necessity for 
security force accountability to civilians, the South African Government and its security forces 
emphasised the need for 'professionalism' and non-interference by politicians (Steytler, 1992). 
Good interpersonal relations between key negotiators were instrumental in arriving at sufficient 
consensus over police issues across the party divide. The relationship between the key SAP 
negotiator, General Andre Pruis, a lateral entry from academia/8 and Advocate Nicholas 
Haysom, representing the ANC, proved particularly important (Shaw, 1994). This relationship 
took root within the institutional context of the Police Board and became consolidated around the 
TEC deliberations. 
In police circles in the late 1980s, the imperatives for institutional change came from two 
quarters. First, the De Witt Commission of Inquiry into the organisational structure of the police 
was a response to the exigencies confronting the police under successive states of emergency. It 
had been appointed in 1988 (South Africa, 1990). Secondly, the SAP's Strategic Plan of 1991 
was a direct response to the political changes induced by the de Klerk government (Cawthra, 
1993). The impact of such internal reviews on subsequenf organisational adjustments of the 
police institution requires some attention. 
The De Witt Commission of Inquiry reported its findings on the Structure and Function 
of the SAP in 1990.29 It proposed various organisational changes. Its most visible result was the 
restructuring of the SAP into 11 regional commands, and the devolution of management 
28 Andre Pruis, an ex-intelligence operative who opted for a short career in academia, became one of the first lateral 
entries into the police in the late 19805. On the strength ofa recommendation of Neil Barnard to the Minister of Law 
and Order (Hernus KrieJ), Pruis then headed the Police-Community Relations Division. He became a pivotal figure 
in subsequent negotiations over the future of the police organisation. Close working relationships between him and 
Fink Haysom, forged in the context of Police Board deliberations, proved instrumental for arriving at agreements 
over the future of policing. In the end, as Shaw (1994) notes, there was more common ground between Pruis and 
Haysom on critical issues than between Pruis and his Minister, Hemus Kriel. In later years Pruis became Deputy-
National Commissioner of the SAPS. 
29 According to Commissioner De Witt, George Fivaz was the principal author of the document. After the elections, 
Fivaz became the first Commissioner of the newly renamed South African Police Service (Interview, ex-
Commissioner de Witt, Pretoria, August 2003). 
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decisions to the regional commissioner level. Furthermore, the Security Branch was 'closed' and 
incorporated into the Crime Combating Division, and the 'riot squads' were regrouped into the 
Internal Stability Division. A new component of Crime Prevention was also established within 
the Division of Visible Policing. Henceforth the SAP was to consist of five divisions: Crime 
Combating and Investigation (following a merger between the Detective and Security Branch), 
Visible Policing (which entailed a merger of the Uniformed and Operational branches), Internal 
Stability, Human Resource Management, and Support Services. 
The second inspiration for organisational change came from more explicit political 
quarters. After de Klerk's February speech, a working group consisting of high-ranking police 
officers embarked on a strategic assessment of the mission, policy and strategy of the SAP in late 
1990. Dramatic changes in the external environment, as the argument went, necessitated such an 
assessment. 3D In response to its identification of the main problems besetting the police force,3l 
management advocated the following strategies for change: a depoliticisation of the police force, 
increased community accountability, more visible policing, improved management practices, 
reform of the training system, and restructuring of the organisation (SAP Strategic Plan, 1991). 
Furthermore, suggestions for the creation of a Police Board, police-community liaison forums, 
and a restructured public complaints mechanism were also mooted. In line with the ideas 
contained in the Strategic Plan, a range of organisational adjustments took place from 1991 
onwards.J2 
The reformist ideas contained in the Strategic Plan of 1991 were particularly influential 
in shaping the relevant sections on policing in the Police Accord. As Marais and Rauch (1992:4) 
noted, such influence provided proof of the extent to which 'Nationalist/SAP negotiators had the 
experience and expertise in policing which other parties lacked.' In an act of anticipatory 
socialisation toward a democratic political order, the SAP had begun to emphasise the 
30 Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie Strategiese Plan 1992-1997. Geheim. Document circulated amongst members of the 
Police Board. 
31 The problems identified included: inadequate service delivery, a poor public image, insufficient deployment of 
manpower, inadequate training and inefficient utilisation of resources. 
J2 For a more detailed description, see Steytler (1992). 
61 
desirability of 'apolitical professionalism,' 'police independence', and non-partisanship in any 
future dispensation.33 As Steytler (1992) observed, this newfound commitment to notions of 
'police independence' was itself driven by political opportunism aimed at insulating the police as 
much as possible from an ANC-dominated government in future. 
3.4 The National Peace Accord: Implications for the police 
The Multilateral National Peace Accord, signed in September 1991 (first by de Klerk, 
Buthelezi, and Mandela and then endorsed by most political parties3\ set the pace for far-
reaching changes in the political and legal rules within which public police were to operate. As 
Cawthra puts it (1993: 184) the "'general provisions" relating to security force actions' amounted 
'to a manifesto for fundamental change.' So, for example, a permanent Commission of Inquiry 
into Public Violence (the Goldstone Commission) was established in October 1991 (Shaw, 
1993). Furthermore, the Peace Accord introduced a range of new structures and operational 
methods that the police had to observe. These innovations included a Police Code of Conduct, 
with an emphasis on professionalism and the utilisation of minimum force; a new complaints 
mechanism, called the Police Reporting Officer, that was to be staffed by legally-trained 
ombudsmen; special units for investigating allegations of police misconduct; and Local and 
Regional Dispute Resolution Committees responsible for monitoring the Peace Accord at the 
local level. These committees had a peacemaking role and consisted of regional representatives 
from a wide range of structures: political organisations, churches, business, trade unions, and the 
armed forces. Lastly, the Accord also made provision for the creation of a Police Board as a 
civilian-police advisory structure to the Minister of Law and Order. Given the historical legacy 
of Apartheid policing, the NPA broke new ground in creating a number of mechanisms through 
which it hoped to institutionalise notions of civilian accountability and multi-party oversight. 
33 See in this regard the Role of the South African Police in a Changing South Africa, Internal Briefing document 
circulated to the Police Board on the Strategic Plan of the South African Police (1991). 
34 The agreement was not signed by the Conservative Party, other right-wing groups, nor the Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC) or Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO). 
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3.5 The National Police Board 
The Police Board was launched at a carefully orchestrated press meeting, held at the 
Officer's Club at Police Head Quarters on 2 June, 1992. The meeting was presided over by the 
Minister of Law and Order (Hernus Kriel), the Commissioner of Police (Johan van der Merwe), 
and the newly appointed Secretary of the Board (Advocate Brunette, a former Deputy Attorney-
General of Natal). The public addresses by both the Minister and the Commissioner noted the 
importance of political changes for the future of the police organisation. Then followed briefings 
by the five divisional heads on the structure and functions of the SAP. The presentations were 
characterised by bureaucratic formality. A closer reading of the Briefing documents to the South 
African Police Board,35 however, revealed the extent to which modern notions associated with 
partnership and co-operation between police and communities, crime prevention, and service 
delivery, had already caught on inside the police bureaucracy by 1992.36 In the context of the 
time, the police elite was now advocating that ' (e)veryone must behave in a professional and 
responsible manner.' Progressive as the discourse on professional policing may have sounded on 
paper, the Board's deliberations quickly confirmed the tension between modern, democratic 
policing concepts and old-style, authoritarian attitudes and practices. 
The 22 members of the Board consisted of an equal number of civilian and police 
representatives.37 The chair, a civilian, was appointed by the Minister. 38 The 11 police 
35 South African Police Board, Briefing Document, 2 June 1992. 
36 For example, the briefing on Visible Policing boasted of a new component, Crime Prevention, and emphasised 
'the value ofa scientific approach to crime ' and the value of 'obtaining the involvement of the larger community' in 
policing. Furthermore, the Internal Stability Unit, established in January 1992, now had as its mission 'to establish 
stability in the community by combating and preventing riots, unrest and crime in a professional and accountable 
manner.' In pursuit of this goal, retraining of 'all existing members of the ISD ... with an emphasis on prevention, 
negotiation, mediation and communication' was envisaged. There was also reference in the document to a 'process 
of purging the ISD of members who are considered to be unsuitable and members who have continually been 
exposed to violence for a number of years' (South African Police Board, Briefing Document. 2 June 1992). 
37 The Minister of Law and Order appointed 11 civilians from a list of names put forward by the National Peace 
Committee, which was in tum based on pol itical party nominations received from signatories of the Peace Accord. 
This included the ANC, Democratic Party (DP), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and NP but not the PAC or Inkatha. 
38 In August 1992, the chair resigned to take up the position of Attorney-General of Transkei. Advocate Brunette 
was replaced by Mr. Van Vuuren, an ex-Director of Armscor. 
63 
representatives were made up of five generals of the SAP, and six from each of the six 'self-
governing homeland' police forces (Lebowa, Kwandebele, Kangwane, Gazankulu, Qwa-Qwa, 
Kwazulu). Excluded from the ambit of the NPA were the police institutions of the TBVC states 
(Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei), in view of their nominal independence. 
Three of the civilian appointees were drawn from the ranks of academic research 
institutions. Clifford Shearing was a well-known international criminologist, and Eirena van der 
Spuy (University of Stellenbosch) and Janine Rauch (University of the Witwatersrand) had an 
explicit interest in policing research. 39 The other nine male representatives all came from legal 
quarters, a number of whom were senior ANC cadres.4o The particular composition of the 
civilian members facilitated interaction between the Board, the local and international research 
community, a range of non-governmental institutions active in the field of human rights and 
police monitoring, as well as key political organisations such as the ANC. The nomination of so 
many lawyers onto the Board may have had a reassuring effect on the police, with expectations 
that the Board's approach to the issue of policy reform would be shaped by a socio-legal 
approach to policy reform rather than by any 'bottom-up' programme of social reform. 
39 Clifford Shearing, a South African by birth, has spent the best part of two decades abroad, carving out a career as 
a criminologist in the Northern hemisphere. At the time of the creation of the Board, he was emerging as a critical 
voice on South African policing reform through first the Community Law Centre and later, the Community Peace 
Foundation at the University of the Western Cape. Shearing provided an important link to the international 
community. He became a persuasive advocate of international policing ideas. Even before the dissolution of the 
Board, Rauch became advisor to the Minister of Safety and Security and later, Chief Director of Policy of the newly 
established Secretariat, the civilian policy structure of the Ministry of Safety and Security. 
40 Nicholas Haysom, a Professor of Human Rights and Labour Law at the University of the Witwatersrand in 
Johannesburg, soon established himself as one of the key ANC negotiators at Kempton Park. His influence over 
ANC policing policy was substantial. After 1994 he became legal advisor to Nelson Mande\a, the newly elected 
president of the Government of National Unity. Pius Langa, a Durban-based Human Rights advocate, in later years 
became Chief President of the Constitutional Court. Mathews Phosa, a lawyer who worked in the ANC legal 
department, also emerged as a key figure in the political negotiations. After 1994 he was elected as Premier of 
Mpumalanga. Advocate Peter Gastrow, the Deputy Chair of the Board, was a long-standing opposition spokesperson 
(first for the Progressive Federal Party and then later in the Democratic Party) on Law and Order issues and a 
member of the Peace Accord structures in Natal. In the constitutional era he became advisor to the newly elected 
Minister of Law and Order and then moved on to become a researcher within the Institute of Security Studies, an 
independent research institution. Sakkie Steyn, a practicing lawyer, was at the time the Inkatha nominee. After 1994, 
he joined the police as a lateral entry and became Director of Labour Relations and the Police Legal Service within 
SAPS. 
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3.5.1 Terms of reference 
A sub-committee of the NPA drafted terms of reference for the Police Board.41 The broad 
aim of the Board was to provide a forum for consultation between elected civilian and senior 
police with a view to improving policing. In terms of paragraph 3.3 of the NPA, the Police 
Board was charged with the responsibility 'to consider and to make recommendations to the 
Minister of Law and Order in regard of policy relating to the training and efficient functioning of 
the police, with the view to reconcile the interests of the community with that of the police' 
(National Peace Accord, 1991: Par 3.3). Designed as a policy advisory structure, the Police 
Board had no statutory powers . It also had no role with regard to the day-to-day functioning of 
the police. Included in the ambit of its authority was the right to undertake research and call for 
representations from the public. Budgetary constraints, however, limited its capacity for 
subcontracting research. Recommendations of the Board were to be made public 'insofar as it is 
essential in reconciling the interests of the community with that of the public.' 
These terms of reference for the Police Board were lather vague. Before long it became 
apparent that such general ity was susceptible to different interpretations of the mandate of the 
Board and its relationship to both the Minister and the Peace Accord structures. The issues at 
stake were threefold. First there was the issue relating to the relative autonomy of the Board vis-
a-vis the Minister of Law and Order. Broadly speaking, civilian members of the Board 
emphasised the political importance of independence from the police given the latter's tainted 
public image. The second issue of contestation concerned the accountability of the Board to 
Peace Accord structures. Most of the civilians argued that the Board, as a creature of the Peace 
Accord, had a political obligation to work closely with Peace structures. The generals, in 
contrast, took a different view. In the early period of the Board's existence, for example, the 
police generals voiced strong opposition to the proposal that Police Board minutes be circulated 
to the Peace Secretariat. In their view, the Police Board had to function independently of the 
Peace Secretariat. Thirdly, there were narrow versus broad interpretations of the mandate of the 
Board. 
41 The three members were the Deputy Minister of Law and Order, Jay Naidoo from the ANC Alliance, and Walter 
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In the face of conflicting interpretations of its mandate, the Board instructed Peter 
Gastrow, the deputy-chair and member with close working relationships with the National Peace 
Secretariat, to draft a Strategic Plan to guide its work. This Plan was tabled, discussed, and 
finaJJy accepted by members of the Board in the first quarter of 1993. The Strategic Plan opted 
for a broad interpretation of the mandate of the Board as set out in paragraph 3.3 of the Peace 
Accord. A wide range of issues was listed as potential policy concerns for the Board. The Board 
was urged to prioritise policy issues of its choice with due regard to capacity constraints.42 It 
furthermore argued that in its del iberations the Board should, within the existing constraints,43 
both protect its independence and enhance its capacity for autonomous decision-making.44 
Regular communication between the Board and structures of the Peace Accord was agreed to. 
Finally, the plan also reiterated that recommendations of the Board had to be made public, albeit 
after prior notice to, and discussions with, the Minister.45 
The adoption of the Strategic Plan by members of the Board signalled a victory for a 
broad and liberal, as opposed to a narrow and conservative interpretation of the Board's mandate 
- features to be explained later in the discussion. A closer working relationship between the 
Board and various Peace Accord structures followed. As a consequence the Board received 
updates on enquiries of the Goldstone Commission. A regular exchange of progress reports 
between the Board and Peace structures also became institutionalised. In addition the Board also 
invited reports from regional Peace structures on violence and policing. The latter provided a 
Felgate from the IFP. 
42 These considerations included : setting overall priorities for policing; improving the relationship between police 
and local communities; police expenditure; criteria for recruitment, training, equipment modes of operation of 
police; appointment of senior police; and strategies for prevention of crime amongst others. The Board was urged 
however to determine priority areas. 
43 For most of its existence the Board, for example, remained financially dependent on the Ministry. 
44 Only in September 1993 did the Board receive a more substantial budget and with it an administrative 
infrastructure. Repeated calls for a more flexible financial approach in support of the work of the Board only began 
to payoff once an amount of R551 000 was given to the Board. This amount was paid out of the South African 
Police's budget to finance a series of regional workshops on police-community relations 
45 In a diplomatic concession it was decided to discuss such recommendations privately with the Minister so as to 
'allow for an opportunity of dialogue between the Minister and the Board.' Police Board, Strategic Plan, 24 March 
1993. 
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counterpoint to the Board's exclusive reliance on monthly security briefings prepared by the 
police. Jointly, the Board and the National Peace Secretariat also organised a national workshop 
on Police-Community Relations in June 1993. Attended by a large contingent of senior police 
and members of civil society, the workshop yielded many insights into relational issues, helped 
to set the agenda for future interventions in this terrain, and cemented relations between the 
Board and the Peace Accord structures. 
3.5.2 Ideological tensions and social alliances 
There were significant political and ideological differences among members of the Board. 
The most visible political division, particularly in the early stage of the existence of the Board, 
involved the police on the one side and vocal civilian critics of the Apartheid regime on the 
other. As the majority of critics had political sympathies on the ANC-side, this division often 
presented itself as police-versus-the-ANC. Beyond the level of appearance, however, the politics 
of race ensured a less-than-united police contingent. Throughout the Board's existence, the 
homelands were silent partners, noted for their physical presence but social absence. The 
dominance of the SAP generals in the proceedings of the Board provided tacit proof of the social 
inequality that had long characterised the interaction between the SAP and homelands police 
forces. Relations between the SAP generals and their 'underlings' in the Bantustans appeared at 
best cool, and at worst non-existent. On the eve of the discussions on the re-integration of the 11 
police institutions into a unitary South African police institution, the political power was 
evidently in the hands of the SAP. As the reform process gained momentum the simple division 
of police-versus-critics gave way to a division between hawks and doves that straddled the 
police-civilian divide. This re-alliance was influenced by two factors in particular: first, the 
departure in early 1993 of the first batch of old guard SAP generals, and their replacement by a 
new contingent of more forward-looking officers. Their departure formed part of a first wave of 
early retirements of 15 members of the general staff to make way for a more reformist-orientated 
and representative leadership.46 The second factor of importance relates to the momentum 
46 In the process, the places occupied by Lt-Generals H.P.M. de ViJliers , A.B. Conrad ie, Louwtjie Malan, Basie Smit 
and J. Swart were filled by a new batch of SAP officers. Each of the new incumbents represented a police division: 
Lt-General J.H. Ie Roux (Crime Prevention and Investigation); Andre Pruis (Community Relations); Mike Bester 
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created by political reform, and the extent to which the working groups established within the 
Board provided a forum within which both professional and social alliances became forged 
between police and civilians. Such alliances effectively diluted the sharp division between police 
and civilians so characteristic of the early phase of the Board's existence. 
3.5.3 Micro-politics of interaction 
A brief look at the micro-politics of interaction within the Board provides a view into the 
ideological fault lines that existed at the time. For purposes of illustration, a few examples will 
suffice: 
Public order policing: At the first meeting of the Board, in response to the presentation 
of the Divisional Heads on the structural framework and functional responsibilities of the public 
police agency, most of the questions from the civilian side focused on aspects of public order 
policing. This 'bias' toward one of the most contentious and political aspects of Apartheid 
policing did not, at the time, go unnoticed in police circles. In all probability it confirmed their 
suspicions about the political partisanship that critics of the regime would pursue through the 
work of the Board. As one general pointed out in no uncertain terms: 'It is clear that some people 
on the Board have political agendas and if we don't beware their political agenda will split the 
Board apart. ,47 
Public order policing remained on the agenda of the Board as controversy continued to 
stalk the routine operation of the Internal Stability Unit (lSU). The Head of the ISU, in 
particular, did not respond well to criticism. Lt- General de la Rosa was of the opinion that 
'normal policing' was not possible in the unstable and violent context of transitional South 
Africa. Critical comments on the part of the Wits-Vaal Secretariat in their presentation to the 
Board about the operational conduct of the ISU in that region were dismissed as 'unfair' and 
(Physical Services Rendering); M. Cronje (Basic Training) and Lt-General A. de la Rosa (Internal Stability Unit). 
47 Field notes, Board Meeting, 5 November 1992. 
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, biased.'48 
That there were other fractures of importance within the police organisation became clear 
from time to time. The most aggressive of interactions took place between Lt-General de la Rosa 
and a fellow police official, Gregory Rockman. The latter was a member of the police who, in 
the late 1980s, achieved celebrity status in anti-governmental circles for having publicly 
criticised the heavy-handed tactics of the riot police in Mitchell's Plain (Rockman, 1989). 
Rockman appeared before the Board to present the views of the Police and Prison Officers' Civil 
Rights Union (POPCRU) on trade union affiliation. In senior police circles, he appeared persona 
non grata. A delay of 30 minutes to the start of the meeting clearly angered Rockman. By the 
time he and his colleagues were invited into the Boardroom, Rockman was in a combative mood. 
He wasted no time in questioning the Board's legitimacy. The hostility was tangible as Rockman 
and Lt-General de la Rosa tried to outstare one another. This little melodrama exposed some of 
the cracks within a police organisation long dependent on subordinates to defend the racial state. 
It also signalled that transitional politics and institutional change were likely to expose pro- and 
anti-reformist schisms within the police organisation. 
Security briefings: Competing interpretations of political violence, and the role of the 
security forces in fanning or mitigating such violence, also constituted a source of division 
within the Board. Briefings on the security situation in the country were a regular item on the 
monthly agenda. Compiled by the Crime Information and Interpretation Centre of the SAP, and 
presented by General Ie Roux, the content of the briefings reflected the security sector's 
interpretation of the prevailing political situation. The briefings included a short discussion of the 
causes of political violence, followed by descriptive details on incidences of violence,49 an 
identification of regional hotspots, and tallies of attacks on police. The presentation of the 
briefings created scope for debates that reflected ideological divisions between supporters and 
critics of the regime and its coercive instruments . 
48 Field notes, Board Meeting,S November 1993. 
49 Political violence more generally, taxi violence, train attacks, farm attacks etc. 
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A revIew of the security briefings between 1992 and 1994 points to the evolving 
character of political violence, as well as to the changes in perceptions and constructions of the 
political enemy. 50 For example, in the early phase of the Board's existence, crude depictions of 
political violence as a function of a brutal power struggle between the ANC and Inkatha 
dominated. Any allegations of police complicity in the cycle of violence were at the time 
considered part and parcel of a ' sensational ist campaign' against the forces of law and order. 
Such depictions, of course, did not go unchallenged. In a particularly heated exchangeS I between 
Mathews Phosa and General Ie Roux, Phosa complained that the political bias of the security 
briefings was evident given the routine depictions of the' ANC as the villains and the cops as 
angels.' He lamented, too, the absence of any reference to the machinations of other political 
forces (such as the Azanian People's Liberation Army [APLAJ) as sources of paramilitary 
destabilisation in the security briefings. The General retorted that the briefings were based purely 
and simply on 'facts' and nothing else. This exchange led to some discussion on the collection, 
analysis, and interpretation of ' facts' in a divided political context such as the South African 
52 one. 
In an attempt to redress the exclusive reliance on police data and interpretations, civilian 
members of the Board proposed that the Board invite presentations from the Regional structures 
of the NPA.53 Shortly thereafter, presentations from the Wits-Vaal and Natal Peace Secretariats 
were made at meetings of the Board . The presentations provided a different angle on community 
conflict and the role of the police. These meetings allowed the SAP to air their complaints of 
50 As the deals struck around the negotiation table turned fonner adversaries into allies, the political challenges to 
social order no longer emanated from the ANC all iance but rather from the far right or the 'leftist reactionary 
terrain' (APLA in particular). After April 1994 again, the threat to the democratic order were identified as coming 
from criminal quarters, bent on perpetuating a ' reign of terror in order to make the country ungovernable.' Police 
Board Minutes, September 1994:2. 
)I Police Board Minutes and Field Notes Board Meeting, August 1993 . 
52 Field Notes, Meeting of the Police Board, 6 August 1993 . 
53 The presentation by Peter Harris on Police trends on the Wits Vaal (November 1993) sketched a complex context 
characterised by political intolerance, poverty, endemic conflict, rumour mongering, the mobilisation of criminal 
networks and security force misconduct. The conduct, modus operandi and operational accountability of the Internal 
Stabil ity Unit were discussed at some length. De la Rosa responded by saying that his analysis was one-sided, and 
that 'normal policing' was no longer possible under the prevailing conditions. (Field Notes, Meeting of the Police 
Board, November (993). 
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one-sidedness and the over-emphasis on police misconduct in the complex situations on the 
ground.54 Such exchanges illustrated the politicised character of policing generally, and public 
order policing more particularly. They served as reminders of the divergent experiences and 
views to which insiders and outsiders of the ethnic state adhered in their approach to the police. 
Broader political events, however, came to emphasise the many fires that were fanning 
political instability in the early phase of transition. On 25 June, 1993, some 300 Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging (A WB) members occupied the World Trade Centre, the venue of 
COOESA. Police handling of the events provoked much public criticism. From then onwards, 
the right wing threat became a regular item in the security briefings to the Board. 
Over a period of time the substance of the deliberations of the Board and its engagement 
with the 'security situation' became more even-handed. By early 1994, members of the Board 
expressed their appreciation for the greater amount of detail and more 'balanced reporting' in the 
. b· fi 55 security rIe lOgs. 
Murder of police officers: The killing of police officials constituted a further source of 
controversy within the Board. The security briefing of November 1993 boldly stated that 
'(a)lmost all the attacks on members of the SAP are either carried out by members of the ANC or 
by members of their affiliates such as the SOU's.' To the Generals the 'ongoing murder of police 
officials' constituted a 'prolonged massacre.'56 They demanded that the Board 'come out in 
support against the aimless killings of policemen.'57 Beyond the total onslaught rhetoric, 
General Pruis argued in more reasoned terms that attacks on the police were a source of 
demoralisation within the institution. Such attacks also placed a damper on reformist attempts 
aimed at demilitarising the police. By late 1993, ANC spokespersons started to denounce the 
random attacks on the security forces. Such denunciations formed part of a confidence-building 
54 Field Notes, Meeting of the Police Board, 5 November 1993. 
55 Minutes of the Meeting of the Police Board, 4 February 1994. 
56 Briefing to the Police Board, 1994. Security Situation in the RSA, 2 September (p .I). 
57 Minutes of the Police Board Meeting, 6 May 1993 . 
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strategy on the part of ANC officials. By September 1994, the ongoing murder of members of 
the SAP again featured prominently in the security briefing. This time round, however, the 
culprits were no longer considered to be members of the ANC. Ordinary 'criminal elements' 
were now identified as the wrongdoers.58 
3.5.4 Forging an institutional identity 
At the first meeting of the Board, there was some discussion regarding the issues of 
substance on which the Board should focus. Three issues were identified: mechanisms of police 
accountability, police-community relations, and an agenda for transformation. All three of these 
focus areas were natural extensions of the kind of thinking that informed the Peace Accord 
framework. Behind the scenes, Board members of the Police Policy Group, (PPG) initially 
constituted as an informal grouping with an interest in developing policing policy within ANC 
political circles, regularly caucused both before and outside of Police Board meetings. These 
discussions were aimed at setting an agenda for Police Board deliberations in line with the 
strategic assessments of the PPG about a future pol ice dispensation. Between January 1992 and 
April 1994, the PPG evolved from an unofficial think-tank existing on the margins of police 
policy with a somewhat fluid composition and some core policy entrepreneurs59 to a think-tank 
of considerable importance to the deliberations of Working Group 3 of CODESA. Under the 
auspices of the PPG, various policy papers were drafted on a wide range of issues . These ranged 
from the democratic principles of policing; structures of police accountability; interim 
mechanisms of political control; community policing; modalities of incorporation of homeland 
police agencies; decentralisation and representivity; priority issues for transformation; and the 
role of the international community in police reform.6o 
58 Minutes of the Police Board Meeting, Security Briefing, 2 September 1994. 
59 The driving force of the PPG was Fink Haysom. Both Etienne Marais and Janine Rauch, at the time researchers 
attached to the Policing Project at Wits funded by Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (JDASA), 
were key participants . Various ANC politicians attended PPG discussion forums . PPG also invited inputs on 
various issues from NGOs active in the security field with the view to formulating policy guidelines to a cadre of 
senior ANC leaders. 
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At the very first few meetings of the Police Board, various requests were made for policy 
details to be made available to members of the Board. Such requests were part of a more 
strategic approach on the part of the civilian section to gain access to particular policy 
frameworks. From the outset, opposition-aligned civilians were keen to utilise the opportunity 
that the Board provided for accessing information that had long been curtailed by various 
administrative and legal rules. On this score they were testing the extent to which the Police 
Board could be used as a convenient platform for wrenching open, at least for the privileged few, 
the culture of secrecy within the institution. In doing so, policy reform could be informed by 
more substantive knowledge of existing policy frameworks. 
3.6 Key policy initiatives of the Police Board 
During the course of its short existence, the Police Board was quite directly concerned in 
a variety of policy issues relevant to police reform. Included in the ambit of the Board's 
deliberation were matters relating to: police training; a public police complaints system; internal 
disciplinary procedures and suspension; strategic planning, institutional restructuring and polite 
effectiveness; police-liaison forums and community policing; deaths in detention and lay visiting 
schemes; public order policing policy and operations; and trade unionism. The policy agenda 
was shaped by three sets of factors. First, there were the general terms of reference for the Police 
Board as set out in the Peace Accord, with specific reference to the restructuring of police 
training and the improvement of community-police relations. Secondly, the strategic framework 
that the Board adopted gave rise to five working groups that pursued the designated areas of 
concern. The deliberations of the working groups coalesced around the following contentious 
points: training; strategic planning; community policing; human resources and personnel; and the 
organisation and 'culture' of the SAP. A third activity was ad hoc in nature. The Board also 
attempted to respond to policing issues as these cropped up in the early transitional period. Two 
in particular deserve attention here: the Boipatong massacre (1992) together with the 
Waddington report on police handling of the events, and renewed concern about the torture of 
60 This discussion draws on various Minutes of the PPO dating from late 1992 to early 1994. 
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detainees in the aftermath of the publication of a report on the topic by the state pathologist, Dr. 
Gluckman. 61 Both issues provided the Board with opportuI1ities to profile policy concerns of 
relevance to the project of police reform. 
The Board conducted its affairs through a number of sub-committees. The composition of 
the sub-committees included both civilian and police representatives. Police divisional heads 
were appointed onto sub-committees that had a direct link to their areas of professional expertise. 
In civilian circles, there was some behind-the-scenes caucusing to arrive at a sensible division of 
labour based on interest, expertise, and political decorum. Each of the sub-committees served as 
a liaison mechanism for engaging with the police organisation itself, as well as other public 
bodies and NGOs on critical policy issues. 
In its bid to make its presence known within the police organisation, the Board conducted 
a number of high profile visits to police institutions. First on the list was a visit to Maleoskop, the 
controversial public order training centre, in June 1992. Thereafter followed a visit to Rooiberg 
(January 1993), where the Koevoet unit used to be stationed, and a visit to the Verdrag Internal 
Stability Unit (February 1993). In April of the same year the Police Board was hosted by the 
SAP Johannesburg Witwatersrand so as to introduce Board members to aspects of routine 
policing of inner city Johannesburg. Members were escorted in military style, one Casspir 
upfront, the other behind, to various nightspots that included a visit to a striptease bar, 
observations of street sex workers, a gay bar, and a so-called Satanist club.62 On a more sober 
note, with a visit to the Forensic Laboratory in August 1993 the Board concluded its public 
relations efforts on this front. 
In the section below, the substantive concerns of each of the subcommittees and their 
respective achievements will be discussed in greater detail. 
61 See Sunday Times, 26 July 1992. 
62 The staging of this particular visit drew criticism from some members of the Board who saw the exercise as a 
compromising one. 
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3.6.1 Strategic planning 
Shortly after its inception, the Police Board broached the issue of strategic planning 
within the police with a view to defining a role for itself in a process aimed at managing change. 
At the time, restructuring initiatives underway in the police institution were considered the 
responsibility of the SAP. By introducing policy issues relating to both the process and outcome 
of strategic planning and involving public input and scrutiny, the Board ventured into a 
challenging area of civilian-police interaction. It took as a point of its departure the Strategic 
Plan of 1991 that was hatched in the inner corridors of the police. The document was circulated 
to members of the Board and, indicative of the culture of secrecy that prevailed at the time, it had 
'confidential' stamped on its cover. From such secretive beginnings, a debate evolved about the 
form, content, and process of strategic planning in a context of rapid political change. Strategic 
planning, it was argued, had to be informed by the philosophy of 'community policing' based on 
the principles of transparency, and a joint articulation of community and police resources in 
pursuit of public safety. 
It was within this framework that the Board approached the issue of strategic planning in 
various contexts. Slowly but surely both the politics and logistics of strategic planning in 
democratic police institutions were being flagged. So, for example, the issue appeared on the 
agenda of a meeting between the Board and the Commonwealth Observers.63 This was a 
consequence of caucusing between a delegation of the Observers, and Board members of the 
PPG. Furthermore it was a focus area of discussion in the Police Board visit to police institutions 
in the UK, which was undertaken by five members in mid-1993. In her report back to the Board, 
Janine Rauch related the dividends that accrued from public transparency of strategic 
assessments, and the institutionalisation of modern management techniques involving 
fi I . 64 per ormance eva uatlOn. 
The sub-committee on Strategic Planning, consisting of the chair, Clifford Shearing, with 
63 Minutes of Meeting of the Police Board, 2S November 1992. 
64 Rauch, 1. 1993. Visit to Britain. Report to the Police Board. 
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Mathews Phosa as the other member, liaised regularly with Efficiency Services, the department 
responsible for Strategic Planning in the SAP. The Chair, too, participated in the discussions of 
the SAP General Management's discussions on the topic. In its progress report of September 
1993,65 the Board reported that consensus was reached that the Strategic Plan had to ' involve the 
community.' Details of how that was to be achieved, and to what end, were very much [eft open. 
Furthermore, there was also agreement that the Police Board should give its support to the 
Strategic Plan, once finalised. 
In August 1993, an external consultant was appointed to facilitate Strategic Planning 
within the Police. The Strategic Plan of the SAP (South African Police, 1993) was promulgated 
on October 19, 1993. For the first time ever it was made public, a not insignificant concession to 
the demand for 'transparency ' embodied within the philosophy of community policing. The Plan 
itself was couched in the fashionable language of environmental analysis. It included a scan of 
both the external macro- and internal micro-environments within which the police organisation 
operated. The driving forces impacting on the role of the police agency included cryptic 
references (in a schematic format) to the needs of the community; technology; globalisation; the 
rule of law and a Bill of Human Rights; trends in crime; trends of violence; and cost-efficiency. 
As such, the Strategic Plan signalled the introduction of some elements of managerial ism that 
became a key feature of organisational reform after 1994. From 1995 onwards the publication of 
the strategic plan of the SAPS became mandatory in terms of provisions contained in the South 
African Police Services Act of 1995 (Act 68 of 1995). 
3.6.2 Police-community consultation/policing 
From the early 1990s, the concept of community policing was being promoted by a wide 
range of constituencies as a suitable paradigm for the delivery of policing services in a post-
Apartheid political order. The utilisation of the concept, however, masked deep-seated 
differences in understanding of what exactly community policing entailed (policing by the 
65 National Police Board, Progress Report to the Minister, dated September 1993 . 
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community; policing in the community; policing an behalf a/the community).66 The notion of 
community policing also developed a currency in police circles 'to describe recent developments 
in "police reform'" (Marais, 1992a:8) with a particular emphasis on the desirability of police-
community consultation. The creation of police-community consultative forums as a mechanism 
for liaising and consulting with members of the community flowed directly from this point. In 
the community at large, debates on community policing proliferated in a wide variety of 
organisational contexts. Those who took part in the discussions ranged from NGOs active in the 
field of monitoring police operations and research institutions, to policy-orientated practitioners. 
Among the fruits of these deliberations were a realisation {hat clarity was needed in defining 
features of community policing, critically assessing its suitability to the post-colonial policing 
context, and an appreciation of the obstacles likely to be encountered in its institutionalisation. 
After \993, key elements of community policing became entrenched in law (the Interim 
Constitution, the Police Services Act) and in-house police policy frameworks. A key mechanism 
through which this approach to policing was to be institutionalised was the Community Police 
Forum, a liaison structure legally enshrined within the Interim Constitution and the South 
African Police Service Act of 1995 (Peiser, 1999). 
The deliberations of the Police Board underline the popularity of the doctrine of 
community policing during the transitional phase. The sub-committee on Police-Community 
Consultation of the Police Board developed as its brief 'monitoring, facilitating and assessing the 
community relations initiatives of the SAP.' In pursuing its objectives, the Police Board latched 
on to initiatives undertaken by other constituencies - particularly those of prominent NGOs and 
research institutions. One example here involved Police Board support and participation in a 
conference, organised by IDASA in October 1992, that explored various aspects of community-
police relations . The conference brought together representatives from political parties, 
community organisations, the police, and international experts . Discussions focused on a wide 
range of issues concerning the reform of a police organisation long maimed by its lack of 
legitimacy and credibility.67 The enhancement of police-community/community-police relations 
was a dominant theme at the conference. 
66 See in this regard the excellent discussion by Marais, E. (\992a) . 
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A second workshop, of particular importance to the Board's role in facilitating policy 
discussions among the police, community organisations, and others on the challenges 
confronting the implementation of community policing took place in June 1993. This time 
around the workshop was co-hosted by the Police Board and the National Peace Secretariat.68 
The involvement of the Police Board ensured a large representation of senior police personnel. 
The workshop took place a week after the right-wing attack on the World Trade Centre (where 
political negotiations were underway) that gave rise to public criticism of police handling of the 
events. The contentious and divided nature of the debate on policing was borne out by the party-
political perspectives on the state of policing. For the remaining part of the conference, 
constructive engagement with both the obstacles confronting community-based policing, and 
pragmatic strategies for intervention took place. This workshop helped set the agenda for the 
Board's own work in the area of community-police relations. It also succeeded in challenging 
head-on the conservative agenda of the police as reflected in their semantic use of the term 
'police-community' (as opposed to community-police) relations. The Board undertook to 
organise a series of regional and local workshops so as to facilitate discussions between the 
police and particular communities. Both kinds of workshops provided proof of the extent to 
which the Police Board could slipstream in the momentum created by the initiatives of others. 
Both workshops confirmed the centrality accorded to community policing in the discourse on 
police reform. 
With regard to the development of a mechanism to address allegations of police conduct 
vis-a-vis detainees, the Police Board played a particularly active role. On this score the force of 
political circumstances proved instrumental. Prompted by a fresh round of allegations concerning 
deaths in detention by Dr. Gluckman, a Port Elizabeth District Surgeon, the Minister of Law and 
Order in a letter to the Police Board69 expressed concern about the 'perceptions which have been 
created and which are worsened by every death which occurs.' Gluckman's allegations once 
67 For a summary see Valentine, S. (\992). 
68 See Programme and Report on the National Workshop, Police Community Relations: The Future, 30 June - I July 
1993. 
69 Minister of Law and Order: Letter to the Police Board, 9 December 1992. 
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again propelled the issue of police abuse of power vis-a.-vis detainees to the centre of attention. 
The Commonwealth Secretariat also raised its concerns about the well-being of detainees. In a 
bid to defuse public concern, the Minister appointed 12 magistrates to visit cells countrywide. 
Permission was also granted to the International Red Cross Committee to visit police cells. 
It was against this background that the Minister requested that the Board advise him 
regarding the possibility of introducing a mechanism for monitoring detention facilities (along 
the lines of the British system of 'lay visiting'), so as to ' convince the public that the South 
African Police has nothing to hide. ,70 The sub-committee on Police Community Consultation 
took the issue forward. An information note on Lay Visiting was circulated to Members of the 
Board in early 1993. Members of the sub-committee carefully examined a body of evaluative 
research on lay visiting schemes in Britain. Bar a few alterations, the British guidelines were 
adopted. Other agencies helped to create a climate conducive to the idea of lay visiting. During a 
visit by the Commonwealth Observer Group in November 1992, issues relating to community 
police liaison and lay visiting were discussed. 71 Chief Superintendent Peter Stevens, a delegate 
from Scotland Yard, held several meetings with police chiefs to discuss the principles and 
procedures involved. A British video on lay visiting was utilised as a marketing exercise with 
police in the various regions. 
[n late 1993, a pilot lay visitor scheme was introduced at a number of SAP stations. 
Opportunities were created for purposes of drawing lessons from the pilot phase. 72 Upon 
finalisation of the national guidelines, community visiting schemes (as the programme then 
became known) were then open to nation-wide implementation. In terms of the operational 
guidelines for community visiting schemes, lay visiting functioned as a sub-community of 
Community Consultative Committees. By January 1995, according to official figures presented 
to the Police Board, the community visitor scheme was operative at 237 police stations. By then 
70 (n its British form, lay visiting was concerned with the 'making of unannounced visits ... by independent persons 
on the detention and custody of suspects in police stations' (Kemp and Morgan, 1990: 13). 
7 1 Peter Stevens (Scotland Yard) and Henry Jensen (Canada). 
72 See correspondence between Janine Rauch and Rob Midgley of the Grahamstown Community-Police Forum, 26 
October 1993. 
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832 visitors had been appointed.73 Interest in expanding the operation of visitor schemes into 
regional structures was forthcoming from organisations with a long-standing interest in police 
monitoring. In the Western Cape, proposals advocated by the Regional Peace Committee to 
develop a regional lay visiting structure modelled on similar programmes in Grahamstown and 
the Wits-Vaal peace committees were met with resistance. The police in the Western Cape 
favoured local schemes operating under the auspices of police community liaison forums. 74 
Evaluative research into the functioning of a small sample of community visiting 
schemes in the Western Cape conducted at two stages (Van der Spuy, 1995; Gopane, 2000) 
suggested that the initial flurry of enthusiasm and activity was not sustainable in the longer term. 
The petering out of the initiative had as much to do with infrastructural constraints as with a 
change in the political mood concerning detainees in police custody. By late 1999, community 
visiting schemes had become a concept more alive on paper than in practice. 
3.6.3 Sub-committee on complaints procedures, suspension, and departmental 
investigations 
For obvious political reasons, the issue of police accountability was central to all the 
discussions on police reform. Concerns about human rights abuses by the police, and the 
structural weaknesses besetting both internal disciplinary procedures and external accountability 
measures, had long fuelled debates on police accountability in South Africa. It was thus almost 
inevitable that the Board came to focus its attention on the issue of oversight more broadly, and 
internal complaints procedures more specifically. The Board's deliberations benefited from a 
momentum for change created on two fronts: provisions contained within the NPA regarding 
proposals to establish a Police Complaints Investigation Unit, and discussions on the issue that 
also emerged within police circles. What the Accord had in mind was the investigation of 
selected criminal offences allegedly committed by members of the Force in an impartial and 
73 Correspondence from Head: Physical Service Delivery to the Police Board, dated 2 March 1995. 
74 See Western Cape Regional Peace Committee Correspondence regarding the Task force on lay visitors 
programme. Report on Meeting with General Du Toit, 23 March 1994. 
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· d' d 75 unpreJu Ice manner. 
A sub-committee on Suspension and Departmental Investigations of the Board was given 
the responsibility of examining the current structures in operation, exploring cross-cultural 
models operative in other societies, and developing recommendations for an appropriate public 
complaints procedure. The sub-committee was headed by Nicholas Haysom, who was widely 
regarded as one of the leading local experts on the topic. 
Given the contentious nature of the topic, the sub-committee's deliberations required 
close working relations with the relevant police divisions. The sub-committee invited a 
Prosecuting Officer of the SAP to brief members of the Board on disciplinary procedures and 
suspension. He concluded his presentation by saying 'that the policy relating to suspension 
seems to be fair and reasonable and if exercised responsibly it should normally satisfy everyone 
who has an interest in the matter. ,76 To this presentation Haysom responded in writing.77 In a 
damning comment on existing police disciplinary procedures, Haysom described the SAP's 
procedure and practice in regard to suspension of policemen and women as 'unfair and unjust; 
arbitrary and selectively used ... out of line with practices in police forces elsewhere, and in 
conflict with current industrial relations practices.'78 Here the appeal to international best 
practices was obvious enough. 
A proposal for a new complaints procedure to an impartial body was accepted by the 
Board and then discussed with the Minister of Law and Order. The Board's recommendations 
were forwarded to the SAP Legal Services and submitted to the Sub-council on Law and Order, 
Stability and Security of the Transitional Executive Council. Such proposals formed the 
75 Proposal submitted to the National Police Board, by Col J.C. Naude on 'Establishing a Unit to Investigate Criminal Offences 
Against Members of the Force,' 29 June 1992. 
76 See Briefing by Col Mulder van Eyck to members of the Police Board regarding the disciplinary procedure in the 
South African Police, 3 September 1993. 
77 Haysom, N. I 993b. Suggestions for Improvement to the Police Disciplinary Procedure. Submission to the Police 
Board. 
78 Ibid: pp.2-3. 
81 
backbone of the proposed Independent Police Complaints Council as set out in section 15 (1)( c) 
of the Transitional Executive Council. 
3.6.4 Restructuring police training 
The sub-committee on Police Training of the Police Board became one of the most active 
and strategically successful of the Board's various sub-committees (See Chapter 5). In its focus 
on police training, the Police Board could count on support and expertise from various quarters. 
The Strategic Plan of 1991 had already identified training as an area requiring revamping and 
investment. The desirability of international exchange and input into training so as to offset the 
damage caused by international isolation was acknowledged within the police organisation. The 
Board could thus count on the support of the police bureaucracy. Reform of training was simply 
considered less contentious than many other aspects, such as reform of disciplinary procedures, 
for example. In ANC policy circles, too, the strategic importance of an overhaul of police 
training was well appreciated. 79 It too had been identified in a confidential briefing document as 
one of the critical areas of reform. Furthermore, as an area suited to technical transfer, reform 
efforts could count on donor support that was said to be readily forthcoming. 
The three members of the Board responsible for co-ordinating the work of the Training 
Committee were Janine Rauch,so Professor Clifford Shearing, and General Cronje (the 
Divisional Head of Physical Services). At the second meeting of the Board, Rauch tabled a 
research report on police training, which she had completed a few months earlier. Entitled "'Drill 
is the Means, Discipline is the End": Basic Training in the SAP,' the paper provided an 
assessment of the basic training programme at police colleges. Rauch argued that the basic 
training of police recruits exhibited a number of problematic features: a preoccupation with drills 
and parades; hierarchical interaction between students and trainers; a tendency toward repetition, 
rote learning and front-loading in the classroom; and a focus on knowledge-based assessment. As 
for the paramilitary habit of mind at work in the field of police training Rauch (1992a: 13) 
79 See submission of the Police Project on Police Accountability to the ANC aligned PPG - dated late 1991. 
80 At the time, Rauch was a researcher attached to the Policing Project at the University of the Witwatersrand. 
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commented as follows: 'The social life and culture of the colleges are characierised by 
regimentation and uniformity, reflecting the philosophies of discipline and drill which underpin 
the training as a whole. The colleges merely reflect the features of the prevailing police culture.' 
In the conclusion to the report, it was recommended that ' training must remain a focus of reform 
energies .. . . because the training sphere is a microcosm of the Police Service at large, reflecting 
its convictions, its discontents, its relationships, maybe even its future .' (See Chapter 5 for 
further discussion). 
Rauch's excursion into the content and dynamics of police training made an important 
contribution to the sparse South African police literature on this issue. Within the context of the 
Police Board, this research report was used to galvanise support for the reform of training. The 
subcommittee was required to advise on the way forward . The restructuring of training, it 
argued, must be informed by a new vision for the SAP. In a short policy paper on the police role 
in a rapidly changing context, there was reference to th-e need for adhering to ' international 
norms of professional policing,81 as a way of addressing the legacy of adversarial police-
community relations. The hand of Clifford Shearing was evident in the argument that, 
internationally, policing had become focused on a problem-solving approach . Such an approach, 
he argued, relied on an integration of police and community resources. In the South African case, 
nothing short of a 'thorough review and revamping of basic training' was required. The policy 
paper helped frame the debate on the utilisation of expertise situated outside the police 
institution. Before long, the Minister announced that an independent expert committee would be 
appointed to investigate training within the SAP. 
The sub-committee on police training was instrumental in the creation of two structures 
of importance to the restructuring of police training: the International Training Committee (ITC) 
and the Multi-National Implementation Team (MIT).82 With international backing from both 
developmental agencies and foreign police institutions, the deliberations of the sub-committee on 
Police Training were quickly transformed into an effective pressure group. With such backing it 
81 Subcommittee on Police Training, Report I to the Police Board, 6 August 1992 (p.2). 
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commanded a considerable measure of persuasive power within the police organisation. A later 
chapter (Chapter 5) will take forward the developments regarding basic training up to and 
including the implementation of a new basic training course for police recruits. 
3.7 Closing down 
In November 1994 the work of the Board was brought to a conclusion. Its closure was 
commemorated by a farewell dinner held at the Training College in Pretoria. Earlier in the year, 
there had been clear indications that the role of the Police Board was being overtaken by events. 
In a context of dramatic political changes, alternative policy centres were being created. First 
came the Transitional Executive Council's (TEC's) Sub-committee on Law and Order that took 
responsibility for drafting interim legislation. Initially the Board played a supportive role vis-a-
vis the TEe. But before long there was concern about the way in which the Board was being 
marginaiised in the Sub-council's deliberations. After the general elections a number of civilian 
members of the Board were appointed to political/policy positions.g3 
After the general elections of April 1994, a newly styled Ministry of Safety and Security 
took charge of the police bureaucracy. By then already it was clear that the momentum of 
political change had overtaken the Board. Devised as a policy mechanism to help facilitate a 
process whereby police-community relations could be normalised and aspects of police reform 
could be developed, by mid-1994 it had become a spent force. From then onwards policing 
policy became the prerogative of interim advisory structures, a wide variety of Technical Teams, 
and later, the newly established policy centre of the Ministry, the National Secretariat. 
3.8 Conclusion 
The Board's influence vis-a-vis the development of policing policy in support of 
82 The Sub-Committee on Police Training set out the Tasks for the International Training Committee and the 
Multinational Implementation Team in a document titled Proposals on Training tabled at the Meeting of the Police 
Board, October 1993. 
83 See footnote 19 for details on the career moves of key civilians on the Board after the elections in April 1994. 
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democratic constitutionalism was constrained by a variety of factors . Issues of structural design 
played an important part in the scheme of things. In the absence of statutory powers the Board 
had little official clout to radically redefine the terms of reference for transitional policing. For 
purposes of influencing aspects of policing policy - particularly in the early phase - it remained 
ever dependent on the power of brokerage that the police generals could wield within the larger 
police organisation. In some respects the Board remained a structure of peripheral importance to 
many of the policy manoeuvrings that interest groups within the police organisation were 
pursuing. Planning around organisational restructuring, for example, proceeded without any 
recourse to the Police Board . As a lever of influence, the Police Board was always dependent on 
the goodwill and support of the police bureaucracy. Some would argue that the Board was never 
intended to play more than a symbolic role. 'It was toothless. The Board was never meant to be 
more than an exercise in window dressing,' as one General put it.84 Other factors also impacted 
on its role. In the first phase of its existence, the Board operated in an environment where 
political control over the police remained firmly embedded in National Party hands. By late 
1993, however, a shift in political power-relations created a certain momentum for change on 
which the Board could capitalise. By the time that political control moved toward ~e 
Transitional Executive Council, the Board became displaced as other policy centres of 
importance to the future of policing emerged. Before long, the reason for the initial existence of 
the Board became obsolete. In this way, the Board became a casualty of a political process that 
delivered the outlines of a new political order as well as broad agreements for a security sector 
subject to democratic control. 
Despite its short lifespan and the absence of any statutory powers, the Police Board 
deserves recognition for its role as a conduit of reformist ideas and practices associated with 
democratic policing. As an interim policy mechanism, the Board helped set the agenda for police 
reform in very particular ways. The Board focused its deliberations on a number of strategic 
priorities: police training; the police complaints system; and mechanisms of civilian oversight 
and community policing. The Board provided a convenient platform for a number of 
strategically-minded players to frame a reformist agenda. 
84 Interview, former Police General and Member of the Board, LM, Pretoria, 3 September 2003. 
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Various sub-committees of the Board succeeded in setting in motion processes of reform 
on which other subsequent structures (TEC; the National Secretariat of the newly established 
Ministry of Safety and Security) capitalised. Key to the success of the Board was the way in 
which it utilised both international and local expertise in mobilising support for reform of the 
former authoritarian police institution. During the course of its short existence it deployed 
innovative strategies based on elite networking across a number of interlocking institutions. Such 
institutions ranged from research units, to political structures (ANC, National Peace Accord, the 
Goldstone Commission), and civil society structures (NGOs such as IDA SA, Lawyers for 
Human Rights [LHR] and others played prominent roles). In addition, networking also 
succeeded in identifying and involving reformist-orientated members of the police organisation 
in the discussions on the future of the police in a constitutional democracy. Lastly, the Police 
Board provided a social laboratory within which strategically placed individuals could both 
conceptualise and refine an agenda for police reform, which tater provided a blueprint of sorts 
for the new Ministry of Safety and Security. 
86 
, .' ". .. . ' .. :~ . . . . ~ .... . '."' ... .. - . . ~ ,.. .. • .. ..< 
Chapter 4 
International Aid and National Police Reform: 
Issues and Trends 
4.1 Introduction 
In the post-Cold War environment, there has been a substantial rise in foreign assistance 
to the police in emerging democracies. Increasingly this aid forms part of sectoral interventions 
by developmental agencies in the reconstruction of criminal justice systems specifically, or the 
security sectors more broadly. As a consequence, developmental agencies constitute an 
important conduit for (largely) western ideas and institutional practices associated with 'good 
governance' and the 'effective delivery' of security services. Academic interest in the shape and 
impact of this kind of assistance has grown concomitantly, as illustrated in the contemporary 
debates on security sector reform (Ball, 2002; Ball et ai., 2003; Brzoska, 2003; Cawthra & 
Luckham (eds) 2003; Winkler, 2002). 
From the early 1990s onwards, in South Africa too, the international development 
community became a significant player in the field of criminal justice and police reform. By way 
of introduction, this chapter briefly outlines the nature of the debate on good governance and 
security sector reform, as well as the role of developmental agencies in assisting police abroad . 
Thereafter the focus shifts to foreign aid in support of South Africa's transition toward a 
constitutional democracy, with a specific emphasis on foreign developmental assistance to the 
public police. In doing so, thematic shifts in developmental assistance for the period 1994-2002 
are briefly identified. Such shifts are interpreted as dynamic responses to both local and 
international changes in the crime environment on the part of policy elites. This discussion aims 
at setting the scene for a more detailed presentation of three case studies of foreign assistance in 
support of police reform in South Africa for the period 1994 to 2003. 
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4.2 Good governance and security sector reform 
Development agencies of the leading economic powers have long constituted one of the 
most influential channels for transporting policy ideas and associated practices across borders 
and continents. In recent years the notion of good governance has come to occupy a central 
place in developmental agencies' debates on how best to facilitate processes of democratisation 
in states in transition. Practices commonly associated with good governance include respect for 
the rule of law, accountabi lity and transparency in government, and efficient public 
administration. More recently, the challenges associated with the institutionalisation of good 
governance in the security sector have also begun to receive more substantive recognition. 
The concept of security sector reform (first introduced by Clare Short, British Minister of 
International Development, in a speech del ivered in 199885) has become popularised in 
developmental circles, as new opportunities for international peaceke.epit;l~, opened up at the end 
. . . . 
of the 1980s. International pe-acekeeping efforts raised the profile of issues relating to the police, 
the military, as well as the justice system in post-conflict reconstruction. By the late 1990s the 
growing concern with public sector reform, to enhance service delivery more generally, also 
infiltrated discussions on security sector reform with an attendant emphasis on government's role 
in the provision of security to its citizens (Brzoska, 2003). 
Currently security sector reform is regarded as crucial for the prospects for democratic 
consolidation in transitional states. As Winkler (2002 :4) argues: 'It is indeed increasingly 
recognised that the reform and control of the security sector is an indispensable precondition for 
human and economic development.' On closer scrutiny, however, the concept of security sector 
reform harbours conceptual and political controversies. The question as to which institutions 
constitute part of the security sector has el icited different responses ranging from broad to 
narrow definitions. 86 Apart from the definitional issue, Brzoska (2003) notes that the concept 
85 According to Brozska (2003) the concept was used in a public speech by Clare Short, Minister for International 
Development in the newly created Department for International Development (DFID). 
86 Williams (2000) distinguishes between three approaches : the minimalist approach defines the security sector as 
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also masks important ideological differences. Some commentators, for exampie, see the primary 
objective of security sector reform as entrenching good governance, with a particular emphasis 
on accountability and effective oversight. Others see the provision of basic security in itself (with 
a resulting emphasis on capacity building and skills transfer) as of critical importance. It is in the 
context of transitional societies, characterised by high rates of violent crime, that these various 
approaches play themselves OUt. 87 In emphasising that security sector reform is a process, 
Edmunds (2002) explains that, in the post-authoritarian context, security sector reforms fall into 
two interrelated phases. 
First generation SSR concerns the establishment of new institutions, structures and chains 
of responsibility for the security sector. Second generation SSR concerns the 
consolidation of previous reforms, and the effective and efficient operation of institutions 
and procedures at a sustainable cost for the state and society (Edmunds, 2002: 16). 
To reiterate: in the post-Cold War era, interest in the capacity of donors to help shape 
institutional restructuring of the security sector has grown steadi Iy (Ball, 2002; Ball et af., 2003; 
Cawthra, 2003; Hutchful, 2003; Hills, 2002). On the practical side of the debate, donor agencies 
are particularly concerned with developing strategic guidelines for assisting reform of security 
sector institutions.88 Critical reviews of developmental assistance are beginning to generate 
various lessons both for policy development and for implementation in the field. Some broad 
principles have emerged from the comparative debate on good practices for justice and security 
sector reform. These principles include the need for: 
- setting clear parameters for assistance (Ball, 2002); 
being composed of statutory forces concerned with the maintenance of state security . The maxima/ist approach 
includes all institutions both statutory and non-statutory concerned with physical security. The author goes on to 
advocate a pragmatic approach that combines both statutory mechanisms of state-centered security as well as non 
statutory (including paramilitary formations) mechanisms that routinely took part in the maintenance of physical 
security (Also see Edmunds, 2002; Ball, 2000; Ball et aI., 2003). 
87 In the post-9I11 environment, developmental assistance may well be tipped in favour of support for building 
institutional capacity (ie effectiveness) of security regimes confronted with the threat of global terrorism (Brzoska, 
2003). 
88 One example of the strategic terms of reference is Ball's (2000) specification of the priorities for security sector 
reform articulated from a governance perspective. 
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- clarity about the objectives of aid; 89 
- balancing short-term and long-term interests in aid packages (Isaacson & Ball 2003); 
- developing a sectoral approach toward police reform, for example, as part and parcel of 
a much broader investment in criminal justice reform (Biddle, Clegg & Whetton, 1999); 
- advancing a participative model of assistance based on close consultation between 
recipient and donor, so as to tune aid to local needs and through that to advance local 
ownership of projects (Ball, 2000; Ziegler & Neild, 2002; DFID, 2003); 
- co-ordinating developmental assistance so as to align efforts of various agencies; 
- utilising confidence-building measures (Ball, 2000); and lastly, 
- conducting impact assessments to generate critical lessons for future assistance (Ball, 
2002; Ball et al., 2003). 
In the case of Africa, restructuring of the security sector is a truly complex enterprise, 
given the historical legacy of civi I-military relations, the overall weaknesses besetting state 
institutions, and the resulting governance deficits (Hills, 2000). Such is the scale of the 
undertaking that Ball et al. (2003) have argued that it is much more appropriate to talk about 
security sector transformation as opposed to mere reform. They explain that: 
transformation processes need to address four institutional aspects of each of the security 
bodies: its organizational character, its cultural make-up, its human resource practices 
and, critically, its political relationships with both the elected authorities and with the 
civil power. Failure to address all four of these areas will, invariably, result in a failure to 
address the fundamental character and purpose of the institution in question and thus 
reduce the likelihood that the transformation process will succeed (Ball et al., 2003 :267). 
Given the Western origin of the concept of security sector reform, its operationalisation 
in the developing world presents various challenges. The importance of developing a distinctly 
African tradition of security sector reform is a point made succinctly by Williams (2000:3) : 
A rigorous and strategic indigenisation of the concept will be required on the African 
89 As [saacson and Ball (2003) argue, this requires clarity on the centrality of core objectives, such as democratic 
accountability, civilian oversight, and professional capacity. 
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content, however, if any semblance of local ownership is to be effected, and if any 
potential discrediting of the concept, from opportunistic and predictable political quarters, 
is to be avoided. 
4.3 Police reform and development assistance 
Police reform constitutes one component of security sector reform. Over the past decade 
the role of foreign agencies in domestic projects aimed specifically at police reform has 
increased dramatically. However, what distinguishes the current phase of foreign aid to police 
reform is that the pursuit of the latter is embedded in a larger strategic framework for advancing 
'democratic governance.' In the decade of the 1990s, as Bayley (2001 :76) recently (and 
somewhat optimistically) concluded, the principles of democratic policing were 'no longer 
prob lematic.' 
A body of literature evaluating this trend has developed· and can be illustrated with 
examples from the case of US foreign assistance to police reform. In 1995, the American 
policing scholar, David Bayley (1995), reviewed the scope for US foreign policy initiatives in 
democratic policing abroad, and formulated eleven guiding principles for foreign assistance to 
police. Six years later, In Democratizing the Police Abroad: What 10 Do and How 10 Do it, 
Bayley (2001) again engaged with this complex terrain, and suggested guidelines for 
developmental agencies involved in institutional transformation. In this latter analysis he notes 
the existence of a tension between support for the police driven by the agenda of democracy and 
'protection against international criminal activity' (p.5).90 A similar point (as discussed in 
Chapter 2 [section 2.7]) regarding inherent tensions in the reform process is contained in a recent 
publication from the prestigious Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) (Ziegler & 
Neild, 2002), entitled From Peace to Governance. 
A further source of pragmatic ideas on how best to support the rebuilding of police 
90 As Bayley (200 I :5) puts it: '(D)uring the I 990s, the US government gradually learned a major policy lesson: that 
security is important to the development of democracy and police are important to the character of that security. 
Assisting in the democratic reform of foreign police systems has become a front-burner issue in American foreign 
policy.' 
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institutions IS emergIng from international peacekeeping efforts in post-conflict contexts. 
Assessments of the work undertaken by agencies such as the United Nations Civilian Police 
(UNCIVPOL) to restructure security agencies in 'collapsed states' (Holm & Eide, 2000) have 
added insights into the politics and logistics of police reconstruction, the role of transnational 
agencies in such endeavours, and the institutional prerequisites for optimal results. 
While much of the debate on foreign assistance to police abroad is practitioner-
orientated, there are also more conceptual explorations of the scope and objectives of such 
reform. The leading voices on this front are undoubtedly those of Bayley and Shearing (1996; 
2001). In short, these authors have argued that the field of policing has been subject to dramatic 
shifts. The structural processes which have fed into pluralisation of policing at the global level 
have been discussed earlier in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. At the national level, the consequences 
of such developments have been an increasingly complex division of policing labour between the 
state, market, and civil society. New pressures are also forthcoming from the transnational and 
international arena. As they argue: 
Policing today is being restructured away from nation-states by two forces: 
multilateralization within countries and supranationalization among countries. In both 
cases, policing is no longer being constructed and provided exclusively by nation-states. 
It is quite unclear how these forces will play out in the next few years. The possibilities 
are worthy of a millennium (Bayley & Shearing, 2001 :40). 
The structural shifts in policing demand a reconceptualisation of policing, its form, 
content, and objectives. Such a reconceptualisation has ramifications for the reform of police and 
policing. In the early phase of South African debates on police reform (and the role of the 
international community), Brogden and Shearing (1993) challenged the conventional, state-
centred approach to the reform of the public police (as discussed in more detail in Chapter 2) and 
argued in favour of a 'dual system' of policing.91 
With this brief sketch of the contemporary debate on developmental assistance to police 
91 These ideas were woven into a 'nodal conception of governance' consisting of a regulated network of 
' participatory nodes' (Shearing, 200 I :259). 
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agencies abroad, the discussior.. now turns to the South African case. 
4.4 Developmental assistance in the South African transition 92 
Any revIew of developmental assistance to post-1994 South Africa demands at least 
some reference to the broader context. There are two aspects of note in this regard. First, post-
1994 developments need to be situated against the role of international support for the anti-
Apartheid movement and its subsidiary organisations up until the early 1990s. Second, 
developmental assistance to post-1990 South Africa needs to be assessed against developmental 
assistance in the rest of the African continent. To take the last point first: compared to the rest of 
Africa, the relative importance of donor assistance to South Africa is small. This stands in sharp 
contrast to the increase in donors' sphere of influence regarding domestic policy in Africa from 
the 1980s onwards. In terms of the logic associated with structural adjustment and 'donor 
conditionality,,93 the granting of aid has become increasingly subject to the implementation of 
domestic policies that will advance both liberalisation of the market and democratisation of the 
state. Through such conditionality agreements, external actors become key players in . the 
domestic policy arena by defining agendas for policy. As Lise! Rakner (2003:35), in her incisive 
review of the role of donor aid in economic iiberalisation and political reform in large parts of 
Africa, remarks: 'More than in any other area of the world, political and economic developments 
in Africa have been heavily influenced and shaped by the changing trends of the international 
development aid debates and policies.'94 
92 This part of the discussion relies on detailed empirical research of the content of donor assistance in the criminal 
justice field that was conducted in two phases, 1998 and 2002. The initial research was conduced at the request of 
the United Nations Office in South Africa with the view to enhancing the trans formative impact of developmental 
assistance on criminal justice reform. For purposes of this thesis I extrapolate from that body of research both 
empirical findings and social observations relevant to the topic of this inquiry, ie the role of the international 
development community in the process of local police reform. 
93 As pursued by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in particular. 
94 Yet, as the Zambian case study illustrates, the relationship between government, internal opposition and external 
actors is always complex. Many factors impact on the capacity of anyone of the key players to shape domestic 
policy agendas . The influence wielded by the international donor community in reform efforts may well be far less 
than the standard conspiratorial depictions of donor aid as a form of new age imperialism. 
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As already stated, international aid in support of democratising the South African state 
and society from 1990 onwards constitutes a new phase in foreign support for the struggle 
against Apartheid. The South African 'problem' has long been internationalised. Moral 
condemnation of white minority rule went hand in hand with financial support in the struggle for 
economic and political rights amongst the disenfranchised. After 1990, the efforts of major 
powers regarding South Africa switched from pressure on Pretoria for a change in its ways, to 
what might be termed 'Project South Africa': an anxious, helping, and of course self-interested 
concern to facilitate the democratic transition. The election of a government of national unity in 
1994, as Bratton and Landsberg (1999: 1) point out, ' signalled the onset of large-scale, longer-
term bilateral programmes of official development co-operation with the South African 
government. ' 
However, in stark contrast to the dependency on aid of other developing countries in 
Africa, official donor assistance to South Africa in the late 1990s constituted less than 2 per cent 
of its annual budget (Department of Finance, 2000b: 1). Unlike its continental neighbours, South 
Africa has not been subject to either economic or political conditionaiity. On the contrary, the 
main authors of structural adjustment have been indigenous rather than foreign. So, for example, 
it can be argued that the macro-economic policy of the Mandela and Mbeki administrations, the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), represents a locally driven structural 
adjustment initiative. In this context, one would expect the external policy relationship between 
the post-Apartheid government and the developmental community to be of a different order to 
that encountered elsewhere in Africa. As argued in an official report on developmental assistance 
for the period 1994-1999: 
SA is a paradoxical recipient of aDA. This is a confident, resource rich, middle-income 
country, straddling many worlds. It is pivotally and influentially located at the strategic 
heart of a range of international relationships of symbolic and structural importance .... 
aDA commitments now constitute fractionally over 1 % of the SA Government's Budget 
and less than 0.3 % of the country' s GOP .... The financial value of aDA to the country 
is thus of marginal significance, leaving the country free to take an open and objective 
look at the qualitative strategic value of aDA (Department of Finance, 2000a: 1). 
The nature and destination of developmental aid in South Africa since 1994 is fairly well 
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documented. With regards to the sectoral distribution of aid, the following five sectors have 
dominated: education, agriculture, business development, health and housing, and democracy 
and governance (Bratton & Landsberg, 1999). It is the last-named category that is of interest for 
this analysis. A sizeable proportion of overall Official Developmental Assistance (ODA), 
particularly in the form of grants and technical assistance, has been earmarked for good 
governance and democracy. 95 According to the tallies from official sources, donor support in this 
area constitutes approximately 8 per cent of overall overseas developmental assistance 
(Department of Finance, 1999). Between 1994 and 1998, the justice cluster received about R256 
million in ODA, of which, as calculated, 65 per cent went to justice and 35 per cent to safety and 
security (Ibid.). Such figures, however, need to be treated with caution. The difficulties 
associated with translating donor assistance - particularly of a technical kind - into monetary 
terms make this exercise a daunting one. Despite such difficulties, the above figures do provide a 
rough numerical baseline for the ensuing discussion. 
Compared to other developing countries, Bratton and Landsberg (1999) note, the South 
African Government has so far succeeded in setting its own developmental priorities for donor 
assistance. In doing so, the South African government has been much more successful than any 
other African country in determining the terms and content of international assistance. Strategic 
frameworks designed within core departments of the criminal justice system have been useful 
mechanisms for steering developmental assistance to this sector in locally defined directions. As 
such, the South African case study differs substantially from the situation prevailing in most 
other African societies, where donor conditionality dominates. A critical ingredient in the South 
African capacity to shape developmental assistance to local priorities has been the state's efforts 
to manage developmental assistance in a more proactive manner. It is to local efforts aimed at 
co-ordinating assistance that the discussion now briefly turns. 
Local efforts towards the co-ordination of official donor assistance in South Africa have 
evolved over a period of eight years . An important milestone along the way was the publication 
95 As the Development Co-operation Report (Department of Finance, 1999:24) states: 'It is evident that the major 
portion of ODA in the form of grants and technical assistance is to the democracy and governance cluster.' 
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of the Development Co-operation Report (Report I), commissioned jointly by the United Nations 
Developmental Programme and the Department of Finance in August 1998 (Department of 
Finance, 1999). This report reviewed ODA for the period 1994-1998. It included an attempt to 
capture in quantitative terms the extent of Overseas Developmental Assistance (ODA) across 
sub-sectors of government, and assessed the effectiveness of foreign funding expenditure. It put 
forward several recommendations regarding future management of developmental assistance, 
based on lessons learnt since 1994. The report made it clear that '[t ]he essential point of 
departure for the government was that it would attempt to exercise a greater degree of control 
over development assistance than was customary among recipient countries' (Department of 
Finance, 1999:30). 
A second landmark in the process toward co-ordination of developmental assistal).ce was 
the publication of the Development Co-operation Report II in October 1999 (Department of 
Finance, 2000a) . This report provides a critical review of the evolution of aid during the 1990s, 
its substantive preoccupations, and the blockages experienced within the aid management system 
for the period 1994-8. As a conclusion, it also crafted a strategic framework within which future 
donor , aSJ;istance should be procured. In line with notions of local ownership of international 
development assistance, it advocated the local management of the development assistance 
programme. This model was to be explicitly South African-led. The point was argued in the 
Report as follows: 
. .. SA needs to authoritatively lead the process of managing ODA, consciously and 
discerningly dictating the nature, source, form and content of ODA in order to ensure that 
ODA makes a significant contribution to the country's development, does not divert the 
development process and, at the very least, does not wastefully and ironically consume 
SA's own resources in the process of managing ODA (Ibid: 12). 
In pursuit of a South African-led programme of development assistance, the absence of 
information management tools to capture ODA flows was seen as a particular shortcoming. The 
urgency of addressing this particular weakness that characterised donor co-ordination was 
emphasised at the time. It is against this background that efforts emerged to develop a 
Development Co-operation Information System (DcrS) under the auspices of the Chief 
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Directorate of International Development Co-operation (IDC), located in the Department of the 
Treasury.96 The achievements to date and the obstacles encountered are discussed in greater 
detail elsewhere (Van der Spuy, 2003). 
4.5 International aid and South African police reform 
Before sketching the main concerns of aid for police reform since 1994, a brief review of 
aid to the criminal justice sector as a whole provides some essential context. In an audit of 
developmental aid undertaken in 1998, (Van der Spuy et aI., 1998) three broad categories of 
assistance to the criminal justice field were identified: Human Resource Management and 
Development; Institutional and Administrative Development; and Logistical Development. For 
the period 1994-1998 the bulk of such assistance, of either a technical or financial nature, was 
channelled towards the Department of Justice and the Department of Safety and Security. In 
contrast at the time, the Department of Correctional Services hardly featured as a recipient of aid. 
These categories of assistance translated into the police organisation as follows: Human 
Resource Development stretched across a wide terrain, with educational courses in human rights, 
gender sensitivity, race equity, and victim-rights, particularly in the area of domestic violence 
and violence against children. Investment in training at both the basic and specialised levels 
consumed a major portion of developmental assistance. And lastly, in the early phase, the 
importation of ideas, principles, and practices associated with community policing proved a 
popular theme of assistance packages. The content and direction of institutional change was 
defined by various management structures operative within the Department of Safety and 
Security in pursuit of the three key areas of institutional restructuring: amalgamation, 
rationalisation, and democratisation of the police organisation. With regard to Institutional 
Development, aid was deployed in support of civilian oversight on the one hand, and complex 
change management processes on the other. Both technical and financial assistance has been 
channelled toward the development of Information Technology and the provision of basic 
96 See Van der Spuy (2003) for an account of the development of the DClS. the difficulties negotiated and the 
achievements thus far. 
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equipment with the view to creating a modern infrastructural base within the police organisation. 
Regarding the obstacles confronting the system of official donor assistance in its early 
phase, the South African experience confirms many of the procedural ailments besetting foreign-
funded projects elsewhere. To name some of the most central: unduly complex managerial 
systems; poor strategic assessment of both the sustainability and suitability of aid packages 
imported from abroad; I imited managerial capacity within local institutions to absorb best 
practices extracted from elsewhere; vague programme objectives; insufficient mechanisms of co-
ordination and oversight of foreign funded projects; and weak communication linkages between 
key players partaking in aid programmes. Having said that, it is also important to highlight that, 
in a relatively short period of time, many lessons have been learnt. Since 1996 in particular the 
system of management pertaining to externally-funded programme objectives has become much 
more streamlined. Individual line-departments within the justice cluster have made concerted 
efforts to clarify the administrative rules regarding the management of aid. Furthermore, the 
search for suitable mechanisms of co-ordination has yielded positive effects - in some 
departments, such as Safety and Security, much more than in others (Van der Spuy et aI., 1998). 
4.6 Shifts in developmental assistance to the South African police institution: From 
'good governance' to the 'war on crime' 
A more longitudinal view of developmental assistance for policing reform stretching over 
a period of ten years, suggests interesting shifts in emphases. Elsewhere I have argued that, for 
the period 1990-2000, three phases can be identified with regard to donor assistance for policing 
reform. For purposes of this discussion, a condensed version of the original argument is 
presented (See Van der Spuy, 2000). 
In the first phase (1992-1996), Western assistance to the police was driven by the need to 
transform an apartheid institution into an accepted and legitimate organ of social control. To this 
end, the doctrine of community policing provided a very useful prism through which policing 
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reform, both within and beyond the state, could be viewed. The model of community policing 
also contributed to an increasing oscillation of local policing ideas towards the Western norm. 
Material and symbolic incentives to encourage state reform were readily forthcoming. On the 
recipient side of the equation there was, at the time, a laissez faire attitude toward developmental 
assistance. It was a case, as someone put it, 'of taking whatever was on offer' without too much 
anxiety about its applicability or sustainability. This attitude was in itself indicative of a lack of 
strategic capacity within recipient institutions in this early phase to proactively solicit and 
manage donor assistance (skills rarely practised during the period of international isolation under 
Apartheid). As a consequence, donor assistance for this period often appeared ad hoc and 
fragmented. 
The following examples illustrate the space that the community police model opened up 
for international intervention into local policing. Between 1994 and 1996, three major foreign 
developmental projects in the policing terrain were operationalised as community policing 
initiatives. 
- The Commonwealth involvement in the Basic Level Training Pilot Programme had, as 
a key objective, the creation of ' community police officers.' 
- The Western Cape Community Policing Project (a United Kingdom initiative) became a 
collaborative project between the provincial police ministry and NGOs, aimed at the 
formation of community policing forums at station levels in the province of the Western 
Cape.97 
- The Community Policing Pilot Project locked the Belgian Gendarmerie and the SAPS 
into a five-year bilateral agreement with the aim of embedding community policing 
principles at 43 stations nation-wide. 
All three projects had a common objective: to entrench the philosophy of community 
policing in police operational practice. Beyond the commonality of that broad objective, however, 
97 Entrenched by statute in the South Africa Police Services Act of 1995, community police forums came to be 
viewed as the key institutional mechanisms for democratising the police at the local, station level. 
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there were a number of important differences: the objective characteristic of the donor institution 
involved, the depth and breadth of donor involvement, the strategies deployed in pursuit of the 
objective, the working methodologies utilised, the exact point of entry,98 the extent of the 
involvement of civil society structures, and the degree of control that the foreign donor exerted 
over the process. 
An analysis of these three examples of donor-assisted projects provides a useful glimpse 
into an intricate process, whereby the international policing machine was slowly extending its 
reach into the coercive centre of the post-Apartheid state. These examples also illustrate the extent 
to which the (nebulous) doctrine of community policing provided a vehicle for transporting 
policing ideas and operational strategies from the North to the South. The preoccupation with 
community policing as a framework for donor assistance served several useful purposes. In many 
instances it locked civil society into projects for policing reform . A number of such foreign aided 
projects relied on the expertise of non-governmental structures. This was especially the case 
when it was a matter of consulting or involving 'the community' in ·the projected reform. The 
legitimisation of the public police was considered contingent on the involvement of local 
communities - a fairly radical idea for the previously authoritarian and centralised South African 
police structures. 
The importation of community policing notions in this phase was embedded within a 
sweeping policy framework for police reform. Initially the political frameworks for re-building 
society and restructuring the Apartheid state were idealistic . In the immediate aftermath of the 
elections of April 1994, policy documents emanating from the criminal justice quarters, as 
elsewhere, promoted the notion that radical reform of old structures was the main agenda. The 
Green Paper on PoliCing exemplified the grand terms of reference for institutional 
transformation of the police that the newly elected policing elite of the Government of National 
Unity (GNU) embraced . Apart from the daunting task of amalgamating and rational ising the 
disparate police and justice systems that existed under Apartheid into unitary state structures, the 
98 For instance, transnational organisation to SAPS, foreign government to police. Police to police., foreign donor to 
local NGO to police. 
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cultural habits of mind within the state had to be altered to embrace constitutionalism. Policy 
documents stressed the need for inculcating new attitudes and creating new mechanisms of 
accountability. A key theme was the need to respect human rights and due process. 
In practice the community involvement agenda did not translate smoothly into reality, 
and in many ways was sidelined. Whilst a range of factors contributed to this marginalisation of 
the doctrine of community policing, one factor in particular deserves attention. Amidst 
increasing lawlessness on the streets and growing public perceptions of 'impending anarchy' and 
a 'crime epidemic,' the demands for making effective 'war on criminaJs,99 rose to new heights. 
In order to do just that, the issue of institutional capacity of the public police agency moved to 
centre-stage. 
In the second phase, from 1996 onwards, Western efforts were directed towards aiding 
the South African government in confronting 'crime' as one of the most central challenges facing 
stabilisation of the emerging industrial democracy. In this context, the lack of institutional 
capacity within the police machinery to counteract crime became starkly evident. Donor 
assistance came to target the public police institution as the major beneficiary of assistance. Aid 
was aimed increasingly at improving the capacity within the public police agency to deliver basic 
services to its constituencies. As a consequence, institutional development and capacity building 
towards effective and efficient service delivery became the prominent preoccupations of 
international assistance. The logic of such assistance seemed to echo the political pragmatism in 
local governing circles in response to what Landsberg and Kabemba (1997) have called a 
perceived 'capacity deficit.' 
It was against this background that a shift in rhetorical appeals to accountability took 
place. While in the early period the project of state reform was aimed at a broad-based political 
legitimisation of the new state, by 199617 the emphasis had shifted to managerialist notions of 
accountability. Organisational restructuring had as its objective greater effectiveness and 
efficiency in service delivery by the police, rather than mere democratic accountability. 
99 Alluded to by President Mandela in his opening speech to Parliament, 9 February 1995 (Hansard, 1995: Col 12). 
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This shift led some observers to argue that the radical agenda of policing reform was 
being whittled down (Shaw & Shearing, 1998) . The anticipated incorporation of informal or 
' popular justice ' structures did not materialise, and policing assumed, on this view, its 
accustomed face. In this debate, the international donor community in particular was singled out 
- as was local corporate capital - as the culprits in sabotaging the project of policing reform in 
favour of mere police institutional reform. By and large, however, such critics were lonely voices 
at a time when the practicalities of fighting crime seemed the paramount and obvious necessity. 
The argument made little impact on those donors who were increasingly working closely with 
government rather than civil society, as in the pre-1994 period. 
Between 1996 and 1998, donor assistance In support of policing reform increasingly 
targeted the state at the expense of the non-governmental sector as its major beneficiary. The 
reasons behind this prioritisation of the public police were threefold . First, in the space of two 
years the state had made some progress in streamlining the mechanisms for managing donor 
assistance, and became an increasingly attractive site for foreign funds . By 1997, the rather ad hoc 
approach to tendering for and administering donor-assisted projects in the criminal justice system 
had given way to much more administrative formalism. Secondly, the decline in the fortunes of 
the non-governmental sector in this period, partly as a result of a post-1994 brain drain to the 
public service, also tipped the scale in favour of the state. Decisions to sub-contract portions of 
criminal justice reform to civil society structures were also increasingly left to the discretion of 
the state itself. loo Locked into a corporatist embrace with the state, NGOs came to enjoy less 
independence, while the hand of the state itself was strengthened vis-a.-vis the international aid 
community (Bratton & Landsberg, 1999). Thirdly, on the negative side of the equation, this 
targeting of the public sector was based on a growing international understanding of the 
structural weaknesses besetting the criminal justice system within the post-Apartheid state, and 
the importance of addressing such capacity deficits through developmental aid . If crime posed a 
formidable challenge to the consol idation of democracy, then the expansion of basic police 
100 Many donors exhibited thi s tendency. The Nordic countries, however, remained more committed to funneling 
funds directly through NGO networks . 
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capacity to deliver a measure of Jaw and order was imperative. 101 
The pragmatic spirit of this period became exemplified in the White Paper on Safety and 
Security, published in 1998. This policy document insisted on the need for rendering the police 
'accountable' in ways that emphasised police effectiveness and efficiency. In contrast to 1994, 
the earlier rather soft notions of accountability to the community were replaced by statements 
about an accountability that 'empowers the front liners to deliver' at the 'local level.' Here 
service delivery became championed as the key to police accountability. This led to an acute 
appreciation of the need for reforming investigative capacity - ie a woefully run-down detective 
force - within the pol ice organisation and for targeting resources to that purpose. In response to 
the White Paper, the SAPS formulated its goals for 1999/2000 as follows: to increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of criminal investigations; to target visible policing to address 
specific crimes; and to improve the quality of service to victims of crime (See SAPS, 1999). 
Again, such strategic assessments of the pressing concerns for institutional development had a 
formative effect on the programmatic objectives of the international aid community. It is at this 
time that a shift away from supporting policy-making toward policy implementation became 
evident. Middle-level police managers in particular were identified as a worthy target for foreign 
investment. In the period under review, capacity-building of this managerial layer of the 
organisation was central. Furthermore, investment in information management systems and 
technology was embraced as a prerequisite for improved service delivery. 
In the third period, from 1998 onwards, donor assistance was also strongly influenced by 
the very specific political concern with organised crime as a threat to global security. With the 
demise of the Cold War, debates on global security began to make strident references to 
organised crime as the cancerous growth of the next millennium. Transitional states in particular 
101 The drift towards co-operative governance within the criminal justice system and around 'priority crimes,' which 
was advocated in the National Crime Prevention Strategy of 1996, provided the administrative parameters within 
which donor contracts became designed. Thus the kinds of projects that attracted favourable attention for funding 
were precisely those which claimed to bolster the institutional capacity of the criminal justice system to wage, as the 
military metaphor would have it, effective 'war' on 'high-profile crimes.' In particular it singled out the need for 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice system without delay. In the end the re-
engineering of the criminal justice system came to consume the lion's share of donor resources between 1996 and 
1998. 
103 
were seen (by the developed world) to exhibit a great vulnerability to the predatory practices of 
trans-national criminal organisations (TCOs) . In such societies, TCOs add further 'turbulence to 
domestic politics and challenge the normal functioning of government and law' (Williams, 
1998:39). As a threat to global security, organised crime required counter-strategies at the inter-
governmental level. It is in line with this kind of thinking that we have seen a lively export _ 
from North to South - of 'best practices ' for making war on organised crime. 
In this period the substantive preoccupations of the donor regime came to exhibit a more 
focused character, with donor investments targeting law enforcement capacity in specific 
specialist quarters of the state. They homed in on the legal, administrative, and operational level, 
with the explicit intention of counteracting organised crime. It is in this latter period that an 
approach to developmental assistance that focused on the region rather than individual states 
became evident. Diplomatic pressure and technical assistance from abroad increasingly sought to 
expand operational capacity within police institutions of the twelve-nation Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). In this regional approach, the international aid community 
viewed South African law enforcement agencies as pivotal players through which law 
enforcement capacity within the region could be developed. 
4.7 Conclusion 
South African developments suggest that international aid has been an evolving 
enterprise, influenced by shifts in the local agenda for policing reform and by Western 
assessments of the challenges to global security, both from organised crime and more recently 
from global terrorism . In its description of the evolution of donor assistance, this discussion has 
outlined three modalities through which foreign governmental aid engaged with police reform in 
South Africa: community policing; professional policing to wage war on crime more generally; 
and specialist policing to wage war on organised crime more particularly. Each modality offered 
opportunities for extending policing ideas and operational philosophies in vogue in the North 
into the policing agency of a post-confl ict society. 
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International assistance to South Africa has been driven both by efforts to bring about a 
more rational, even humane, world order, and by the geo-political and material interests of the 
major donor countries in securing a stable free market economy on a continent desperately in 
need of economic progress. And, as shall be seen in following chapters, development agencies 
themselves exert their own dynamic on the form and content of foreign project assistance, as 
agency personnel pursue the next best idea in a career context. For South Africa itself, the influx 
of developmental assistance was a significant instrument by which the government as a whole, 
and the police in particular, came to participate in an increasingly joined-up world. After decades 
of isolation and only covert relationships with the world policing and security community, the 
SAPS was now firmly I inked with global policing theories and practices, all in part paid for by 
the major foreign donors. It is a trend that has continued ever since. 
With this broad overview of the form and content of development aid in support of South 
African police reform, as well as thematic shifts overtime, the discussion now turns to a more 
detailed engagement with three selected case studies of aid. 
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Chapter 5 
International Assistance and Reform of Basic Police Training 
in South Africa, 1994-5 
5.1 Introduction 
The discussion now turns to an account of one important police reform project 
that depended heavily on foreign assistance: the Basic Level Training Pilot 
Programme (BL TPP). Funded by the Office of Development Administration of the 
UK, and supported by a Commonwealth Advisory Team, the BL TPP constituted a 
sizeable intervention in a critical area of policing. In this discussion emphasis is on 
the actors, processes, and principles involved in the solicitation of aid and the 
implementation of the project. Opportunities utilised or discarded for aspects of 
policy diffusion, transference, and convergence in the field of basic training are 
outlined. 
5.2 Foreign assistance and police training: In search of international policing 
standards 
The area of police training has long been a popular target of development 
assistance, suited to the objectives of both professionalisation and democratisation. As 
articulated in the work of one critical structure which participated in the restructuring 
of basic police training in South Africa: 
Review of the basic level training programme is seen as one of the key 
elements in re-orientation of the SAPS towards the concepts of service and 
accountability to the community. It will also be an integral part of the Human 
Resource strategy for improving the competency and representativeness of the 
SAPS. 102 
102 MIT. 1994. Terms of reference for an advisor for the Multi-national Police Training 
Implementation Team. June. In-house document. 
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The difficulties associated with engendering such changes, and the appropriate 
strategies to be followed in pursuit thereof, are much better acknowledged at present 
than in the past (Chan, 1997; Marks, 2004; Brogden & Shearing, 1993). 
By the early 1990s, the necessity for the reform of police training in South 
Africa was well acknowledged in many circles. For example, the Police's own 
Strategic Plan of 1991 identified training as an area requiring revamping and 
investment (SAP, 1991). The desirability of international exchange and input into 
training so as to offset the damage caused by international isolation was conceded 
within the police organisation. Reform of training was simply considered less 
contentious than many other aspects, such as reform of disciplinary procedures, for 
example. In ANC policy circles, an overhaul of police training was identified in a 
confidential briefing document as one of the critical areas requiring reform as outlined 
in chapter 3. 103 In the South African case, enhancing respect and protection for 
human rights constituted critical components of a political project that aimed at the 
institutional reform of the public police agency (Brown & Van der Spuy, 1999). 
The strategic importance of international assistance In the restructuring of 
police training was an issue of debate. A briefing paper on the role of the international 
community in policing reform, developed for the Police Policy Group (PPG), set the 
tone for some of the discussions (Nathan, 1992). Drawing on Zimbabwean and 
Namibian experiences, the author identified police training as an area particularly 
suitable for foreign assistance and an exchange of personnel. Subsequently, Nathan 
(1993 : 121) argued that Namibian experiments in police reform provided a 'useful 
case study of a project to fundamentally alter the nature of apartheid policing.' 
Furthermore, as a sphere in which technical transfer was very feasible, reform efforts 
could count on donor support that was said at the time to be readily forthcoming. 
In opposition circles, before 1994 there was broad agreement that training had 
to be modernised to equip police officers with professional skills . On this score, 
international developments in 'new style training' were considered particularly 
103 See submission of the Police Project on Police Accountability to the ANC aligned Police Policy 
Group - dated late 1991 . This assessment was influenced by pioneering research undertaken by Janine 
Rauch (l992c) in the early 1990s. 
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critical for purposes of both human resource and infrastructural development. New 
strategies for recruitment and selection were an integral component of such 
restructuring. The latter, of course, were critical components of a larger endeavour to 
change the social composition of the public police institution in South Africa so as to 
become more representative of the population. 104 Lastly, but by no means less 
important, the reform of basic training was interpreted as a critical access point to 
engender a cultural change within the organisation by advocating new values and 
aligning institutional habits to international best practices. 
The recruitment and deployment of 1 760 community police officers in 1995 
provided an unprecedented opportunity to institutionalise modem democratic values 
and new professional skills within a police organisation which had long grown 
accustomed to serving regime interests in a repressive manner. Closer scrutiny of the 
arguments in support of restructuring of police training also suggested that police 
training was viewed as a pivotal medium through which the institutionalising of 
community policing as an organisational paradigm could be effected. Consider in this 
regard the argument set out in supportive material distributed amongst field training 
officers by the Multi-National Implementation Team (MIT, circa 1995): 
the philosophy and mission of Community Policing can drive all aspects of 
training, so that training becomes the key to promoting and institutionalizing 
the shift to Community Policing. This requires analyzing all aspects of training 
to ensure that they promote the mission of Community Policing which is to 
provide decentralized and personalized police service that empowers the 
community to participate as partners in the process of making their 
neighbourhoods better and safer places in which to live and work (p.l). 
5.3 The role of the Police Board in the restructuring of police training: 
Mobilising resources and setting the agenda 
As discussed in chapter 3, the Police Board became a critical player in 
promoting the reform of training police recruits. The sub-committee on Police training 
104 The importance of a change in social composition of the police agency was a point stressed by 
foreign advisors involved in the reform of the Namibian police. Nathan (1993) too argued in favour of 
transferring lessons for pol ice reform from one post-colonial context (Namibia) to another (South 
Africa). 
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of the Police Board became one of the most active and strategically successful of the 
Board's various sub-committees. The three members of the Board responsible for co-
ordinating the work of the Training Committee were Janine Rauch,105 Clifford 
Shearing, and General Cronje (the Divisional Head of Physical Services). 
At the second meeting of the Board, Rauch tabled the research report on police 
training to which reference has already been made above, as well as in chapter 3. She 
had completed this Report a few months earlier, under the auspices of the Policing 
Project of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR). The paper 
provided an assessment of the basic training programme at police colleges. Rauch 
concluded the report by arguing that the paramilitary habit of mind at work in the 
field of police training was quite pervasive. 
The social life and culture of the colleges are characterised by regimentation 
and uniformity, reflecting the philosophies of discipline and drill which 
underpin the training as a whole. The colleges merely reflect the features of 
the prevailing police culture (Rauch, I 992a: 13). 
It was against this background that she recommended that training must constitute a 
focus of reform efforts. 
Rauch's excursion into the content and dynamics of police training made an 
important contribution to the sparse South African police literature. Within the 
context of the Police Board, this research report was used to galvanise support for the 
reform of training. The sub-committee was asked to advise on the way forward. In 
response, the sub-committee argued that the restructuring of training had to be 
infonned by a new vision for the SAP. A short policy paper on the police role in a 
rapidly changing context argued that there was a need for adhering to international 
norms of professional policing l06 as a way of addressing the legacy of adversarial 
police-community relations. The hand of Clifford Shearing was evident in the 
argument that, internationally, policing had shifted towards a problem-solving 
methodology which emphasised a proactive and preventative approach rather than a 
105 At the time a researcher attached to the Policing Project at University of the Witwatersrand. 
106 Sub-committee on Pol ice Training, Report I to the Police Board, 6 August 1992:p.2. 
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reactive one. A problem-solving methodology was reliant on an integration of police 
and community resources. In the South African case, nothing short of a thorough 
review and restructuring of basic training was required. The policy paper helped 
frame the debate on the utilisation of expertise situated outside the police institution. 
Before long, the Minister announced that an independent expert committee would be 
appointed to investigate training within the SAP. 
The sub-committee on police training was instrumental in the creation of two 
structures of importance to the restructuring of police training: the International 
Training Committee (ITC), and the Multi-National Implementation Team (MIT). 
With international backing from both developmental agencies and foreign police 
institutions, the sub-committee, through its deliberations, was quickly transformed 
into an effective pressure group. With such backing, it commanded a considerable 
measure of persuasive power within the police organisation as an ally of some 
institutional importance to the political elite. 
5.4 The International Training Committee: Combining external and local 
expertise in re-conceptualising police training 
In October 1992 an International Training Committee was appointed to review 
and oversee all reform in the field of police training. To whom the ITC should report 
became an issue of contestation between the Board and the Minister. 107 Diplomacy 
guided the decision around the composition of the ITe. It was to consist of a mix of 
educational expertise drawn from institutions with a long-standing history of 
involvement in police education, such as UNISA, and more critical-orientated 
institutions, as well as foreign experts. 108 The utilisation of foreign expertise was of 
107 The Minister wanted the Training Committee to report directly to him . In a bid to protect its own 
autonomy the Police Board proposed that the lTC would report to the Minister through the Police 
Board. It resolved further that the Police Board was to scrutinise reports from the LTC before they were 
sent to the Minister. The Minister was quick to claim ownership of the initiative in stating that ' he 
deemed it necessary to appoint a committee of respected academics and experts to evaluate the full 
scope of training in the South African Police.' Letter from Minister Kriel to appointees of the 
International Training Committee dated 021I all 992. 
108 The following members were elected to the ITC: Prof. Paul Steyn as Chair (UNISA); Prof. Ben 
Smit (UNTSA); Prof. L.B.G. Ndabandaba (UNISA); Dr D.M. Moore (Technicon, SA); Janine Rauch 
and E. Marais (Wits); Prof. M. Brogden (UK); Ass Comm J. Ndambuki (Kenya Police); David 
Pickover (British police officer seconded to Namibia); Genl. P.J. Coetzee (SAP Academy); Col. N.J .C 
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both symbolic and strategic importance. It was symbolic in so far as it signalled the 
re-entry of the SAP into the international policing community after decades of 
international isolation. It was strategic in so far as the international experts brought 
the local training debate in line with international developments. The mandate of the 
ITC was 'to evaluate all aspects of training in the South African Police and determine 
standards and requirements for training which will comply with present-day demands 
and the needs of the community - compared to international standards' CITC Report, 
22 June 1993). 
As a way of furthering contact between the Board and the police-training 
establishment, members of the Board were urged to visit police training colleges close 
to them. 109 Access to training institutions was organised through a central directive 
from the Minister's office. Visits, limited as they were, provided an opportunity for 
advertising the work of the Police Board and engaging with the concerns of trainers at 
such institutions. In the Western Cape, a pilot project was conducted under the 
auspices of the Board. By involving Bishop Lavis and Paarl Training Colleges, it 
succeeded in opening up the debate about training concerns as perceived by trainers .. 
themselves, and yielded recommendations regarding reform of training establishments 
(Schwella, 1993). From this investigation followed some provisional 
recommendations for pursuing institutional reform at Paarl College, in particular. I 10 
Despite the fact that such interventions were piecemeal, it succeeded in making more 
visible the political rifts - between hawks and doves - within the police organisation. 
In the ensuing months the ITC proceeded to rewrite the script of basic policing 
training. The conceptual parameters were defined by the philosophy of community 
policing on the one hand, and the principle of probationary training on the other. In 
both respects the ITC could draw on the international expertise in its midst. In 
November 1993, at a formal ceremony held at Silverton College, the ITC presented its 
Olivier (SAP Training); Maj-Gen M. W. Cronje (SAP). 
109 See in this regard, for example, the Report on Visits to training centres in the Western Cape 
conducted during February/March 1993 and discussed at a Meeting of the Police Board, 4 February 
1994. 
110 Schwella, E. 1994. Investigation into Police Training Colleges in the Western Cape: Selected 
Provisional Proposals. Submitted to the Police Board, March 1994. 
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various reports to the Police Board (lTC Report, 1993). Broad agreement on the 
curriculum seemed to have been readily forthcoming. Overall the new curriculum was 
to emphasise interpersonal skills training. A more controversial aspect of 
restructuring, however, concerned the issue of ' demilitarisation.' Whilst the ITC 
allocated 44 periods to drill, MIT later questioned the wisdom of this decision in the 
light of the importance of moving away from a military model of training. III The 
emphasis on drill, in the view of MIT, further reduced the need for recruits to develop 
self-discipline (Ibid). 
5.5 Putting ideas into practice: The role of the Multi-National 
Implementation Team 
Implementation of the new script for police training became the responsibility 
of the Multi-National Implementation Team (MIT), whose mandate was ' to direct and 
achieve the implementation of the new South African Integrated Policing approach 
through Basic Training' (Multi-National Implementation Team, 1995: 1). Clifford 
Shearing had first mooted the idea of a MIT in a report to the Police Board in October 
1993 . The idea was taken up in full by the ITC. 112 Foreign donor interest in providing 
financial and technical assistance for the work of MIT was secured. With full political 
backing from the office of the newly appointed Ministry of Safety and Security, MIT 
commenced work in August 1994. Sixteen months later, in December 1995, it 
concluded its mission. A comprehensive overview of its work can be found in the 
Report on the Work o/the Multi-National Implementation Team on Police Training in 
SouthAfrica (Multi-National Implementation Team, 1995), spanning both a planning 
and implementation phase. 
After April 1994 the newly established Ministry of Safety and Security took 
formal charge of all areas of policy formulation. An Interim Advisory Team was 
appointed in May 1994, with the task of advising the Minister on all aspects relating 
to the amalgamation, rationalisation, and transformation of the Service. 113 A number 
III MIT Progress Report, 20 August 1994. 
112 Minutes of MIT, 28 September 1994. 
11 3 See the Report on the Ministry of Safety and Security, Interim Advisory Team, Servamus, 
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of structures were created to aid transformation. In the area of training, the Technical 
Team on Training, with its various sub-committees, came to play an important role. 
In the new political environment it was destined to become the institutional vehicle 
through which the initiatives, spearheaded by the Police Board, co-ordinated by the 
ITC, and implemented by the MIT, could be further developed. 
All in all, the Police Board, through its Sub-committee on Police Training, 
proved of critical importance as a mechanism for setting the agenda on restructuring 
of police training in line with international developments. The Board was also 
instrumental in creating institutional capacity to develop and implement a new 
training curriculum. After 1994, its work benefited greatly from the support it 
received from the new political masters and its ability to override resistance within the 
police bureaucracy. In addition, it was successful in mobilising both local and 
international expertise for developing the content of, and implementing, the proposals. 
In May 1994, the newly appointed Minister of Safety and Security requested 
that the MIT be established. The call was heeded by the Overseas Development 
Agency of the UK with Commonwealth support. MIT commenced work in August 
1994. The MIT was charged with the responsibility of operational planning and 
overseeing the implementation of the concept. It consisted of four international police 
officers (one each from the UK, Sweden, Holland and Zimbabwe I 14) and four SAPS 
officers working as an integrated team. Before long, local police representation was 
extended to include training expertise from the TBVC police agencies. Initially, MIT 
reported directly to the Office of the Ministry of Safety and Security. Subsequently, it 
also reported to the Commissioner of the SAPS. It liaised with a variety of other 
structures: the ITC, the Police Board, the broader constituency of police trainers, as 
well as NGOs and academics with an explicit interest in police training. MIT's 
deliberations extended from project planning through to implementation and 
evaluation of the Pilot Programme. 
September 1994. 
114 The Dutch representative withdrew from MIT not long after its inception - apparently due to 
differences of opinion regarding the policing model to be followed. 
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In December 1995, 16 months after its inception, MIT concluded its mission 
to implement an altogether new basic training programme under the political auspices 
of the new Ministry of Safety and Security. In the space of those months MIT, in 
collaboration with a variety of other local structures, and against considerable odds 
(of time, space, limited resources and cultural resistance), re-moulded basic police 
training in its entirety. During the course of its deliberations, MIT undertook a project 
'needs analysis' (particularly in the area of trainer needs) and planned the course 
delivery in fine detail accordingly. In the implementation phase MIT, devised a style 
of training that was student-centred, and developed methods of assessment 
appropriate to 'new style training.' It was also responsible for devising new 
management structures to oversee the programme as a whole. 
The following account of this whole experiment is based on an analysis of 
documentary sources produced in the course of MIT's work (such as the minutes of 
weekly MIT meetings; various policy documents; and progress reports produced by 
MIT and other structures). Furthermore, evaluative research of the New Basic 
Training Pilot Programme for recruits to the SAPS, in which I participated as a 
member of a wider team of evaluation experts also informs this discussion. The 
evaluation research was conducted by the Training Eyaluation Group (TEO) with 
funding provided by the British High Commission through the Office of the British 
Development Division in South Africa lIS (TEG Final Evaluation Report, 1996). The 
evaluation study was conducted between May 1994 and October 1995. Both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods were utilised. These included: field 
observations at training colleges and training stations; focus group interviews with 
samples of trainees, trainers and international advisors; a stratified random sample 
questionnaire involving trainees, as well as open-ended questionnaires circulated 
amongst field training managers and international advisors. For purposes of this 
115 The terms of reference of the TEG were to 'conduct an independent evaluation of the basic level 
training programme, so as to establish its contribution to a new SAPS human resource policy that 
would ensure greater representativeness on the one hand and greater competence on the other. 
Furthermore to assess the contribution of the BL TPP to the overall goal of institutional ising a 
community related model of policing and formulate policy proposals for improvement and 
recommendations for the improvement of future basic level training programmes' (TEG Terms of 
Reference, BDDSA, 1994). 
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discussion I draw on the evaluative findings as reported by the Training Evaluation 
Group (1995; 1996). 
5.6 The Basic Level Training Pilot Programme: Importing new concepts and 
methodologies 
The BL TPP commenced in January 1995 with an intake of 1 760 students. 
Henceforth, basic training was to extend over 12 months, instead of six as in the past. 
The first phase of 26 weeks was to comprise college-based instruction in the theory of 
policing. The second phase offield training consisted of on-the-job learning under the 
tutelage of a mentor. 
The explicit aim of the pilot training programme was to produce 'community 
police officers' (ITC, 1993a). The first task that MIT had to grapple with was the 
development of a profile of the new South African police constable that could guide 
both the selection of recruits and their assessment in the programme. The terms of 
reference for developing the profile were already set by the ITC, following its rather 
loose definition of community policing. In terms of ITC's documentation, the 
community police officer comprised ' . .. innovative police officers capable of sound 
judgement, discretionary decision making, problem solving abilities, officers who are 
provided with the knowledge, skills and tools to deal with the social causes of the 
crime phenomenon rather than act only in terms of its consequences - police officers 
who can win the respect and trust of the community.' 116 From this profile MIT 
extracted five principles, which they considered 'inherent' in the doctrine of 
community policing: transparency, accountability, democracy, communicative, and 
professional skills, and specified the behavioural features for each. For example, 
'transparency' translated into someone who displays openness, integrity, impartiality, 
consistency and reliability; 'democratic' translated into someone who acts 
democratically, is sensitive to diversity, is approachable, is loyal, and yet able to 
criticise. These rather broad behavioural measures were then ostensibly utilised in the 
selection and assessment of trainees (lTC, 1993a). 
116 ITe. (1993). Report to the South African Police Board. 4 November. p.I-2. 
liS 
Under the guidance of MIT, itself a multi-national advisory structure involved 
in what has been called 'process consultancy,' pockets of other international experts 
were deployed to develop local policing expertise in areas such as recruitment and 
selection, managing the pilot programme, training of trainers, overall management of 
the project, and support of field training. A brief outline of the extensive deployment 
of international police expertise in support of the pilot project follows. 
Recruitment and selection: This key phase included the involvement of a UK 
officer in the design and implementation of a new system of recruitment. This advisor 
worked in close co-operation with a Special Project Team, composed of local police 
trainers situated at the training college. The Team took charge of the recruitment of 
community police officers that would meet the social profile of the New South 
African Police Officer. tt7 Through Superintendent R. Griffiths, British expertise was 
brought to bear on local methods of selection and screening, and a strategic plan for 
recruitment and effective management developed. In this way, international 
experience helped shape both managerial policy and the operational logic of the 
recruitment division. 
Training local trainers: Foreign police expertise was also deployed to re-train 
some 400 local trainers at centres throughout the country. These workshops were held 
under major constraints of time and infrastructural resources. As a specialisation, 
training had long suffered from a lack of status within the police organisation of old. 
Throughout the police agency, human capacity was at worst uneven and at best 
underdeveloped. Over-ambitious in design, the training workshops hardly scratched 
the surface. Under the circumstances, they offered little more than rudimentary 
excursions into 'new style training.' This idea included an emphasis on role-play, 
critical thinking, experiential and cognitive learning, and the use of continuous 
assessment. All these critical elements associated with new style training, as 
conceptualised in the training field of the UK, posed considerable challenges to 
trainers schooled in a paramilitary and outdated teaching methodology. 
117 See the Report prepared by Griffiths (1994). 
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An evaluative workshop conducted with 33 trainers in mid-1995 solicited their 
assessment of the pilot training programme of which they formed such an integral part 
(TEG, 1995). The trainers were unanimous that the crash course did not equip them 
adequately to undertake training. The negative effects of rudimentary training were 
exacerbated by a number of other factors, such as disparities in resources across 
training colleges, and the unevenness in educational standards amongst trainers 
themselves. Responses solicited at the workshop also made it clear that trainers 
themselves were struggling with broader diversity and multi-cultural issues in the 
post-1994 work environment. One of the critical issues included the lack of 
proficiency in English, which became, by administrative fiat, the official medium of 
instruction after April 1994. More generally, feelings of job insecurity and uncertainty 
about their career future in training also affected · trainers. Communication problems 
between students, trainers, and managers, and overall lack of grievance procedures 
further complicated matters within the training environment. Many felt that the 
BL TPP constituted too abrupt a move away from a military tradition, and they felt ill 
equipped in the new environment to maintain 'discipline.' The responses of trainers 
provided some insight into the dislocations experienced by trainers (not exactly well 
equipped for the demanding job of presenting a new curriculum delivered in a · 
different style) caught in the throes of a radical restructuring of the training and 
broader organisational environment. 
It is against this background that MIT became a useful scapegoat for the 
frustrations expressed by trainers . In terms of the views solicited, many of the trainers 
regarded the MIT as a 'sinister force' , consisting of foreign government 
representatives with direct political relations to the new Minister and his Change 
Management structures. In large part this perception was fuelled by the fact that 
management at the colleges ' passed the buck to MIT' when confronted with concerns 
of trainers. 
Supporting field training: The field training part of the restructured basic 
police training programme required an altogether new infrastructure. Suitable training 
stations had to be selected, relevant station commissioners briefed, and field training 
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support staff deployed. liS Eighteen International Advisors worked alongside an 
interlocking network of local field training operatives that included Field Training 
Officers, Supervisors, and Managers. Drawn from a number of Commonwealth police 
institutions,119 the group brought together comparative experiences from both 
developed and developing societies. However, the numerical dominance of UK 
officers in the team ensured that British models prevailed. Tasked with the 
responsibility of advising on matters of field training in all provinces, they were 
considered 'an invaluable resource. ,120 The advisors were expected to network 
widely, establish working relationships on a broad front, devise remedial plans to 
keep the programme afloat, and identify and report on problems experienced in the 
deployment of the field trainees . By all informed accounts, the advisors were critical 
players in the process whereby the field training programme was operationalised. 
Deployed in mixed teams of two (one UK officer, one non-UK) to the 107 
training stations scattered across all nine provinces, the working conditions of the 
advisors varied quite considerably in terms of geographic diversity and regional 
complexities. 121 A focus group interview conducted with the international advisors 
toward the end of their deployment also suggested that differences internal to the 
group existed. Selection criteria for these personnel drawn from a range of societies 
varied, making for uneven training expertise within the contingent of advisors. 
Different contractual arrangements also gave a material base to the initial tensions 
within the group. Furthermore, differences in political background, cultural practices, 
and policing style also affected working relationships on the ground. Proficiency in 
English, too, varied within the group and impacted on their field deployment. Despite 
118 This included three categories of field training staff drawn from the ranks of the police organisation: 
field training officers, supervisors, and field training managers, each with clearly defined 
responsibilities. 
119 Nine were UK officers, two from India, two Malaysian and one each from Pakistan, Singapore, 
Zimbabwe and Botswana. 
120 Interviews with members of MIT and with Field Training Managers were conducted during the 
course of 1995 . 
121 The number of stations to be supervised ranged from five (North West Province) to 88 (Northern 
Province) . The number of field trainees in an area under their supervision ranged from 100 to 329; field 
training officers ranged from 37 to 110 and Field Training Supervisors from four to 33. The average 
number of kilometres covered per week ranged from 400 krn to 2300 krn. The details were gathered by 
means of a survey which was circulated amongst the international advisors in 1995. 
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these differences, it was the TEO's assessment that, in its external relations the 
international advisors managed to project a professional esprit de corps. 
The advisors, thinly spread across the country and with a remit considered 'too 
wide and nebulous,' 122 attended to an extraordinarily wide range of issues. Their 
interventions were critical in keeping the field training programme afloat. 123 Whilst 
issues concerning training methodology were central to their deliberations, they also 
attended to matters relating to the implementation of community policing. This 
included advice with regards to the launch of community forums, structuring 
community involvement in policing, advising the community on policing matters, and 
addressing aspects of community relations. A third area of focus was interpersonal 
skills, including communication skills, techniques of problem solving, and conflict-
mediation. Advice relating to police managers touched on the management of change, 
general managerial skills, and aspects of staff development. Lastly, they also attended 
to a range of operational and logistical matters relating to the field-training 
programme. As in the case of the MIT, the international advisors were often exposed 
to the thinness of the line separating the advisory function (so frequently stressed in 
their briefings) from the actual management of the field-training programme. 
Through their deployment in the field, the international advisors also 
developed a critical understanding of the wide range of factors that impacted on the 
successful implementation of the programme. Part of their explicit brief was to 
identify obstacles so that the policy elite could devise ameliorative strategies. The 
contents of their monthly reports reflect the virtues of 'deep monitoring' of the 
opportunities for change and the obstacles encountered in the course of their 
deployment. Furthermore, the responses collated from an evaluative questionnaire, 124 
122 Response received from the questionnaires distributed amongst international advisors as part of the 
evaluation assessment undertaken by the TEG for the contracting agency, British Development 
Division in Southern Africa (BDDSA). 
123 Interviews with members of MIT as well as Field Training Managers continned this . 
124 Out of the 18 questionnaires distributed in October 1995, 15 completed questionnaires were 
returned. Of the fifteen questionnaires eight were completed by UK officers and seven by 
Commonwealth police officers. Furthennore a focus group discussion was also held in Pretoria 7 
December 1995, This focus group discussion was attended by 13 officers (seven from the 
Commonwealth and six UK officers) to canvass their views on a number of select themes relevant to 
the evaluation study. The findings of this part of the evaluation are discussed more fully in the 
119 
circulated amongst the international advisors, included reference to a wide range of 
factors on which the sustainability of the project hinged. Structural concerns raised by 
the advisors included insufficient physical resources, and inequities across training 
stations. In their view, overall poor working conditions within the public police also 
sapped professional commitment. Issues relating to organisational culture also 
featured in the responses. This included general resistance within the police 
organisation to changes induced by 'outsiders.' Such resistance was exacerbated by 
what was described as a siege mentality pervading the organisation, an autocratic 
management style, and a fire-brigade approach to practical policing. Advisors 
furthermore commented on the pervasive nature of both racism and sexism within the 
police organisation. Sexual harassment at the training colleges was described as an 
endemic problem. During the pilot programme sexual liaisons between trainers and 
trainees, for example, posed a problem of some dimension on which the advisors 
commented at their report back meetings. 125 A further set of obstacles pertained to the 
quality and training of all field training operatives, and an insufficient grasp of key 
educational principles on which the pilot training programme was based. Finally, an 
overall lack of appreciation amongst the policy elite of the politics of language 
bedevilling the pilot project was again highlighted in discussions. 
The monthly reports of the international advisors constitute a rich resource for 
those interested in the tricky politics and logistics of institutional transformation. MIT 
engaged with the content of those reports in an earnest fashion and drafted reports for 
higher authorities indicating matters that required urgent attention. One issue amongst 
many others that were highlighted concerned the receptivity of the larger organisation 
to the principles on which the basic level training programme rested. Others, too, 
agreed that the changes introduced into the training environment were not sufficiently 
marketed to the wider organisation, nor was enough done to help induce a change in 
the mentality of the wider canteen culture. 126 In the event, changes within the training 
environment remained relatively contained. In many instances field trainees were 
evaluation report compiled by TEG for BDDSA. See in this regard TEG Final Evaluation Report 
(\996). 
125 MIT, Minutes of Meeting, 6 July 1995. 
126 See the findings of the questionnaire circulated to Field Training Managers. As reported by TEG, 
1995. 
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deployed and left to fend for themselves In a rather hostile organisational 
environment. 
5.7 Evaluating the impact of the BLTPP 
What can be concluded on the basis of this particular case study regarding the 
value of international deployment in support of police reform? The value of 
international deployment, as in support of the BLTPP, seems to lie at a number of 
different levels. At a political level, international advisors provided legitimacy to a 
broader process of institutional reform, boosting the confidence of the wider South 
African community in the process. In the context of the basic level training 
programme, the international advisors also fulfilled a developing and nurturing role. 
As training experts drawn from the police environment, they were well placed to 
identify local needs in the field. Through their deployment at the ground level they 
provided a safety net of skills and expertise to local field training operatives. As such, 
they acted as catalysts of change, on the one hand imparting new values and 
operational principles, whilst also providing practical techniques as the need arose. 
Deployment of international police assistance in the BLTPP also suggested that the 
foreign contingent could play an intelligence role, functioning as the eyes and ears of 
the post-authoritarian policing elite, conducting reconnaissance into the strengths and 
weaknesses of the police institution inherited from the past, and setting the agenda for 
future reforms - albeit in an indirect kind of way. 
In the focus group interview conducted with field advisors, the time-
consuming nature of building trust and gaining credibility (on which the effectiveness 
of the advisory contingent deployed in support of process consultancy depended) 
featured strongly. It is with this observation in mind that the views of local managers, 
deployed in support of the Field Training Programme, regarding their international 
compatriots were solicited. Field Training Managers occupied a position of particular 
importance in the field-training programme. They worked in close liaison with the 
team of International Advisors, although the intensity of contact and quality of the 
relationship with field training operatives varied from team to team and from province 
to province. Regarding the achievements of the Field Training Programme, the 
following views emerged. The training programme provided a 'space for police 
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reform' by challenging the military habits of mind that for so long had prevailed at 
training colleges. It also advanced training expertise. But on the opposite side of the 
equation, the programme was said to have failed to spread the message of reform 
more widely within the police organisation. Neither could the programme address the 
many logistical constraints that required structural adjustments beyond the reach of 
the BL TPP. The integration between theory and practice of policing also left much to 
be desired. As for the value of international deployment, they were said to have 
brought their practical experiences in both new style training and community policing 
to bear on the South African situation. However, a certain 'lack of knowledge 
regarding the complexity and diversity of the South African context' was noted as a 
factor that constrained their influence. 127 This point of view had a certain resonance in 
many other conversations with local operatives involved in the BL TPP. 
In an evaluation of the work of MIT, conducted by TEG (1996), it was noted 
that it provided a visionary construct of policing based on radically different sets of 
educational concepts and political values operative in the police agencies of western 
democracies; it translated with some success the new vision into managerial policy; it 
helped put in place the organisational infrastructure supportive of the new vision; it 
partook in the development of resources, and monitored progress and obstacles 
confronting the effective utilisation of the basic level training programme (Vander 
Spuy, 1996). Acting as a catalyst of change, MIT could not avoid becoming 
embroiled in turf politics. To reformists, MIT constituted an ally of considerable 
importance. To others it was a source of deep resentment for changes forced upon the 
organisation with the political backing of the Ministry of Safety and Security. 
In the end, however, external factors almost completely undermined the 
investment in training. A moratorium on new recruits that took effect in 1996 
effectively halted the momentum for change galvanised by the Police Board, the lTC, 
and MIT. Trainers were redeployed to train batches of low level municipal police 
officers who were being integrated into the SAPS. The basic training and the field 
training programme, as developed by the ITC and MIT, came to a halt, training 
127 Written response to questionnaire circulated amongst field advisors. October 1995 . 
122 
expertise was lost, and staff demoralisation was said to be rampant at training colleges 
(Van der Spuy, 2000). 
5.8 Conclusion 
The donor-supported training initiative was one of several ambitious 
programmes that the SAPS undertook in conjunction with foreign partners. Mention 
has already been made of the Belgian-supported Community Policing Project, and 
Western Cape Community Policing Project, and the Community Policing PilOl Project 
in Section 4.6. Even more ambitious than any of these has been an ongoing project on 
'Reform of Policing in the Eastern Cape' (to be discussed in chapter 6). None of these 
initiatives has been markedly successful. While the reasons for failure in each case 
differ in detail, the underlying issue remains the intractability of changing a large 
bureaucratic institution, whose basic character was settled as a result of the political 
compromises of 1993 in the first place, and the massive budgetary constraints that 
emerged almost immediately after May 1994. The result has been a set of ad hoc 
measures that were not foreseen before the ANC's advent to power, particularly by 
the somewhat idealistic policy drafters whose goals became subordinate to the 
realities of day-to-day politics. 
The unanticipated moratorium on the recruitment of new police personnel was 
only one of the set-backs to the dream of a new, democratic, and professional police 
service in the New South Africa. But it also illustrates the limits of donor power, and 
of the effectiveness of quite substantial foreign investments in security sector reform. 
The underlying lesson is that donors, no more than governments, do not work with a 
clean slate, even at a time of highly symbolic renewal and change like that signified 
by the democratic elections of April 1994. Nevertheless, despite setbacks in project 
implementation and the limited impact of the major donor-supported reform 
packages, the importance of a scheme as potentially (if not in the event actually) 
influential as the basic training programme lay in the fact that it institutionalised the 
principle of large-scale donor co-operation with the state police. In doing so, it also 




International Assistance and Local Pressures in Police Reform: 
The Case of the Eastern Cape 
6.1 Introduction 
In an attempt to expand the enquiry into the interplay between international 
influences and local pressures in the reform of policing, this Chapter takes up another 
case study of a very different kind to the Basic Level Training Pilot Programme 
(BL TPP). The project under consideration also involved large-scale foreign 
involvement in the restructuring of South African policing, but has been conducted 
over a much longer span of time. Initiatives regarding Assistance to Policing in the 
Eastern Cape (known in local parlance as APEC) date back to 1995. Project planning 
was conducted throughout 1996 and the project officially started in March 1997. In 
the original project framework, APEC was intended to have a life span of three years. 
This project warrants attention for a number of reasons. First, in both 
quantitative and temporal tenns, the scale of the assistance stands in sharp contrast to 
ad hoc, small interventions characteristic of many early investments in police reform. 
This intervention was described as 'the largest overseas police aid programme in the 
African continent' at the time of its inception, in a report of the Eastern Cape 
Department of Provincial Safety and Liaison (2000:25). 
Second, the principal recipient of assistance, the Eastern Cape provincial 
police, represented one of the most underdeveloped of provincial police institutions. 
Since it operated in an impoverished and largely rural region of the country, this 
experiment in police reform was in a particularly taxing locale. As such, this 
engagement in police reform may throw into sharp relief the potential for, and 
obstacles to, foreign aid effectiveness in a difficult policy environment (Collier & 
Dollar, 2004). 
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Third, the project involved the joint mobilisation of resources of two of the 
most prominent of donors in South African criminal justice reform, the EU, and the 
Department of Foreign International Development (DFID) of the UK. APEC is thus 
representative of multi-donor involvement in pursuit of institutional reform of the 
public police agency. 
Fourth, the project has spawned a number of reports - mid-term reviews, 
evaluation reports conducted under the auspices of donor agencies, as well as 
independent project reviews - to which access was negotiated. 128 These reports lend 
themselves to the kind of interpretative analysis that is not possible in the absence of 
project assessments. 
Last, a focus on developmental assistance in the Eastern Cape allows one to 
map both continuities and discontinuities in objectives across two programmes in 
consecutive periods of time. A comparative analysis of the two phases (APEC I and 
APEC II) of the programme yields insights into the development over time of project 
assistance, and the kinds of factors that may shape shifts in focus. Tracking assistance 
across time may also throw light on the sustainability of reform initiatives. 
Any evaluative assessment of APEC almost eight years after its 
conceptualisation needs to be sensitive to the historical context within which it was 
designed. In recent years, the terms of reference that guide project design and 
implementation have become more sophisticated, as instructive lessons have emerged 
from the trials and errors of the past. In addition, as one observer notes, the ' landscape 
of aid policy has changed' considerably over the past five or so years (Mosley, 
Hudson & Verschoor, 2004:217). Viewed against this evolving policy background, 
the design flaws in APEC I may be much more obvious. But such a retrospective 
assessment needs to appreciate that, for its time, APEC I was innovative and bold. 
128 Negotiating access to the grey literature is cumbersome and success depends in no small part on 
one ' s location, one's networks and the overall culture of both recipient and host institutions vis-a-vis 
access to infonnation. 
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Documentary analysis and follow-up interviews 129 with a small sample of 
officials who were closely involved in APEC comprised the key methodological tools 
utilised for reconstructing the trajectory of assistance. The evolution of assistance is 
charted through four phases ranging from Project Initiation and Design; Project 
Implementation; and Project Evaluation; to Project Closure or Project Re-engineering. 
This chapter provides descriptive details regarding the evolution of the project. In 
doing so, it also illuminates some of the themes relevant to the politics of 
developmental assistance. Such themes include: 
- The nature of the institution targeted for reform in line with contemporary 
definitions of democratic policing; 
- The dominant policing paradigms, m terms of which developmental 
assistance is couched, and how these may shift over time; 
- The role-players, project mechanisms, and institutional conduits involved in 
the transfer of policing ideas, cultural attitudes, and operational practices 
associated with democratic policing; 
The contextual factors that impact on project conceptualisation, 
implementation, and evaluation; 
- The relevance (or not) of lessons learnt for project closure, donor exit, or 
alternatively donor reinvestment. 
Organising the discussion along the above-mentioned themes allows one to 
appreciate that international assistance to police institutions (situated in high-crime, 
transitional societies) is an endeavour fuelled by missionary intentions, shaped by 
conceptual frameworks (clear-cut or ambiguous), mediated by bureaucratic 
procedures, and almost always plagued by uncertain outcomes. In practice the links 
between project goal, purpose, outputs, and outcomes - so neatly specified in project 
129 Four interviews were conducted. This included the following : E-mail correspondence with a 
technical assistant that was deployed by one of the donor agencies in support of project implementation 
from 1997-2002 (Interview I); Face to face interview with a member of the Scoping Study for Phase [! 
of European Assistance (Interview 2); An interview with a project co-ordinator deployed in the Pretoria 
office of the EU with considerable experience in developmental assistance (Interview 3); Interview 4 
had as a respondent a Programme Manager deployed by one of the donor agencies within SAPS Head 
Office. 
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log frameworks - are more tenuous than project proposals would suggest. Exploring 
the micro-politics of developmental assistance through this case study allows one to 
track the interaction between foreign funded projects and local realities. It is this 
interaction that calls into question the notion of an inevitable march toward a 
democratic policing future which may linger in structuralist approaches to the subject. 
6.2 Overseas Development Assistance and policing III the Eastern Cape: 
Beginnings 
The imperative for rebuilding the South African police agency into something 
approximating a functioning law enforcement agency was clear enough with the. 
arrival of constitutional democracy. Homeland police forces had been an essential part 
of the 'grand apartheid' plan. Policing by the South African Police and its homeland 
appendages converged on a common objective, the protection of state security. 
During the widespread insurrections of the 1980s, the homeland police agencies, 
much like the SAP, had ruled 'with the whip' (Haysom, 1983). Within the homelands, 
the relationship between the governing elite and its armed men was highly politicised. 
As in the centre, human rights violations on the part of the armed forces in the 
Bantustans were widespread. 
This reform imperative was all the more valid in the case of the Eastern Cape. 
The locale of two homelands (Ciskei and Transkei), it was also in a dire economic 
state, reflected in high levels of poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment. The Province 
enjoyed the dubious status as the second largest, and the poorest province in the 
country. In 1992, Bisho, the then capital of the Ciskei, was the scene of a bloody 
confrontation between armed forces and about 60 000 marchers, led by a number of 
ANC stalwarts. The Bisho massacre, as it became known, left 29 dead and hundreds 
injured as troops opened fire (Naki, 1999). Looking beyond the Bisho event, wider 
patterns of violence had further contributed to social instability and fragmentation in 
the region since the early 1990s. A Report by the Human Rights Committee (1997) -
published at the time of APEC's inception - on the state of criminal justice in the 
province painted a gloomy picture of infrastructural decay, lack of resources, rampant 
demoralisation amongst staff, and low levels of public confidence in the system. The 
failure of public justice was in part related to the emergence of self-help policing 
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agencies in townships in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage. Key examples of the 'self-
regulating organs of popular justice' (Nina 1995:51) were the anti-crime committees 
that emerged under the auspices of the South African National Civic Organisations 
(SANCO) from 1992 onwards. On the eve of the political transition to a constitutional 
state, public and private forms of policing in the Eastern Cape stood in a complex and 
largely antagonistic relationship to one another. 
After May 1994, one of the first tasks of the newly renamed Ministry in 
charge of the Police, the Department of Safety and Security, was the amalgamation of 
eleven nominally independent police forces : the SAP itself, and its homeland spawn. 
As a result of deals struck at the pre-1994 negotiating table, these various bodies were 
to be brought into one unitary service. This process of amalgamation, which has been 
the subject of too little in-depth research, bequeathed a number of problems which the 
united SAPS still struggles to overcome, most notably that of incorporating under-
trained and incompetent homeland police into a white-officer-dominated hierarchy. 
The Eastern Cape was required to bring together three different police 
agencies (the South African Police, the Ciskei, and the Transkei police). [30 The , 
merger, which took place 1 September 1995, was complicated by considerable 
discrepancies in resources, skills, and organisational styles (Marais, 1992b). The 
legacy of regional inequities in access to policing resources was evident enough. A 
study of provincial budgets undertaken in 1995 found that the Eastern Cape police 
were substantively under-resourced, with many of the 205 police stations 
geographically isolated across a rural landscape (Batchelor [n.d]). 
In response, a locally driven initiative emerged in 1995 to solicit international 
assistance for rebuilding the police institution. In the early phase, the provincial 
Premier and the provincial Police Commissioner took the lead. From the start, various 
interest groups were involved in the deliberations, which resulted in a project proposal 
which was submitted to the developmental arm of the UK. The British Development 
Division (South Africa) in turn undertook wider research into a framework for 
developmental assistance. Again, a consultative approach brought many stakeholders 
130 The numerical strength of the different police agencies was as follows: SAP had 10,000 officers, 
the Ciskei police 3,000 and the Transkei police 5,000 (Biddle, Clegg & Whetton, 1999:91). 
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in the province into the ambit of the discussions (European UnionIDFID, 1999). The 
provincial 'wish list' was then presented to the British government, which apparently 
reacted 'in horror' at the sheer scale of the assistance requested (Interview 1, 2004). 
Through a process of further bargaining and negotiation, the EU was also brought on 
board, and after some lengthy process a three-year project framework was agreed 
upon. The latter constituted a slimmed-down version of the original request. This was 
the inception of 'Assistance to Policing in the Eastern Cape' (APEC). With joint 
funding secured from the British government aid agency, DFID, and the EU, and a 
demarcation agreed upon between the areas of responsibility, the total budget for 
APEC compromised 13.729.000 Euro or ZAR 82.404.000. 131 Project implementation 
only commenced in April 1997 and the project was formally concluded in 2002 
(European Union, 1997). 
As already noted, APEC developed in a difficult policy environment (Collier 
& Dollar, 2004) characterised by poverty, social instability, and weak criminal justice 
institutions. In both quantitative and temporal terms·, the project was one of the largest 
assistance packages to the South African criminal justice system. Its ambitious design 
stood in sharp contrast to the ad hoc and small-scale interventions characteristic of aid 
investments in the early phase of South African police reform. A further feature of 
APEC was its multi-donor involvement, in which two prominent players in the field 
of criminal justice assistance, namely the EU and DFID, pooled resources . This multi-
donor role was itself to prove problematic, particularly given the EU's cumbersome 
and time-consuming disbursement procedures. 
The finalisation of the agreement on APEC envisaged that it would consist of 
five key components. Two were concerned with institutionalisation of police 
accountability, a novel idea in the South African context: the establishment of civilian 
oversight mechanisms, and support for community policing forums. A third aim was 
the development of human resource policy and programmes, which boiled down, in 
practice, to extensive training ventures. This theme has been a feature of much other 
international assistance to the SAP, as was the fourth, namely ' support to management 
131 The project budget needs to be put in perspective. At the time when the project was approved the 
exchange rate stood at ZAR 6 to the British Pound. At the time of conclusion of the project the 
exchange rate stood at ZAR 13 to the Pound which meant at the recipient end more than a doubling of 
the amount originally agreed upon. Even allowing for inflation this was a significant windfall. 
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structures and processes' both within the SAPS and the Secretariat. The fifth 
component comprised an unusual intervention for donors in the South African case: 
investment and assistance in infrastructural development, which included the 
provision of physical resources and the development of a building and transportation 
programme. 
APEC conceived of police reform in classical 'good governance' terms (Brzoska 
2003 :30). In line with reformist efforts in other transitional contexts, the creation of 
mechanisms of oversight and accountability was considered critical to enforcing the 
principles associated with the rule of law and respect for human rights in a 
constitutional democracy. In its explicit resort to a good governance framework, 
APEC's objectives were at the time neatly aligned with national priorities to 
institutionalise civilian oversight and control, and thereby separate the (civilian) 
policy function from the operational command function of police management (Rauch 
2002b). 
In the post-1994 context, the National and Provincial Secretariats for Safety and 
Security were designed with a policy advisory role to the political executives, while, 
injecting a measure of civilian oversight. It is against this local policy background that 
APEC enshrined in its project framework extensive capacity building in the Office of 
the Provincial Ministry of Safety and Security and the Provincial Secretariat. In an 
important way donor aid followed, rather than dictated, a locally-driven agenda for 
police reform, 
Secondly, APEC also strongly embraced the philosophy of community policing. 
In particular it was intended to assist the statutorily defined Community Police 
Forums (CPFs). At the time of APEC's inception, national policy viewed CPFs as key 
mechanisms for building trust between police and the community, and for advancing 
a community responsive mode of policing. In addition, the development of vibrant 
CPFs was seen as a way of advancing a partnership approach to policing involving, as 
the dogma would have it, the 'joint mobilisation' of resources in pursuit of 
community safety, The community policing component of the project proposal was 
earmarked for British assistance. Support to CPFs in the Eastern Cape was a logical 
extension of DFID's (then known as the Overseas Development Agency, [ODA]) 
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track record with regard to the institutionalisation of CPFs in various parts of the 
country, which included a pilot project undertaken in Grahamstown in the Eastern 
Cape (the Grahamstown Community Safety Project), and in three other provinces 132 
(Biddle, Clegg & Whetton, 1999). Project experiences accumulated in each of these 
other locations shaped project management and project implementation of community 
policing in the Eastern Cape. Two features in particular deserve mention: the 
extensive involvement of local NGOs in project design and execution, as well as the 
widespread utilisation of foreign technical advisors working in close collaboration 
with the Office of the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) in each of the 
provinces. 
A third feature of APEC concerned its emphasis on institutional development. The 
importance of expanding human resource capacity in the project framework was an 
attempt to plug some of the holes left by apartheid policing. This deficit was 
particularly evident in the case of the former homelands. Addressing basic capacity 
deficits in training and revamping management systems constituted two components 
in this regard. Both were standard features of the kind of developmental interventions 
which aid agencies, involved in police reform, have deployed over the past decade 
(Clegg, Hunt & Whetton, 2000). 
Last, a particularly distinctive feature of APEC was the extent to which it 
prioritised financial investment in the infrastructural hardware of the police agency. In 
contextualising this aspect of APEC, it is worth noting that the proper mix of material 
and technical assistance to police abroad remains one of the areas of disagreement in 
developmental circles (Biddle, Clegg & Whetton, 1999). APEC suggested that the 
prospects for a change in cultural disposition on the part of the police (from a 
repressive to a democratic style of policing) were in part dependent on an upgrading 
of the physical environment from which policing services were being dispensed. 
According to the logic of the argument, the need for improvement in basic 
infrastructure was a necessary facet of a larger aim at 'police transformation.' The 
APEC project document included ambitious plans for upgrading building 
infrastructure and revamping the transport system across the province. The need for 
132 Western Cape, Free State and North West. 
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such improvements has all too often been neglected in the various policy documents 
for local police reform of the post-l 994 environment (Erropean Union, 1999). 
6.3 APEC in action: The difficulties of implementation 
Project management structures were only slowly put in place. Once project 
implementation was underway, a number of interlocking structures were supposed to 
manage APEC. Management and control of the Project rested with a Project Co-
ordinator. The Project Steering Committee, chaired by the provincial Minister of 
Safety and Security, was responsible for policy decisions. This Committee consisted 
of a wide range of representatives including the Provincial MEC, the Provincial 
Commissioner, the Permanent Secretary of the Provincial Ministry of Safety and 
Security, and the Project Co-ordinator. Observer status was granted to the two donors. 
Project Committee members were also co-opted from CPFs, as well as from the 
Council of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA). The latter body 
represents the hereditary leadership (in colonial parlance, the 'chiefs') of the country's 
nine ethnic Bantu-speaking groups. With the Eastern Cape containing all the rural 
descendants of the Xhosa-speaking branch of the Nguni language family, the relevant 
members of CONTRALESA constituted a potentially significant source of rural 
authority. However, from the various evaluation reports, it transpires that this 
organisation did not participate much in APEC meetings. 
A Project Management Team assumed responsibility for the day-to-day 
functioning of the project. Later evaluations of APEC indicate that the Project 
Management Team played a particularly important role with regard to project co-
ordination. According to an evaluation report it functioned as an 'efficient 
management forum' (Delegation of the European Commission in Pretoria, 2002:33). 
Furthermore, the project design made provision for the deployment of technical 
assistance. Such technical assistance is mostly regarded as an increasingly important 
conduit for foreign interests and policy-choices (Actionaid, 2000). 
The Policing Advisor to the MEC for Safety and Security played a particularly 
important role with a wide range of responsibilities. An employee of DFID, he was 
considered a critical catalyst for modem policing ideas and methodologies. His 
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deployment proved critical to the success of the project. APEC thus put together an 
elaborate project management structure backed with technical ass.:stance and having 
at its disposal an international resource person, deployed as a Policing Advisor, with a 
professional background in policing and developmental assistance. In combination, 
these mechanisms played a key role in the day-to-day implementation of the project. 
6.3.1 Initial implementation obstacles 
The implementation of APEC first faced bureaucratic and administrative 
problems. A delay of a year was caused by the lack of clear-cut procedures at the 
National Treasury with regard to the procurement and utilisation of donor funding. 
This initial delay in disbursement echoed problems relating to budget management 
that so often plague developmental aid (Foster, 1999). Procedural and management 
differences in project implementation between the two developmental agencies also 
complicated matters. Inflexibility on the part of the EU in accommodating to the local 
context was one stumbling block. 
Of more significance, however, was the role of politics. As observers of . 
developmental aid have commented, political pressures are all too often a neglected 
feature of project assistance literature (Caparini & Marenin, 2004). One central 
component of APEC related to the development of effective oversight mechanisms in 
the Province, particularly with respect to the Provincial office of the MEC for Safety 
and Security and the Provincial Secretariat. Hostility between the MEC for Safety and 
Security and the Provincial SAPS marked the initial stages of project implementation 
(European Consultancy Organisation, 2003). The historical legacy of Eastern Cape 
policing proved hard to shake off. A major issue was the adversarial nature of 
political relations, both between the police and the community, and the police and the 
new political masters. 
A conflict of interpretation concernIng the oversight function further 
bedevilled project efforts. As one respondent put it : 'The roles and responsibilities of 
the Provincial Ministry of Safety and Security were completely misunderstood' 
(Interview 1, July 2004). A major casualty in the war between the political and 
operational arms was none other than the Provincial Commissioner, considered in 
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some circles to be a truly competent officer. Shortly after the commencement of the 
project, the Provincial Commissioner was axed - apparently after a dispute with the 
Office of the MEC. The post was left vacant for a period of twelve months with a 
consequent lack of strategic direction on the part of the SAPS. 
The reasons underlying the political hostility between the SAPS and the MEC 
and Secretariat were complex. The Mid-Term Review painted the following picture: 
Politicisation, understaffing, poor morale, loss of staff, poor relationships 
with SAPS, geographical distance between SAPS and PMoSS 133, delay in 
developing their strategies despite the efforts of the Policing Advisor, have 
all taken their toll (European Union 1999:27). 
The Annual Report of the Department of Provincial Safety and Liaison for the 
period 1999/2000 confirms some of the internal difficulties mentioned above. 
Budgetary constraints meant that projects were put on hold. A high turnover of staff 
and a freezing of posts within the Secretariat negatively affected its role. The lack of 
continuity regarding staff effectively neutralised developmental efforts toward 
capacity building among Secretariat personnel (Eastern Cape Department of 
Provincial Safety and Liaison, 2000). 
Apart from inter-agency conflicts, project implementation in the area of 
accountability also had to contend with shifts in national policy vis-a-vis the 
Secretariat. As Rauch (2002b:23) notes: 
For instance, institutional restructuring of the Department of Safety and 
Security under Minister Tshwete resulted in a significant disempowerment of 
the national Secretariat, rather than the strengthening envisaged in the 1998 
White Paper. Not only were the oversight functions envisaged for the 
Secretariat retained by the SAPS, but the crime prevention role advocated for 
the Secretariat was also shifted to the SAPS. 
Thus, by the end of the first national administration In 1999, changes in 
strategic thinking regarding the role of the National Secretariat were in the offing. At 
a time of alarmingly high crime rates, politicians at the centre were under pressure to 
respond to a public that was becoming ever more vocal about crime. One visible 
IJJ Provincial Ministry of Safety and Security, Eastern Cape. 
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consequence was a shift in emphasis away from prioritising effective accountability 
and oversight arrangements in police reform, toward an emphasis on improving law 
enforcement capacity in the face of a crime epidemic. In practice, this development 
entailed the dilution of the oversight function of the Secretariats at both National and 
Provincial levels, and the reassertion of the operational autonomy of police 
management in conjunction with Ministerial control. These changes undermined 
project efforts to support provincial oversight structures (European UnionIDFID, 
1999). 
Troubled though the relationship between the Provincial leadership and the 
Secretariat was in the initial phase, the experience did lead to greater understanding in 
the longer term between the political executive, oversight structures, and the police 
organisation. One of the project's achievements, as noted in the evaluation report, has 
been described as a normalisation of relations and the establishment of political trust 
between key constituents involved in policing. 
But institutional issues were the lesser of the predicaments facing APEC's 
implementation. The nub of the problem was the disfunctionality of large numbers of 
the police themselves. APEC's answer was perhaps predictable: a heavy emphasis on 
'skills development.' Large numbers of police officials made obligatory pilgrimages 
to training workshops. At the end of APEC, it was claimed that more than 6,000 
police officers had attended training courses funded by APEC (Delegation of the 
European Commission in Pretoria, 2002: Annexure 7). The list of such courses makes 
for impressive reading: Station Commissioners Course in Functional Skills; Labour 
Relations; Administrative courses; Suicide Prevention; Trauma and debriefing; 
Interpersonal Development; Personnel Services Training; Training of Visible Policing 
in Crowd Management; Detective Training; Tactical policing skills; Strategic 
Management; Team Leadership Programmes and so forth. 
To put this international assistance in perspective, in the case of APEC foreign 
funding in the area of human resource development far outstripped local investment in 
human resources in the province. According to the evaluation in the Final Report 
(Delegation of the European Commission in Pretoria 2002: 1 0) in 2000 and 2001, 
APEC covered 'about 2/3 of the total training expenses of the police' in the province. 
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On paper at least, developmental assistance stood to make a substantial difference in 
bringing about a corps of trained police officers in the province. 
The human resource component of the project was in hindsight vastly over-
ambitious. From the very start the initial design team of APEC seemed to have 
underestimated the extent of the skills deficit. According to the Mid-Term Evaluation 
Report of 1999, the sheer scale of training needs was not properly anticipated. The 
Final Report further underlines this point: 'During the implementation it was soon 
found that the level of skills was far below what had been anticipated. It was often not 
a question of improving skills, it was rather a question of illiteracy. The quality of the 
buildings was also much worse than expected . . . (thus) some of the 
objectives, ... turned out to be unrealistic'(Delegation of the European Commission in 
Pretoria 2002:20-21). Generous as the training investments were, they fell short of 
making a significant difference (European Consultancy Organisation, 2003). This is a 
conclusion one is tempted to accept in the light of an observation recorded in a Safety 
and Security Portfolio Committee Briefing (30 May 2001). In that briefing a member 
of the African National Congress (ANC) reported that 'she had recently returned from 
the Eastern Cape and had found the management, training of officers and condition of , 
equipment in police stations totally appalling. ' In response, Commissioner Selebi 
noted that SAPS had to close down a detective branch in Umtata because ' detectives 
were not doing their jobs.' However, as Selebi pointed out, the root of the problem 
was of a more systemic nature, as 'there are too many highly ranked officers and too 
few constables in SAPS who are willing to get their hands dirty.' 
6.3.2 Project evaluation: Shortcomings in hindsight 
As is common practice with donor projects of this nature, APEC was 
subjected to a mid-term and final evaluation. Such reports have their own inbuilt 
problems. Donors for instance are alleged to be averse to reports which are 
comprehensively negative about a project. (Interview 2, May 2004). One recurrent 
theme running through the evaluations, however, is that the designers involved in the 
conceptualisation of APEC I seemed to have underestimated the sheer scale of an 
undertaking aimed at bringing about competent law enforcement in such a large area. 
A specific shortcoming was identified as the lack of a full feasibility study prior to the 
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finalisation of the project framework. The evaluation reports state that a proper 
estimation of the depth and breadth of developmental assistance required to improve 
police capacity in the province was never undertaken - hence the overly optimistic 
targets at the inception. 
It is also the case that, in the early phase of reform, few observers really 
appreciated the range of challenges that confronted the reform of the South African 
police organisation as a whole, and not just in the Eastern Cape. As Shaw (2001 b:28-
29) puts it: 'Given the history of policing in the country, it was assumed that the SAP 
was an all-powerful instrument which could be used effectively by the new 
govenunent if two conditions were satisfied, namely, that it could be made more 
accountable to those whom it policed and at the same time more legitimate.' This 
overwhelming emphasis on the political aspects of reform simply failed to appreciate 
the infrastructural decay, and the dearth of conventional policing skills in the 
province. Only by the late 1990s did the compounded impact of many ailments such 
as 'limited resources, an overly centralised and bureaucratic hierarchy, a lack of 
appropriate skills and training, a lack of managerial expertise, and a limited 
intelligence and investigative capacity' receive proper recognition (Peiser & Masuku, . 
2002: 116). It could be argued that APEC I was in no position to address the depth or 
breadth of need that prevailed in the province, as the scale of investment required far 
outstripped the budgets of the external players. 
A further factor which constrained efforts to ImprOVe human resource 
management within the province had to do with national versus provincial 
jurisdictions and mandates. Changing the rules in areas of selection and promotion, 
for example, was only possible if decision-making was devolved to the local level. In 
some instances, APEC initiatives to streamline human resources provoked resistance 
from national office. It soon became clear that changes to systems ~1l1c1 rules could not 
be implemented at the provincial level without national approval. [n retrospect, the 
APEC framework did not make sufficient allowance for the involvement of the 'dead 
hand in the centre' (Interview 1, July 2004). 
With regard to the upgrading of police stations, unrealistic I :1rgets were also 
set in the project framework. APEC envisaged the upgrading of an ill i lial 100 stations. 
137 
Soon, however, it became apparent that the scale of need for infrastructural 
investment far outstripped the budget. By mid-term only 38 stations had benefited 
from APEC. Contributions to the Fleet Management System and Workshop 
Maintenance System also failed to materialise as the national centre expanded its 
control over transport issues. This put an abrupt stop to any provincial efforts as 
initially envisaged by APEC (Delegation of the European Commission in Pretoria, 
2002). 
A key component of the overall project aimed to provide support for a model 
of community-responsive policing. Officially known as The Partners in Policing: 
Crime Reduction Programme (PiP), this initiative was managed by three NGOs in the 
area, with financial support from DFID. These NGOs were the Independent 
Mediation Service of South Africa (IMSSA), Independent Teacher and Enrichment 
Centre (ITEC) , and the Urban Monitoring Action Committee (UMAC). Their 
participation focused on stimulating community-policing awareness and conducting 
crime prevention training at 195 police stations. Under the auspices of this component 
of the programme, a flurry of initiatives were undertaken. Hundreds of community 
members and police officers were trained in establishing and maintaining CPFs. Some 
4289 members of the community and 3148 police officers were beneficiaries of this 
training (Delegation of the European Commission in Pretoria, 2002). 
The Policing in Partnership programme was subject to independent external 
evaluation (PeIser & Masuku, 2002). The reports claimed considerable success for 
the establishment of CPFs. The APEC evaluation stated that PiPs had successfully 
trained both SAPS personnel and members of the community. Various study tours, of 
both police and community members, to the UK took place. According to the 
evaluation reports, CPFs proved instrumental in making co-operative working 
relationships between police and community possible. In what seemed like an 
overstatement, the evaluation claimed that CPFs 'have helped to ensure cultural 
change within SAPS' (Delegation of the European Commission in Pretoria, 2002:58). 
But like elsewhere, the record of CPFs in the Eastern Cape was uneven. Many 
had to contend with community apathy on the one hand and politicisation on the 
other. The evaluation study canvassed a wide range of views about the Community 
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Policing programme objectives and its successes. What emerged from the report was 
that participants (police, civil society, NGOs) held diverse views about the 
programme objectives, which ranged from crime reduction more generally, to 
ensuring community involvement in crime reduction more specifically, enhancing the 
capacity of CPFs, strengthening the relationship between the community and SAPS at 
station level, and finally, improving service delivery on the part of the police. 
Different constituencies brought different expectations to the project. 
The final evaluation also concluded that a key assumption on which PiP was built, 
namely that CPFs as representatives of the community were able to draw on voluntary 
participation in crime reduction projects and in doing so would improve 
community/police relations, was questionable. In practice the organic link between 
CPF representatives and the community was far more tenuous. Nevertheless, the 
evaluation concluded on a positive note in stating that the programme did achieve 
important results, including buy-in on the part of stake-holders involved (Delegation 
of the European Commission in Pretoria, 2002). This finding was supported by a 
respondent who stated that the whole PiP initiative contributed to a dramatic 
improvement in the relations between communities and the police. In his view, a 
much neglected spin-off of the PiP programme was the reduction in crime levels at a 
number of stations (Interview 1, July 2004). On the other hand, it must be noted that 
the promotion of CPFs in the late 1990s and thereafter was taking place at a time 
when the leadership at the centre had effectively lost their earlier enthusiasm for the 
kind of community involvement that effective CPFs seemed to promise . 
6.4 Conclusion: The end of APEC I and the start of APEC II 
Local institutions may display diverse competencies and cherish divergent 
strategies. APEC experiences attest to two sets of dynamics in this regard. The first 
concerned the friction between centre and province. The second came to the fore in 
the early adversarial relationship between the political leadership on the one hand, and 
the police leadership on the other. Aid may exacerbate social tensions and cleavages, 
as recent reports from humanitarian assistance confirm. Vigilance and strategic 
management is required to offset such side-effects. By all informed accounts, in the 
case of APEC the policing advisor played a critical role as ' honest broker' and 'peace-
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maker' to manage the political tensions and build trust between the different 
constituencies. Whilst local ownership ma~J be one of the necessary pre-conditions for 
sustainable interventions, it is more likely to evolve in the process of project 
implementation than being a condition well-established at the outset of project 
implementation. 
APEC I came to its appointed end in 2002. The final evaluation report was 
delivered in 2003. Shortly thereafter a scoping study for a possible continuation of 
developmental assistance was undertaken, the recommendations of which were 
released in late 2003. A new project agreement came into effect in June 2004 and with 
it the EU pledged an amount of E25m for a project titled ' Support to Policing of 
Crimes against Women and Children in the Eastern Cape.' In doing so the EU more 
than doubled its investment in enhancing security services for the province. 
The second round of assistance substantially departed from the project 
framework that guided APEC I. In part, the lack of continuity between project 
objectives and the change in the key recipients of aid (in part) appears to be a function 
of international shifts in aid policy in Brussels and elsewhere. Relevant here is the 
move toward ' pro-poor' policies generally, and the recasting of assistance to security 
as a developmental objective aligned to the needs of marginalised communities in 
particular. In line with the emerging wisdom that currently informs aid policy, the 
new project document argues that high levels of crime infringing on the rights of 
women and children (the most vulnerable segments of the poor) pose a particular 
challenge to the strengthening of democracy (Clegg, Hunt & Whetton, 2000). As a 
consequence it earmarks both technical and financial assistance to the enhancement of 
service delivery to victims of violence against women and children. In line with this 
pro-poor and victim-centred logic, support to an oversight mechanism - the 
Independent Complaints Directorate - aims specifically (and some would argue 
narrowly) at building capacity to monitor SAPS compliance with legislation relevant 
to crimes against women and children. The new project articulates the need for 
moving away from a state-centred investment in law enforcement capacity toward 
crime prevention more broadly, actively nurturing civil involvement in the pursuit of 
community safety, and advancing cross-cutting partnerships (across the public, 
market and private spheres) in the process. 
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Shifts in the metropole over the design and content of aid packages, as noted, 
reflec~ far more than lesson drawing from an existing project. In the case of APEC, 
however, the sharp switch in policy objectives in the new phase may also reflect at 
least some learning from the local. Making only faltering progress with the official 
structures of law enforcement in the Eastern Cape, funders - the EU in particular -
have turned to other sectors to supplement police action, while narrowing the scope 
for police reform in the Province to what may seem a more manageable but strategic 
area, namely the status of women and children. The re-introduction of crime 
prevention motifs also testify to a realisation that law enforcement functions may 
make little headway when chronic social issues remain unaddressed. But both the 
management of domestic violence and child abuse, and crime prevention strategies 
present formidable challenges of their own, as international experience has shown. 
APEC II may well prove to be a far more taxing exercise than expected. 
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Chapter 7 
Managerialism and Aid: 
The Service Delivery Improvement Programme 
7.1 Introduction 
By the late 1990s in South Africa, much greater clarity existed with regards to 
the core principles underlying the model of democratic policing to be pursued through 
transforrnative actions. By then, three principles were jostling for space and attention: 
legitimacy, accountability, and effectiveness. The demand for effectiveness in 
policing gained momentum as crime rates and public concern increased. By the time 
of the second democratic election in South Africa, operational effectiveness was 
considered a necessary precondition for sustaining the legitimacy of the post-
Apartheid police. It is in this context that the concept of police accountability itself 
became more responsive to calls for more effective policing through an improvement 
in service delivery. 
This chapter reconstructs part of the story of the adoption of the principle of 
effectiveness in the pursuit of police reform. It examines the ways in which both local 
and international influences combined to put managerial efficiency on the agenda of 
police reform. Some key features of the managerialist paradigm and the conceptual 
building blocks on which it is based (partnership and service delivery) are outlined. 
Broader factors have rendered the ideas attractive (cost effectiveness and crime 
control capability) . Its implementation, however, has been characterised by 
unanticipated difficulties and institutional resistance. By way of conclusion a brief 
assessment of the potential democratic spin-offs, 134 flowing from the process whereby 
police work is crafted onto a managerial grid, is offered. Do managerialist-orientated 
strategies yield benefits for purposes of both modernising and democratising systems 
of public policing? In particular, is this true of those police agencies long shaped by 
134 The democratic dividends could be considered at the level of structural, procedural and cultural 
change of a former colonial police institution. 
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the proclivities of colonial politics with their centralised forms of control and 
paramilitary habits of mind? Some observers think that this is in fact the case. 135 
This discussion focuses on the ways in which managerial reform became 
prioritised as a particular means to a more effective police organisation that both 
internally operated with greater sophistication, and externally tackled high crime rates 
with greater success. These reforms have been quite wide-ranging. Many of them 
have concerned the adoption of up-to-date administrative procedures, accounting 
practices, and personnel policies. This chapter restricts itself to an analysis of the 
attempt to introduce service delivery improvement principles and mechanisms in the 
SAP through a process of interactive co-operation between the Belgian Gendarmerie 
and the SAPS between 1995 and 2000. Before focusing on managerial reform in 
policing and considering the relevant case study, the broader context, both global and 
national, is outlined. 
The analysis presented here relies on scholarly sources and on documentary 
material emanating from various transnational policy agencies involved in public 
sector reform, as well as South African policies relevant to public sector re-
engineering and project-specific documents in the field of managerial police reform. 
In addition, interview material conducted for a project that was undertaken during 
1998, and which at the time involved participants in the pilot phase of Project Lifeline 
and the Community Policing Pilot Programme (CPPP), was re-examined for purposes 
of extracting background information and insight into the current analysis. 136 Lastly, 
four interviews were conducted with members of SAPS management situated at head 
office. 137 These interviews explored issues relating to the implementation of foreign 
135 For example, Marks and Fleming (2004:803) maintain that more participatory forms of 
management are crucial in police agencies 'whose objectives are more democratic and comrnunity-
oriented policing.' In terms of this argument managerialist reforms are seen as a necessary if not 
sufficient facet of organisational democratisation. Yet experience suggests that the obstacles to the 
assimilation of corporatist strategies, as the authors note, are mUltiple . Others again are much more 
concerned with the damage which the efficiency imperative may inflict on police organisations 
(Vickers & Kouzmin, 200 I) . 
136 The research findings were included in a report by Van der Spuy (2000). 
13 7 All four of these officers had, or still have, an intimate involvement with the modernisation of 
human resource management. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with Stefan Pieterse and 
George Moorcroft of the SAPS in Pretoria, 16 April 2005 . Pieter du Plessis (EU) in Pretoria, 16 April 
2005; Eugene de Villiers from SAPS, Somerset West, 5 August 2005 . 
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assisted project interventions, such as the Service Delivery Improvement Programme 
(SDIP), and its impact on the police agency. 
7.2 Public sector reform and new public management 
The popularity of public sector reform, based on the 'New Public 
Management' paradigm, is well documented (Hood, 1995; Kaul, 1997). These 
reforms rely on the importation of new management techniques from the private into 
the public sector. Underlying the New Public Management (NPM) approach is a 
belief that the state itself has become too large and that the market offers superior 
mechanisms for achieving the efficient delivery of goods and services (Polidano, 
2001). In the developed world the reforms have been driven by a wide range of 
factors, such as the importance of the fiscal crisis of the post-welfare state, the 
increasing appeal of neo-liberalism, the impact of information technology, and the 
. . fl f I 138 growmg m uence 0 management consu tants. 
Over the past two decades public sector reform has brought new paradigms 
and mechanisms to bear on the workings of state bureaucracies. The objectives of 
public sector reform are wide-ranging. They include the reduction of the size of 
government; improving accountability; boosting efficiency and effectiveness through 
the introduction of principles such as 'value for money' and the 'customer as 
consumer'; and the development of performance management indicators. Some 
commentators are of the opinion that these steps hold considerable potential to affect 
the cultural habits, values, and outlook of public service organisations. As Kaul 
(1997: 15) puts it: 'The concern for quality and the increasing identification with the 
public concerns are important aspects of the new culture. This gives rise to the 
possibility that a new public service value system is emerging in which quality, like 
probity more traditionally, is taken as moral as much as regulatory.' In this view new 
management techniques provide both an impetus for, and a key to, organisational 
change within public service organisations. 
138 Consultants, Larbi (1999) notes, have been particularly instrumental in the transfer of management 
techniques from the private to the public sector. 
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In practice, 'managerialism' has had far reaching effects on management 
systems and procedures. Administrative structures have been overhauled; human 
resource management revamped with an emphasis on flexible staffing, performance 
contracts, outputs and incentive packages; service users have been reconceptualised as 
consumers; and, last but not least, systems of financial planning and management 
have been re-engineered (Kaul, 1997). All of these efforts stand traditional notions of 
accountability on their head. As Ketti (1997:456) explains: 
[T]he government reform movement. . . radically transforms the nature of 
democratic accountability. It introduces an important bottom-up influence to 
counter traditional top-down control. 
The notion of a lean and cost efficient delivery of public services holds 
particular appeal in developing regions where state bureaucracies have long been 
wasteful, inefficient, and corrupt (Klitgaard, 1997). It is against this background that 
the spread from North to South of the virtues of NPM, particularly by transnational 
institutions, donor agencies and their platoons of management consultants, needs to be 
appreciated. Once donor agencies began to construct a link between improved 
governance and poverty reduction, public sector reform became linked, conceptually 
and strategically, to developmental objectives. In recent years, notions of 'good 
governance' have become closely intertwined with the principles of 'new 
managerialism.' This transfer, both voluntary and coercive (as under conditions 
where aid conditionality applies), of NPM reforms to developing regions 139 has 
contributed to a certain 'globalization of public sector management' (Flynn 1997 
quoted in Larbi, 1999: 1) and a 'diffusion of reforms' (Halligen, 1997 quoted in Larbi, 
1999: 1). In this process of diffusion various transnational agencies, such as the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OEeD), have been playing a particularly important 
role (Bislev, Salskov-Iversen & Hansen, 2001). 
139 As for the transfer of new paradigms from North to South the UNDP notes as follows : 'NPM seeks 
to roll back the role of the state by applying private sector management principles to government 
organisations. The enthusiastic dissemination of this model to developing countries was seen by some 
as a new attempt to colonize development administration with a standardised, western approach to PAR 
(public administration reform). Nevertheless, the language of NPM, and the principles of client focus, 
decentralization, the separation of policy making from implementation, and the use of private partners 
for service delivery continues to inform current thinking about PAR' (UNDP [circa 2003] Public 
Administration Reform: Practice Note, pA). 
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African experiences also attest to the pivotal role of donors in state 
restructuring (Kiragu, 2002; Therkildsen, 2001). Outcomes, however, are far from 
guaranteed as change toward NPM has been 'uneven and contested' (Larbi, 1999:35), 
with cross-national studies revealing significant variations in public sector reform 
(Stevens & Teggemann, 2004). 
A critical question for new democracies is whether the adoption of public 
sector management approaches will open up political spaces for democratising 
institutions beyond a mere modernisation of institutional structures and processes. 
This view is captured in the United Nations' argument that public sector management 
'is also about fostering dynamic partnerships with civil society and the private sector, 
to improve the quality of service delivery, enhance social responsibilities and ensure 
the broad participation of citizens in decision-making and feedback on public service 
performance' (UNDP, 2003:5). In this description the normative elements of NPM 
are explicit. If nurtured with care, NPM may advance contractual relations between 
public agencies and private citizens infused with elements of participatory 
accountability. It is the accrual of democratic spin-offs from NPM that is of particular 
interest in a discussion on police reform in the context of political transition. In the 
field of security the adoption of a new discourse of public management and its 
associated principles may facilitate the pressure for reforms towards a model of good 
policing characterised by social responsiveness (both upwards and downwards) and 
accountability to 'multiple audiences' (Bayley, 1999:5). 
7.3 Managerialism in criminal justice policy 
The infusion of managerialism into criminal justice policy (Dilulio et aI., 
1993) and research (Jefferson & Shapland, 1994) has become a subject of 
considerable debate over recent decades (Bottoms, 1995; Feeley & Simon, 1996; 
Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). The managerialist paradigm, as Muncie, McLaughlin, 
and Langan (1996) put it, is 'committed to the effective management of the criminal 
justice system and its component parts. Cost-effectiveness, efficient forms of custody 
and control, the identification and classification of risk, performance indicators, quasi-
competition and organizational targets are the concerns of the new managerial 
regime' (p.305). Others again have warned that the instrumentalist spirit so 
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characteristic a feature of managerialism should not blind us to the more insidious 
political implications of the new paradigm (See Lacey, 1994). 
7.3.1 Managerialism in policing 
A number of critical commentaries on the impact of managerialism on public 
police agencies have emerged in the past decade (Cope, Leishman & Starie, 1997; 
Reiner & Spencer, 1993; Loveday, 1998; Loader, 1999; Fleming & Lafferty, 2000; 
Vickers and Kouzmin, 2001; Fleming & Rhodes, 2004). The debate has crystallised 
around a number of distinct themes. One is the change in discourse. For example, the 
adoption of new public speak in police policy circles is to be found in the demand for 
'effectiveness and efficiency' in the delivery of police services; the setting of 
'policing objectives' through an assessment of local crime concerns; the adoption of 
'citizen charters' responsive to customer needs; and in the wide-spread insistence on 
public-private partnerships. Real managerial reforms have accompanied the rhetoric 
so as to 'set standards' for services, 'monitor' performance and 'engage' in 
consultative interaction with customers (Dadds & Scheide, 2000). 
A second component links managerialism with police accountability. Within 
this strand of the debate there are clear differences of opinion, between those who 
accentuate the rapport between new managerial approaches to policing and the model 
of community policing, and others who predict that managerial modes of 
administrative accountability may well erode more organic forms of social 
accountability. With regards to the first view, Gianakis and Davis (1998) emphasise 
the synergy between the managerialist emphases on economy, efficiency and equityl40 
and the model of community policing. In their view 'community policing has become 
recognized as the law enforcement manifestation of that movement ... ' (p.48S). The 
affinity between the principles underlying NPM and community policing is also 
emphasised by Eck and Rosenbaum (1994).141 A second body of opinion is less 
optimistic about the actual democratic spin-offs of managerial approaches. New 
140 Where efficiency means the efficient use of police resources and equity refers to the equitable 
distribution of police services. 
141 Although one should note that conceptual affinity and synergy at a rhetorical level provide little 
guarantee for a convergence of outcomes at the operational level. 
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accountability creates a range of accounting devices to 'measure performance and 
make decisions auditable' (Chan, 1999:255). But new accountability, warns Chan 
(1999), gives emphasis to managerial standards, as opposed to legal or public-interest 
standards which prevailed in traditional models of accountability. Whether the new 
form of accountability actually renders police more accountable to social audiences 
situated at the local level, is thus a moot point. Here Scott (1998) too concurs. In his 
view the emergence of a performance culture may simply steer police organisations in 
the direction of managerial accountability, which may well be at odds with more 
participative notions of community-based accountability. 
Equally contentious in the debate is the question as to the receptivity of police 
bureaucracies (so long considered resistant to outside influences) to new managerial 
ideas. Some anticipate that managerialism may result in structural and organisational 
reforms. Such changes, it is argued, hold considerable potential for re-shaping the 
institutional culture of public police organisations in the direction of greater openness 
and transparency. On the opposite side are those who exhibit more scepticism. 
Savage (2003) traces the 'reform-resistant nature' (p.171) of the British police, 
highlighting the capacity for cultural resistance which the canteen culture exhibits. On 
a slightly different note, the paradoxical consequences associated with the imposition 
of new managerialist approaches within the British police are outlined by McLauglin 
and Murji (1997:99): 
While, on the one hand, there continues to be deep resistance to 
managerialization, on the other hand, at many levels within the organization, 
the impact of various forms of managerialism have already been felt deeply. 
The ways in which these tensions will be played out remained to be seen. 
The pitfalls associated with inserting a managerialist agenda, and buying into 
management tropes and their 'potentially deleterious effects on police organizational 
abilities' are explored in further detail by Vickers and Kouzmin (2001:7). Here they 
part company with those who embrace the new paradigm and its faddism so readily, 
warning instead against 'blind acceptance of managerialism' and the' possibilities of 
disaster. ,142 
142 Such then is the substance of the debate on managerialism in police organisations in the developed 
world. To date very little research exists with regards to the impact of new public management ideas on 
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7.4 Public sector reform in post-Apartheid South Africa: The citizen as 
active consumer of public services 
The advent of constitutionalism had far-reaching implications for the public 
service, whose broader mission and routine practices have been moulded by ethnic 
politics. After 1994 a radically new policy framework was required for the public 
service to create 'a better life for all.' A string of policy papers sought to coerce and 
co-opt, push and shove the state bureaucracy into a new frame of action. The Interim 
Constitution of 1993 and The Public Service Act of 1994 set the base line for re-
organisation in the civil service. Various obstacles had to be negotiated: the scarcity 
of management skills, institutional fragmentation, the underdevelopment of the 
human resource function, and the lack of management information. 
The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (1995) 
stipulated eight transformation priorities. 143 Shortly thereafter followed the Green 
Paper on Transformation - Public Service Delivery (December 1996). The latter, too, 
provided evidence of a new managerialist ethos, with an emphasis on the 
improvement in 'quality, quantity and equity' of service provision. In 1997, the 'Year 
of Service Delivery,' the Batho Pele (People First) Service Delivery initiative was 
launched. This campaign profiled the need for transforming service delivery with 
departmental-specific delivery plans. Key to the implementation of Batho Pele was 
management reform. 144 The White Paper on Human Resource Management in the 
Public Service (1997b) refined the policy framework with the view to facilitating the 
shift from 'personnel administration to human resource management' (p.9). The 
Public Finance Management Act of 1999 attended to financial management in the 
public sector with more onerous reporting responsibilities for accounting officers. 
police institutions in transitional contexts. Three exceptions however are worth noting: Sepp, (2002); 
Marks and Fleming (2004), and Collier (2004). 
143 These were: rationalisation, institution building, representivity and affirmative action, transforming 
service delivery, democratising the workplace, human resource development and training, employment 
conditions and the promotion of professional service delivery. 
144 The priorities for such reform were simpler regulatory regimes; improved human resource 
management systems with performance targets ; decentralisation and delegation of responsibilities; and 
the participative involvement of consumers through feedback systems. 
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The new framework for governance as advocated in the public sector filtered 
down to individual state departments. But soon the gap between expansive policy 
frameworks and actual governmental practice at the department level loomed large. 
Additional guidelines for public sector reform were provided in the wide-ranging 
Presidential Review Commission of 1998. Sweeping in scope, this Review captured 
the flawed nature of the machinery of government inherited from the past and the 
enormity of the challenges in striving toward '(t)he creation of a people centred and 
people driven public service which is characterised by equity, quality, timeousness 
and a strong code of ethics' (Ministry for the Public Service and Administration, 
1995: Paragraph 2.1). 
This brief overview of post-1994 policy guidelines provides evidence of the 
extent to which the language, principles and mechanisms in support of public sector 
reform permeated discussions on state reconstruction after 1994. In developing policy 
frameworks, the Department of Public Service and Administration took the lead and 
borrowed freely from international best practices. The new legislative frameworks in 
support of public sector reform and financial management clearly created 
opportunities for change and reform (Collier, 2004). 
As is to be expected, reform of the public sector also provided a space within 
which the international community could pledge its support and provide assistance 
(both technical and financial) to the new democracy. Public sector reform in the 
context of political transition opened up opportunities for international assistance in 
South Africa. For example, the export of public service ideas from the UK dates back 
as far as 1990, when 75 senior ANC officials benefited from an exchange agreement 
initiated by Nelson Mandela with the Civil Service College. After 1994, the Civil 
Service College continued to function as a critical conduit of British practices and 
. . d' 145 training ventures an assistance. 
145 See http://www.publicnet.co.ukipublicnetl98040101.htm (Accessed 5 September, 2004). 
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7.5 Managerial reform and the South African Police Service 
The social re-engineering of the civil service set the framework for intrusive 
departmental reviews of the state's machinery. Managerial reform within the police 
bureaucracy thus constituted one aspect of a state-wide effort. After April 1994 the 
new political elite of the renamed police administration had to manage a complex 
process of rationalisation and amalgamation in order to redress the effects of 
balkanisation. The unification of the eleven former police forces into one central 
structure was an expensive and time-consuming exercise. Beyond the technical 
processes lay the more fundamental priority of transforming the Police Service to 
improve its quality and accessibility. With hindsight, it is clear that from the start the 
complexity of institutional reform of the old SAP had been underestimated. The 
immensity of the task, and its unintended consequences, seemed not to have been 
properly appreciated. There was little anticipation that dramatic shifts in policy could 
have sweeping budgetary implications. Key pieces of policy such as the Green Paper 
on Policing of 1994, and the NCPS of 1996 were all constructed in a budgetary 
vacuum. 
The availability of international donor aid was, however, some slight 
palliative. Measures that could properly be considered 'managerialist' in scope and 
aim received the support of a number of foreign agencies. In this regard five donors in 
particular deserve mention: the Swedes, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, and the EU. All of 
these donor constituencies became involved in human resource developments within 
the wider criminal justice sector and/or the police specifically. Such interventions 
ranged from policy development more broadly, to various forms of capacity 
development which targeted different layers of the organisation more specifically. 
Furthermore, infra-structural support, assistance with developing information 
management systems, and redesigning of budgetary systems were prominent features 
of bilateral support (Van der Spuy, 2003). The rest of this Chapter considers just one 
case study among this flurry of managerial initiatives, but one that more than most 
others was directly concerned with enhancing policing performance at the grass roots, 
and hence with crime reduction. This example concerns a Belgian-assisted project that 
targeted management reform at police station level in particular: the Service Delivery 
Improvement Programme. 
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7. 6 Managerial reform and service delivery: The Service Delivery 
Improvement Programme 
The Service Delivery Improvement Programme (or SDIP for short), as it 
eventually became known, had a chequered history. It evolved from disparate 
beginnings and diverse inputs from a number of different quarters (in-house and 
departmental, corporate and foreign) into a more consolidated approach to service 
delivery improvement. In its initial phase this project was co-driven by change 
management structures within the SAPS and a team of police advisors seconded from 
the Belgian Gendarmerie. The emphasis in the discussion below is on the Service 
Delivery Improvement Programme as one facet of · a new managerialist ethos, its 
evolution over time, key formative influences and alliances created in its 
institutionalisation (involving the local business community, a foreign police agency 
and the administrative core of the SAPS), and its integration into both the semantics 
and actual business of policing. 
In 1995, flowing from a number of tangential inter-personal, political and 
organisational factors, negotiations between the SAPS and the Belgian Gendarmerie 
began with a view to a five-year exchange agreement. Influential in this regard had 
been contacts built up since the early reform period after 1990. So for example, in 
1992 Judge Goldstone (who headed the Comm,ission of Inquiry into Public Violence) 
had involved Cyril FUnaut, a policing expert from Belgium, in the work of the 
Commission. Peter Harris during his stint at the Regional Peace Accord structures in 
the Witwatersrand also built up contacts with technical experts from Belgium. Harris 
called on those experts when he moved to the Independent Electoral Commission 
(IEC). As a result, in January 1994 an identification mission was undertaken by the 
Belgian Gendarmerie to determine the feasibility of providing support during the first 
democratic elections in April 1994. This led to the deployment of two police officers 
involved in the monitoring endeavours of the IEC in the pre-election phase. During 
this deployment further consultations between the Belgian Gendarmerie and interim 
advisory structures within the Ministry of Safety and Security developed. In these 
circles Etienne Marais, a well-known civilian policing expert and later member of the 
Civilian Secretariat of the SAPS, played a particularly critical role. These personal 
networks proved important. They were to lead to the Minister of Safety and Security'S 
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invitation to the Belgian Gendarmerie to assist the Change Management Team, a 
critical structure in the organisational reform of the SAPS. The outcome was a five-
year exchange agreement between the two police agencies signed in 1995. 
7.6.1 Competing interests: Business Against Crime, Foreign consultants and 
'low cost solutions' to service delivery 
The implementation of the 1995 agreement with the Gendarmerie proved 
protracted. One result was that its operations ran up against related activities that had 
managed an earlier start. The story is somewhat involved, but requires a brief 
digression if the final shape of the SDIP, and the influences brought to bear on it, are 
to be appreciated. 
By the time the Gendarmerie moved into action on the ground, similar efforts 
regarding grass roots police reform had been underway for some time. In particular 
there was 'Project Lifeline.' The driving force behind this project was an American-
based consultancy firm, McKinsey Incorporated. The latter claimed specialist 
expertise in improving operational performance of organisations through a problem-
solving methodology. The company first entered South Africa in 1995 . In its initial 
review of the South African scene it identified the perceived lack of capacity on the 
part of the police to address high rates of crime. After consultations with the Minister 
of Safety and Security and senior police officials, a pledge for support, sold at the 
time as of a pro bono nature,146 was translated into a skeleton framework - Project 
Lifeline. Its goal was to improve substantially the performance of 100 of the most 
'needy stations' across the country.147 The aim was to work closely with station 
commissioners and their personnel to develop a plan for improving performance at the 
station level. 
146 Whilst in the initial phase there was much emphasis on the pro bono nature of McKinsey'S 
involvement, the business community ended up footing what was described 'as an expensive bill' for 
the consultancy work whilst the SAPS budget had to pay the costs for conununication and transport 
(Interview, EvV, 5 August 2005). 
147 Needy stations were identified as those confronting high levels of crime, weak station capabilities 
and inadequate infrastructure. 
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However, McKinsey Inc. were not the sole actors involved in Project Lifeline. 
The McKinsey consultants moved ahead with the backing of a local coalition of 
economic interests, Business Against Crime (BAC). The formation of BAC, a Section 
21 Company, followed in response to an appeal from President Mandela to business 
leaders in August 1995 to co-operate with government in fighting crime. In the initial 
phase there was little clarity as to the objectives or strategies to be deployed by this 
loose corporate alliance. Ad hoc and localised interventions characterised this first 
phase of assistance. 'Adopting' a 'local cop' or 'local police station' became a way of 
targeting specific police stations for business support. Much media attention 
accompanied the involvement of business in crime control: 
The war on crime by business is steadily gaining momentum, with a national 
chicken fast food franchise joining The Star, Plascon and BMW, among 
others, in announcing plans to ruffle the feathers of criminals. Nando's 
Chickenland has joined hands with Business Against Crime with the launch of 
its Crime Busters campaign which, along with new menus, logos and bumper 
stickers, will get outlets around the country to donate SOc off each purchase to 
a neighbouring police stations for the next eight months .... BMW South Africa 
donated 100 vehicles to the Gauteng Highway Patrol Unit, Plascon is raising 
about R 1 million through the sale of paint, Saambou makes awards for' 
community police forums, and now Nando's has a crime-buster initiative (The 
Star, 4 September, 1996). . 
By late 1996 the promulgation of a key policy framework, the National 
Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), provided business with broad terms of reference 
for their interventions. As discussed in Chapter 4 this framework highlighted four 
focus areas ranging from Re-engineering the criminal justice system (Pillar 1), Crime 
Prevention through Environmental Design (Pillar 2), Civic Education (Pillar 3), to 
Efforts focusing on Transnational Organised Crime (Pillar 4). After the unveiling of 
the NCPS, almost all of BAC's support came to be directed to Pillar 1. In search of a 
detailed strategy for support, BAC dispatched teams of consultants (of which the 
largest and most expensive of efforts involved Anderson Consulting) to identify 
blockages within the criminal justice system and devise priorities for reform. Priority 
crime projects were identified and business plans developed. A team consisting of six 
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agencies. 1SO Furthermore, the paramilitary leanings and centralised nature of their 
organisational structures made for a certain organisational rapport. Both agencies had 
to respond to a changing crime environment in which transnational crime was 
presenting new operational demands. Such broad similarities, it was argued, bestowed 
credibility on the exchange agreement, emphasising the virtues of 'reciprocal 
exchanges' and 'joint learning' based on a 'comparative' engagement with 
'international trends', as opposed to a mere unidirectional transfer of solutions from 
donor to recipient. The imperative underlying the exchange was for both public 
agencles to get into line 'with international developments' and develop their 
respective capacities for 'professional service delivery.' As stated in the Technical 
File (1995) the basic principles on which both police organisations 'want to build 
their future organisations, are very similar. Both organisations clearly perceive the 
need for professional servIce delivery'(Point 2.2). This appeal to 
'internationalisation', and the need to emulate international best practices and utilise 
international experts, provided a powerful legitimating argument in support of the 
project. 
A critical factor in the negotiations pnor to the signing of the agreement 
related to the direct access that the Belgian contingent enjoyed to the Ministry of 
Safety and Security, the interim advisors team (rAT), and then later to change 
management structures within the police organisation. Such direct access to change 
agencies within the centre of the bureaucracy proved very useful. Within police 
circles at the time, some concerns were expressed about the potentially exclusionary 
implications resulting from signing the Belgian agreement. The concern hinged on the 
possibility that SAPS could be losing out on other international support (Dutch, 
British and Danish support in particular) that was said be forthcoming in similar areas. 
The newly appointed Commissioner of Police, George Fivaz, was adamant that the 
dangers of the Belgians 'obstructing or dictating' the long-term vision of the SAPS 
had to be avoided. 1Sl Such concerns, however, did not derail the process, and neither 
did they materialise in practice. On the Belgian side there was considerable emphasis 
on their 'support' and 'coaching' role. The Gendarmerie's technical experts would 
150 Ethnic tensions characterised the Belgian side and racial animosity the South African side. 
151 Internal Information Note attached to the Technical File (1995), dated 05-04-1995 . 
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help to identify the levers for change, and 'signal' where problems existed. In the long 
run, after all, they had to become 'dispense-ble.' 
Signed in March 1995 for a period of five years, involving close to 164 
million Belgian Francs (about R20.5 million), the agreement paved the way for 
interactive engagements involving information missions, elaborate training sessions, 
study tours, workshops, audits, conferences, field research, and a large number of 
seminars. Project structures and agents included management sectors, station 
commanders, project teams and leaders, and facilitators and trainers deployed at 
different levels of the organisation. The paper trail that ensued resembled that of a 
publication industry with diagnostic packs, training documents, status plans, scouting 
reports, research papers, and mid-term reviews, as well as a compact final evaluation 
report which was completed around 2003. 
As mentioned earlier, the CPPP constituted one component of the overall four-
pronged intervention specified in the agreement. In this initial phase Belgian efforts 
focused on the operationalisation of the community policing framework as explicated 
in the CPPP. The efforts in this regard revolved around a project-based methodology ' 
aimed at gaining clarity as to the kinds of services to be offered to the community " 
(Technical File, 1995). Couched in the discursive framework of a CPPP, it advocated 
the virtues of ' needs driven' policing relying on 'active partnerships' and 'joint 
problem solving.' 
In the evolution of CPPP on the ground two phases can be distinguished: a 
pilot, and an extended second phase. In the pilot phase 20 stations in the 
Johannesburg Area, a hotbed of crime, were targeted. The minute details of the 
process, its ambitious scope, and the thick web of structures spawned in support of the 
programme, are contained in a large number of station-specific project documents. 152 
Programme Johannesburg provided an opportunity for piloting a model for effective 
policing - it was likened to a 'professional conduct' campaign which would tum 
police members into 'professionals' (SAPS, [circa, 2003]:42). It aimed at creating 
152 More information is also contained in the briefing notes to the Portfolio Committee for Safety and 
Security delivered in August 1998 (Briefing, 1998). 
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'pockets of excellence' and 'rolling out' such successes to other parts of the country. 
The project documents made reference to 'oil staining effects' and 'cascading lessons 
down.' Articulated in this manner, Programme Johannesburg publicly signalled the 
intention of overhauling the operational efficiency of the SAPS in toto . 
The pilot project consisted of five phases based on a so-called SWOT 
methodology.I53 In the preparatory phase, buy-in amongst station management was to 
be secured. Phase 2 involved a diagnosis of crime rates at the local level, and an audit 
of the current performance levels utilising performance charts. During Phase 3 ideas, 
such as how to address root causes of the problem at station level, had to be 
generated. In Phase 4 an integrated implementation plan was developed. In the final 
phase implementation and monitoring of the plan concluded the intervention. As 
articulated in project documents, the project's initiative was to develop community 
pilot projects with the view to a 'change in culture' away from the 'command and 
control' model of management. Project operatives situated at the station level were 
expected to 'take initiative' and ' solve problems' in a 'creative' fashion and with a 
clear understanding of 'basic standards' of service delivery (SAPS, [circa, 2003]: 68-
70). 
Project documents and business plans compiled for each of the twenty police 
stations provide a detailed view on the wide range of initiatives involved and the 
complex dynamics that ensued once project implementation got underway. At this 
point CPPP was described as a 'methodology,' a 'management tool' geared toward an 
improvement of service delivery at station level through developing practical ideas; 
expanding skills and knowledge; boosting morale; instilling discipline; and addressing 
communication blockages within the organisation. The target beneficiaries were 
conceived in wide and inclusive terms. 154 
In order to appreciate both the symbolic and material importance of 
Programme Johannesburg, some reference to the prevailing state of organisational 
IS) Between 1994 and 1996 SWOT methodology which became popular in organisational auditing, 
focused on the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) in planning exercises . 
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affairs within the police organisation at the time is necessary. The SAPS resembled a 
beleaguered instillition - under-policed, under-resourced and under siege - both 
internally and externally. In the budget vote delivered by the Minister of Safety and 
Security in May 1997 there was already reference to a 'vicious circle of crisis 
management' within the police (Hansard, 1997: Col 1462). In this speech the Minister 
pointed to the dire need for outside expertise and assistance in the actual management 
of support functions such as human resources, logistics, and finance. Such assistance, 
it was argued, would allow the police to focus most of its attention on operational 
matters. It was to this call for assistance that the chairman of South African 
Breweries, Meyer Kahn, responded with an offer of a two year secondment to SAPS. 
It was anticipated that this senior executive would lend momentum to efforts to 
modernise human resource practices and instil fiscal discipline within the police 
organisation. 
Meyer Kahn's appointment as chief executive of the SAPS took effect on 
August 1 1997. It was heralded as a 'vital milestone in the drive by government and 
the private sector to combat crime' (SAPA, 24 May, 1997). It was Kahn's intention to 
pursue market-based principles of organisational management within the police' 
bureaucracy and to instil fiscal discipline - particularly through the reduction of -
personnel expenditure. Soon after his appointment, Kahn pushed for the installation of 
an Automated Finger-printing Identification System (AFIS). The latter he argued was 
a basic prerequisite for the modernisation of the police infra-structure. Whilst lack of 
clarity with regards to his role and function seemed to have plagued his appointment 
(Shaw, 2002a), the challenges confronting Kahn were formidable. The political 
compromises forged at the negotiation tables of CODESA in 1992-3, combined with 
the harsh budgetary constraints, combined to rule out truly sweeping reform. For 
example, one casualty of a budget-enforced policy of attrition and downsizing was the 
replacement or supplementation of the old SAP and its homeland surrogates by a 
properly trained cadre of new recruits. The incorporation of the Botha-era special 
constables ('kitskonstabels ') was to saddle the new SAPS with around 30 000 police 
officers who were scarcely literate, hardly trained, and generally despised. Again and 
154 It would involve the criminal justice sector (Justice, Correctional Services, Welfare/Social 
Services), local government, metro police, the business community, victims of crime, community 
police forums, police management as well as rank and file. 
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again the desire to professionalise policing would bump into the 'special constable' 
problem. Furtherrr:ore the desire to balance the costs of salaries with those of 
operations also ran into intractable difficulties. To add insult to injury, infrastructural 
capacity was weak at best. At the time of Kahn's appointment the backlog regarding 
police equipment amounted to R2 billion (Hansard, 1998: Col 3265). In addition, a 
reduction in operational expenses was also on the cards (Hansard, 1998: Col 3302). 
Against this harsh economic reality and amidst spiralling crime rates, the development 
of managerial competence and the inculcation of financial discipline became the straw 
onto which the police clutched in their quest for modernisation. 
Meyer Kahn threw his weight behind the pilot project ill metropolitan 
Johannesburg. As in the case of Project Lifeline, the project methodology relied on 
dramaturgical devices which in turn created some momentum at the station level. But 
the collective energy of the workforce did not provide a magic wand for neutralising 
systemic blockages. Before long, performance charts ran into procedural difficulties. 
In many instances the station plans suffered from poor implementation, or simply 
gathered dust. Lessons learnt (negative or positive) during the pilot phase were never 
fonnally captured, nor passed on in any systematic fashion. As a consequence the' 
notion of 'oil-staining' and 'cascading' of best practices did not materialise to the ' 
., 11 . d 155 extent ongma y enVIsage . 
During the initial phase of the project, managerial reforms were pursued 
following the doctrine of community policing. In the second phase, the desirability of 
management reform took on its own momentum and became increasingly divorced 
from the semantics and logistics of community policing. In this phase, managerial 
principles fed more directly into traditional crime combating objectives. This 
development would signal a third phase in the co-operative agreement between SAPS 
and the Belgian Gendarmerie. 
155 Interview, Ex-Police Official attached to Project Office of Programme Johannesburg, Pretoria: 16 
April 2005. 
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7.6.3 Phase 3: Inserting strategic planning and SDIP into policing 
priorities and plans 
It was almost inevitable that tension would develop between the project 
initiatives undertaken under the auspices of Project Lifeline, Project Johannesburg, 
and CPPP proper. There were three aspects to this tension: the politics of turf, 
differences in approach and time-lines, and the degree of local ownership. 
Relationships between Lifeline consultants on the one hand, and the Belgian 
Gendarmerie and SAPS on the other, became increasingly competitive and 
acrimonious. 156 CPPP evolved at a much slower pace than the 'rapid appraisals' and 
'low cost' interventions characteristic of Project Lifeline. In police circles there was 
also concern about too close a dependency on costly consultants in keeping the 
initiatives of Project Lifeline going. The building of in-house organisational capacity 
to drive the project initiatives under the Belgian agreement was viewed more 
favourably. 
Against this background, project managers working within the SAPS made a 
strategic decision: first, to integrate Project Lifeline into the CPPP, and later to 
repackage the Belgian initiative into an organisation-wide effort to improve service 
delivery. In the process, the connection with McKinsey Inc. was jettisoned, though 
not without subsequent disputes that led to McKinsey threatening to take court action 
against the SAPS. The project methodology, a central feature of CPPP, became 
relabelled as the SDIP. In this incarnation it entailed an expansion of the original set 
of interventions, a mainstreaming of new public management strategies within the 
police organisation, and a much stronger consolidation of SAPS ownership of the 
process as a whole. 
156 Interview with ex-Project Manager, E v V Somerset-West, 5 August 2005. 
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7.6.4 Managerial reform and shifting emphasis in policing: from Service to 
Force 
These latter developments need to be appreciated against shifts in political 
mood and operational policy about the time of the second democratic elections. As 
argued in Chapter 4, from 1998 onwards a shift in gear was evident as the project of 
police reform became redefined, from broad-based legitimacy to police effectiveness, 
from the technocratic idealism of the NCPS to 'Back to Basics' in the 'War Against 
Crime.' Public concern about the escalation of rates of violent crime served as a 
pressure point on the political elite. In response, police management began to place 
far less emphasis on broad policy frameworks, to refocus police responsibilities on 
law enforcement, and to invest limited resources on some indispensable policing 
capacity such as investigative skills and intelligence gathering. In 1998 the Minster of 
Safety and Security publicly acknowledged that the police agency was in a bad shape: 
'What we currently have is a generally untrained, ill-equipped and underresourced 
SAPS' (Hansard, 1998 : Col 3244). He proceeded to lament the overly ambitious 
nature of previous police plans, arguing that there is a need for a return to 'the core 
business of the department namely enhanced and improved law enforcement and · 
delivery of effective crime prevention programmes,' with the objective of building a 
lean and streamlined police service (Hansard, 1999: Col 2586). 
The above quotation can be seen as indicative of a new political pragmatism 
spawned in part by transformation fatigue. One spin-off of the latter became a much 
more technically orientated attempt to fix basic administrative systems and practices 
so as to improve law enforcement capacity in the face of spiralling crime. At this 
point the principles of new public management (conducting crime trend analysis, 
stipulating priorities, aligning resources, quantifying outputs and assessing impact), so 
carefully nurtured during the bottom-up pilot phase of the CPPP, became inscribed 
into the SDIP and inserted forcefully into the harder, crime combating edge of 
operational strategies. 
SDIP comprised a diagnostic analysis of the internal and external environment 
within which a police station was situated; an assessment of the performance of the 
station; an identification of the factors impeding performance; the development of an 
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implementation plan in response to the diagnosis of situational and organisational 
ailments; the utilisation of performance charts which specified desired and actual 
outputs; and an assessment of performance by evaluation teams. Elaborate business 
plans were to be developed with a detailed exposition of core deliverables and sub-
deliverables, required inputs, a specification of activities, desired outputs, and time-
lines. 
In the second phase Belgian assistance moved to the centre of the police 
organisation and aimed at advancing effective policing vis-a-vis 'priority' crimes (as 
outlined in the Strategic Plan of the Police) with visible short term combating 
objectives. Here the ideas of SDIP begin to merge with the in-house planning of top 
police management. One striking indication of the application of basic managerial 
principles to crime combating strategies is to be found in the details of the National 
Crime Combating Strategy, announced by the SAPS in 2000 (SAPS, 2000a). This 
strategy relied on a two-phased programme - targeted crime fighting in 'hot spots', to 
be followed by more explicit crime prevention measures of a developmental nature. 
The NCCS made explicit its resolve to fight crime. Stations with high rates of 
recorded crime became earmarked for support and monitoring. In total 145 police' 
stations considered 'hot spots' became recipients of additional resources with closer 
monitoring keeping a check on efforts. The logic involved and the operational 
strategies deployed resemble a more elaborate application of the very principles and 
ideas generated in the pilot phase of Project Johannesburg. 
National instructions on service delivery were dispatched to police stations in 
2000. The development of these instructions relied heavily on Belgian assistance and 
marked its integration into core policy frameworks of the organisation in line with the 
requirements set out in the Batho Pete White Paper. By now service delivery ideas 
became an integral part of overall strategic planning within the police organisation. At 
this point official descriptions of SDIP described it as a program designed to improve 
the 'quality of services rendered to the community' by the Police Service, and to 
improve the functioning of the Service, consisting of integrated plans which would 
align the priorities of the respective levels, setting out tasks, responsibilities, service 
standards, resources and time frames (SAPS, 2000b). 
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7.7 Managerial regimes and police reform: South African lessons 
Notwithstanding its rather ad hoc beginnings and the initial turf battles 
between external players jostling for position, by 2000 the SDIP had evolved into a 
large-scale intervention in strategic planning. It left few of the old management 
systems within the police organisation unaffected, although its success in improving 
grass roots policing, and hence in reducing crime, could be held to be minimal at best. 
The momentum of this process, as the discussion has tried to make clear, was 
shaped by a combination of local and foreign influences. Of critical importance for 
the police agency (as for other state departments) was the promulgation of generic 
regulatory frameworks for the public service of the new democracy. A successive 
number of policy and legal frameworks obligated all departments to comply with new 
sets of administrative rules. Within the criminal justice sector more broadly, important 
shifts towards system-wide planning and a 'clustering' approach aimed at co-
operative governance in the criminal justice system had emerged. The latter was 
explicated in the NCPS of 1996 ( discussed in Chapter 4) and provided further 
momentum to notions of 'cooperative management' - so dominant a feature of the ' 
systemic dimension of managerialism as outlined by Bottoms (1995). 
The SAPS seemed to have embraced the new regulatory regime with more 
enthusiasm and with more relative success than other departments in the criminal 
justice sector. As Shaw (2000: 14) puts it: 'The system of priorities and objectives as 
implemented by the SAPS since 1996 is probably the most comprehensive of any 
government department.' Leggett (2003) too talks in favourable terms of the 
Department of Safety and Security's innovative efforts to 'develop and track 
performance indicators' within the police organisation. In an interview 1s7 with 
Commissioner Moorcroft, the head of Corporate Services, he too boasted about the 
extent to which the Department of Safety and Security, compared to other 
departments, was at the forefront of compliance with service delivery regulations. 
157Interview, Commissioner George Moorcroft, Corporate Services, SAPS Head Office, Pretoria: April 
16,2005. 
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The trajectory of this programme aimed at service delivery produced many 
lessons about the politics and logistics of inculcating new managerial regimes. Good 
intentions and a flurry of activities again provided few guarantees for effective impact 
or long-term sustainability. Deficiencies at the management level played havoc with 
project objectives. Political commitment amongst key functionaries varied and diluted 
the momentum for change. Volatility within the work force - due to attrition, 
redeployment of personnel, and/or affirmative action - scattered the expertise 
developed through a number of projects, ranging from Project Lifeline, to Project 
Johannesburg and CPPP. Over-ambitious target-setting made realisation unlikely and 
vague indicators of success, as contained in station plans, bedevilled efforts to assess 
impact. Many of these lessons are also echoed in Collier's (2004) detailed enquiry 
into the fate of large-scale efforts to introduce local financial management, based on a 
replication of UK experiences, and involving an exchange agreement between the 
West Mercia Constabulary and the SAPS in Bloemfontein. Marks and Fleming's 
(2004) analysis of managerial reform in a public order police unit in the Durban area 
further captures some of the obstacles encountered in inculcating participatory 
management techniques, aimed at changing workplace cultures and practices, in 
specialist sectors of the SAPS. Management deficits create unwieldy obstacles, and· 
persistent adherence to traditional notions of discipline restricts the scope for 
participatory management practices. 
In Project Johannesburg, the lack of support and co-ordination from the centre 
meant that implementation was uneven and often weak. In this regard managerial 
deficiencies played a role, as did the unevenness of the policing landscape within the 
Johannesburg area. Situated a mere 10 kilometres apart, conditions on the ground 
varied starkly across the twenty police stations included in the project. From the 
corporate splendour of Sandton to the residential leafiness of Rosebank to the grime 
and decay in an inner-city station such as Hillbrow, the field of policing proved 
diverse . Amidst such variation in local policing context, the creation of 'pockets of 




In the space of a decade the interdependence of policy formulation and 
budgetary allocation had become a prominent feature of the new managerial 
approach. Increasingly stringent requirements emanating from National Treasury for 
constructing policy within tight budgetary frameworks forced police managers to 
apply their minds to a difficult issue. The South Africa Police Service Act of 1995 
obliged the police bureaucracy to compile annual police plans with a specification of 
priorities, targets, and performance indicators. From 1996 onwards this has been an 
evolving exercise. The excessive priorities, unrealistic targets and multiple 
performance indicators so characteristic of the early experiments have been 
simplified. A more direct alignment between priorities and resource allocations has 
been brought about (Shaw, 2000). Through trial and error (ie through negative 
lessons) more pragmatism has emerged. Those in search of proof, on paper at least, of 
the new managerial discourse and its impact on operational delivery need look no 
further than the more recent Annual Reports of the Commissioner of the South 
African Police Service and/or Departmental specifications of Policing Priorities and 
Objectives. The Strategic Plan for the South African Police Service for 2004-2007, 
compiled by the SAPS Strategic Management division, reflects the new managerial 
sensibilities that have come to pervade the police organisation. Its conclusion is worth 
quoting in full so as to capture the new managerial discourse: 
The Strategic Plan 2004-2007 provides the strategic focus, within the context 
of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework, and sets the parameters within 
which the SAPS intends to pursue its objectives towards contributing to a safe 
and secure environment. The plan sets out the Department's programmes, 
priorities and strategies in terms of which funds are allocated and directed for 
the purpose of both, addressing crime effectively, and improving service 
delivery. 
The successful implementation of the planning information will determine the 
extent to which the SAPS has achieved its objectives. This will be determined, 
inter alia, by the output of the various programme and subprogrammes, the 
level of satisfaction in the community, and the general feeling of safety which 
prevails in the RSA. Key to the success of the Plan will be the ability of the 
SAPS to prevent the rate of priority crimes from increasing, while ensuring 
that the detection rate does not decrease in 2004 to 2005 (SAPS, 2004b:40). 
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has contributed to a discussion of a more existential nature as to what policing is 
about, and what the ~olice should be doing, as well as their capacity to be involved in 
crime prevention efforts (Leggett, 2003). In this debate the difficulties and pitfalls of 
utilising crime rates as indicators of police performance had been broached. The latter 
question is particularly critical in a high crime context such as the South African one, 
where reductions in violent crime rates are all too frequently offered as political 
promlses. 
This analysis of the SDIP case study cannot, of course, by itself provide 
definitive conclusions regarding the extent to which imported ideas regarding 
professionalism and new management paradigms have been disseminated in a 
transitional police agency, or of their overall effectiveness. But the South African case 
study suggests that managerialism may yield varying and divergent reformist 
dividends. In the first phase of experiments of service delivery, from Project Lifeline 
to CPPP, a social conSClOusness pervaded managerial experiments. That 
consciousness tipped the project towards 'service delivery' in line with 'community 
safety' concerns. Key tools utilised were safety audits and local crime surveys, 
consultative engagements and partnership arrangements, the introduction of station ' 
service charters, and the conducting of exit polls to gauge 'customer' satisfaction. 
Such endeavours aimed at expanding the knowledge base for a locally-orientated 
policing service, the improvement of police-community relations, and an expansion of 
horizontal alliances between business, the police and the community, 
Over time, however, the managerial innovations became channelled into more 
technocratic domains. In the second phase, a more organisationally-specific 
engagement with service delivery improvement gained momentum. Modernising 
systems and procedures within the police bureaucracy now consumed the bulk of 
energy and resources. In this phase, administrative experts within the police 
organisation assumed a more prominent role. This managerial cadre focused its 
attention on developing human resource indices: performance contracts, performance 
charts, and performance indicators. Instead of administrative accountability being a 
means to and end (of consumer satisfaction), it became an end in itself The appeal of 
administrative accountability in its narrow form seemed obvious enough, as it allowed 
for more control over the product and control over the process whereby policing was 
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delivered. 15S Increasingly the business imperative and logic of managerialism became 
applied to force as opposed to service aspects of police business. There is ample 
evidence of this development in the National Crime Combating Strategy of 2000. The 
latter relied on basic managerial principles in devising a national policing plan 
informed by crime analysis; the identification of policing priorities and their 
operationalisation; an alignment of budgetary resources and operational activities; and 
a monitoring of impact and outputs of crime combating. 
The challenges confronting the implementation of the paradigm of New 
Public Management are also evident from closer scrutiny of field experiments in this 
regard. Complexity and contradictions characterise the process. Although the 
modernising rhetoric pervades the recent policy documents, the concrete evidence for 
an improvement in the quality of service delivery on the part of the South African 
Police Service remains elusive (Lapsley, 1999). In the end we again confront, the 
potential for, as well as the difficulties relating to, the transferability of grand 
narratives such as professionalism and managerialism into locales as difficult and 
contested as South Africa (Mulcahy & Ellison, 2001). 
158 The appeal of managerial authority in an organisation which has been deeply affected by the 
collapse of discipline which accompanied the demilitarisation drive should not be underestimated (See 
in this regard the potent comments of Vickers & Kouzmin [200 I J). 
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Chapter 8 
Policy Transfer and Policy Convergence in Policing: 
Concluding Observations from Transitional South Africa 
8.1 Introduction 
The current project of police reform in South Africa is about fifteen years old. During 
that time dramatic changes have taken place in the ethos, structure and operation of the 
SAPS. Reform measures since 1994 have embraced an extremely wide agenda, and 
objectives have shifted in response to conditions on the ground. It remains a contentious 
matter just how much the reforms have contributed to a more effective police force, or may 
rather have exacerbated its institutional and personnel instability. Of course, both may be the 
case, with pockets of greater efficiency co-existing within an unsteady matrix. This study did 
not attempt to answer this very large and vital question. It has had a more modest goal: an 
examination, through selected case studies, of the interplay of novel, often externally derived, . 
ideas and practices with a national police force at a time of immense political transition. 
The course of organisational change of the public police agency in South Africa has 
been driven by structural dynamics, both national and global, and by the concerted efforts of 
a wide range of social agencies. South African police reform can be described as a variation 
on the theme of 'interactive globalization' (Cain, 2000:250), where local and international 
influences mix and combine - often in unexpected ways. 
This discussion started from the South African vantage point, with a conceptual 
enquiry into the phenomenon of lesson drawing and policy transfer in pursuit of police 
reform. Here it is appropriate to return to the key questions formulated in the introductory 
chapter as a framework for exploring policy changes in South African policing after 1990. In 
attempting to answer these questions, some general conclusions are drawn from this 
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(selective) inquiry into post-1990 policing developments in South Africa. The following 
thematic concerns are thus addressed in this concluding Chapter: 
• What causes policy transfer, lesson drawing and innovation, and what kinds 
of influences shape transfers? 
• What kinds of actors and agencies participate In the process of policy 
transfer? 
• What can we conclude regarding the contextual factors which may facilitate 
or inhibit the transfer of policy in new democracies? 
• What observations can be made regarding the link between policy transfer 
and policy convergence? 
8.2 Policy transfer, lesson drawing and innovation - structure and agency 
South African experiments attest to the fact that the interchanges between internal 
and external policing ideas have been greatly facilitated firstly, by political events at the, 
national level and secondly, by global shifts in policing. South Africa's turn towards political 
negotiations in 1990 facilitated its reinsertion into the international community. Considerable 
goodwill at the international level was combined with receptivity at the local level for policy 
change. As Brocklehurst et al (2000) put it, the climate of transition facilitated lesson-
drawing. South Africa's aspiration to belong to a 'nonnative community of nations', 
(Bernstein & Cashore, 2000: 81) exemplified by western democracies, aided the process of 
exchange. The international normative discourse, associated with the rule oflaw and human 
rights, shaped the agenda for policy change within the local police organisation in definitive 
ways. 
Opportunities for changing the structure, function and legitimacy of the police 
institution were exploited by a wide range of constituencies (Mawby, 1990). In the South 
African case, the change was conceptualised as one involving a shift from a repressive, 
colonial model to a consensual model of policing. The example of Anglo-American policy 
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and practice proved particularly persuasive. In the contested context of the time, and 
particularl y in the early phase of reform, lesson drawing from 'international' best practices 
provided political leverage on sensitive policing issues. Lesson drawing from mature 
democracies thus served as a powerful source oflegitimisation ofreformist endeavours in the 
face of resistance from conservative political quarters and from the old police guard. Only in 
recent years has there been an interest to tum toward developing contexts as appropriate 
locations for purposes of lesson drawing. 
In the post-Cold War context, the existence of what Marenin (2005: 107) describes as 
a 'transnational policing regime' - defined by the principles of democratic governance - has 
become widely acknowledged, perhaps optimistically so. The third wave of democratisation 
(Huntington, 1991) has brought national police agencies offormer authoritarian regimes into 
the normative orbit of democratic policing. As a consequence, national efforts towards police 
reform in new democracies have increasingly been influenced by the normative assumptions 
embedded within the democratic policing regime. A particularly prominent feature of this 
regime that has emerged during the 1990s is the centrality of notions relating to Community. 
Orientated Policing (COP). In the South African case, as the discussion in previous chapters 
illustrated, COP too has wielded a strong influence over the debates and experiments for a 
new policing dispensation. Again, various agencies have invoked the principles associated 
with democratic policing in their quest for setting a strategic framework for South African 
police reform. 
Although the normative 'pull' of a democratic policing model is not to be disputed, 
more recent developments in the field of security, such as those associated with the growth 
in the illicit economy and the re-insertion of terrorism onto the international security agenda, 
pose new challenges for the institutionalisation of democratic policing regimes. In the post 
9/ II security environment, contradictory pressures may be exerted on national police 
agencies to prioritise their efforts toward democratic governance on the one hand, whilst 
pursuing police effectiveness to counteract terrorism on the other. Shifts in South African 
policing policy over the past decade provide evidence of changes in the reform agenda. 
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While the' legitimacy deficit' dominated in the first phase for police reform, reform efforts 
have increasingly shifted to addressing the 'capacity deficit' in specialist enclaves of the 
police. Growing concern with high rates of crime of a predatory nature, as well as with 
organised crime, has contributed to the increasing emphasis on police effectiveness in 
combating crime. The rival forces associated with the quest for democratisation and for 
securitisation are thus likely to place competing demands on domestic policing policy in the 
contemporary era. Although such effects need to be examined more closely before firm 
conclusions can be formulated, it would seem that the institutionalisation of a democratic 
policing model, as discussed in the previous chapters, is already subject to challenges 
(Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998). 
The 'decentring,159 of policing (Marenin, 2005: 100) in the international sphere has 
created favourable conditions within which an ever-wider range of actors and networks 
(state, non-state, transnational, corporate) have become involved in policy development at 
the domestic level. Recent South African developments confirm the range of non-domestic 
influences over, and agencies involved in, the reform of public policing policy. While, 
recognising the variety of players involved in the crafting of a post-Apartheid policing policy, " 
this dissertation focused on a small selection of such social agencies. It is with hindsight that 
the interconnectivity of such agencies and conduits (local and international) involved in the 
project of South African police reform seem much more evident than at the outset of the 
analysis. This is a point to which we return in the concluding paragraph. 
8.3 Actors, agencies and networks involved in policy exchange and transfer 
This dissertation focused on three institutional conduits for reformist policing ideas in 
recent years in South Africa. The three conduits constitute a small but critical part ofa much 
wider range of social mechanisms through which policy ideas are invoked and made to travel 
across time and space. Such actors comprise individuals, institutions, coalitions and 
159 Marenin's (2005) use of the concept of 'decentring' captures the extent to which policing in the 
contemporary era has become, in the words of Bayley and Shearing (2001 :vii), a matter of pluralisation and 
'multilaterisation. ' 
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networks. The actors may hail from the public sphere more generally, the police institution 
more specifically, the corporate sector, or from civil society. The agents may be situated at 
the domestic, regional, international or transnational level. In each of the three institutional 
conduits profiled in this dissertation, the discussion identified the social context within which 
the policy community functioned, the political sponsors and cultural entrepreneurs involved, 
the policy networks constructed, and the social alliances created in pursuit of police reform. 
For the purposes of this conclusion, a brief summary of the areas of focus and the major 
findings will suffice. 
8.3.1 The role of knowledge-based networks or 'epistemic' communities in 
police reform 
In the first instance, the discussion focused on the community of policing scholars 
who have helped to shape the debate on police and police reform in South Africa. Police 
studies as an area of critical enquiry in South Africa only developed from the mid-1980s. 
Despite the existence of repressive controls, local members of the academic community 
were able to interact with international ideas on issues relating to social control and the role 
of armed state formations. Furthermore, in the South African case, a tradition of intellectual 
activism facilitated a critical engagement with the political dynamics of Apartheid policing 
and the challenges confronting a post-Apartheid policing dispensation. From the late 1980s 
onwards, the quest for policy orientated research in support of reconstruction created new 
opportunities for local researchers to contribute to police debates. Exchanges between local 
and foreign scholars grew exponentially as the international isolation of South Africa gave 
way to constructi ve engagement. In the early phase of reform, the strategic utilisation of high 
profile international expertise gave political stature to local policy debates which 
emphasised, for example, the importance of depoliticisation, demilitarisation and 
democratisation (Caparini & Marenin [eds], 2004). Informal political networks, as well as 
professional alliances, proved useful in identifying and inviting to South Africa international 
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scholars 160 to participate in public debate, academic conferences, and in later years, in the 
actual drafting of policing policy. The return to South Africa of intellectuals in exile too 
boosted local research and policy advocacy. 161 The strategic importance of external 
scholarship - particularly in the early phase of political reform - should not, however, detract 
from the role which indigenous members of the research community came to play in policy 
debates. Local members of the 'epistemic community' had a fine grasp of the contextual 
dynamics with which a future policing model had to contend, as the earlier policy 
engagements with community policing by Etienne Marais (1992a), for example, so 
convincingly illustrated. 
Chapter 2 outlined the various conceptual paradigms which diagnosed the South 
African policing 'problem' and the way in which each engaged - to varying degrees - with 
the future of policing beyond Apartheid. In the South African case, academic research has 
informed policy making for the SAPS, particularly so in the early phase as intellectual 
energies honed in on the project of state reconstruction. By the late 1990s, the growth of in-
house research capacity within the police was combined with a certain cooling of 
relationships between independent research outfits and the police institution. This may have 
contributed to greater marginalisation of external research in police policy formulation. 
Whether this is likely to be a long-term trend remains to be seen. What is, however, beyond 
dispute is the role in policy deliberations which knowledge-based or 'epistemic' communities 
(Haas, 1992:2) have played over the past decade. 
Academic debates of a critical persuasion have imparted a degree of reflexivity into 
policing debates, examining the linkages between the police and the state, the police and the 
broader society, and the national state and transnational community. More recently, local 
debates have also engaged with the dynamics confronting policing reform in the context of 
160 The most notable of these were : John Brewer from Northern Ireland, Clifford Shearing from Canada, Mike 
Brogden and Tank Waddington from the UK, and Ron Weitzer and Philip Heymann from the USA. 
161 The most important figure in this regard is Gavin Cawthra, the military/security sector expert who, during his 
period of political exile, held a research position with the UK-based International Defence and Aid Fund during 
the 1980s. 
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political transition (Shaw, 2001c; 2001d). Observations regarding the politics of police 
reform in post-conflict settings have introduced a much needed comparative angle into 
policing discussions. In this regard South-South exchanges between scholars situated in 
developing regions, for example, constitute one promising development. Such research 
networks provide a useful counterpoint to the almost exclusive reliance previously on North-
to-South lesson-drawing so characteristic of the earlier phase of police reform. South-South 
networks may prove crucial for appreciating the forces which promote 'indigenization' of 
policing ideas and practices in developing contexts (Edwards & Hughes, 2005 :348). Within 
the Southern African region, South African academic and research networks exert 
considerable influence in regional deliberations on policing and security sector reform. This 
influence is clearly a function of the relatively advanced nature oflocal scholarship on police 
and security sector reform and the policy expertise acquired over the past decade. There is 
also growing evidence oflesson-drawing from South to North in recent policing discussions 
in which local experiments in the governance of security drawn from South African 
townships are being projected into western academic forums (Kempa & Shearing, 2002). 
8.3.2 Policy mechanisms in police reform 
Policy units everywhere have a distinctive role to play in the conceptualisation, 
advocacy, and implementation of policing policy. Expertise in policy formulation, as well as 
capacity in policy implementation, are critical requirements, all the more so in the quest for 
transforming police institutions with colonial and authoritarian histories. Technical assistance 
provided by international aid agencies and transnational think tanks, for example, constitute 
resources for policy innovation in post-conflict settings. 
The trajectory of South African police reform has been shaped by a wide range of 
policy mechanisms. Chapter 3 considered the contribution of an interim policy mechanism, 
the National Police Board, a product of South African's own peace settlement, in some 
detail. The Board itself had no real powers, and only operated for a short period (1992-1994) 
in a fluid political environment. In addition, the Board had to contend with considerable 
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hostility from the police organisation. The Board soon outlived its purpose, as political 
deliberations about the future police dispensation shifted to central political structures. It 
was disbanded shortly after the formation of a new Ministry of Safety and Security and the 
consolidation of policing policy. Nevertheless, it was a locus for some major policy 
deliberations, the first such in which senior officials of the police force were required to 
debate with civilian outsiders. Viewed from a micro angle, and based on an analysis of the 
substantive deliberations of the Board, it is clear that the Board provided a novel interim 
platform from which civilians could actively engage with members of the police elite on 
critical (and all too often contentious) issues of police reform. This process of dialogue and 
exchange at the elite level was of strategic importance at the time, given the adversarial 
legacy of the past. Through its deliberations, the Board accrued a measure of informal power 
and helped to set an agenda for police reform amongst a wider network of policy instruments. 
More importantly, the Board served as an instrument for establishing alliances 
between civilians (academics and political activists with political access to the mass 
democratic movement) and reform-orientated police that proved instrumental after 1994" 
During the Board's existence a number of civilian members of the Board sharpened their 
policy skills, and then went on to become influential members of the policing policy elite in 
the new dispensation. In a way the Board served as a launching pad for the careers of future 
policy makers. During the Board's existence it also functioned as a conduit for international 
policing ideas and strategies, though often in an ad hoc and informal manner. It provided an 
internal platform within which international ideas could be debated between local 
constituencies. Through its substantive work, as discussed in chapter 3, the Board helped to 
introduce a comparative angle onto a number of policing issues such as police accountability, 
police training, strategic planning, and partnership arrangements. The Board interacted with 
various other policy communities: it drew on external research expertise in exploring the 
terms of reference for a future police dispensation; it helped to canvass the opinions of 
community-based organisations on policing issues; it embarked on some study visits abroad 
to extract 'best practices' from elsewhere; it helped convene workshops and conferences 
between former political adversaries; and it acted as a sounding board for foreign police 
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practitioners eager to offer advice. Much of the authority of the Board was derived from its 
institutional connections with Peace Accord structures. The capacity of civilian members to 
mobilise NGO support for some of its endeavours also proved critical to the Board's role. 
This ability to mobilise and involve community expertise in public debates on post-Apartheid 
policing was particularly critical in the search for greater inclusivity in policy deliberations, 
and for advancing local capacity for steering the reform agenda after 1994. Within the 
constraints flowing from its structural design, the Board mobilised social capital across the 
boundaries of state and civil society. Yet, in the wider scheme of things, this policy 
mechanism was no more than a small cog in an otherwise complex social machine feeding 
off the momentum of political change. 
8.3.3 Developmental aid as conduit for policy innovation and change 
Third, this discussion profiled the international development community as an 
influential actor in the process of local police reform. The impact of international donor aid 
in South Africa is a striking exception to the situation in much of the rest of Africa, where. 
the infusion of foreign funds and expertise may make the difference between state viability 
and public bankruptcy. In the latter case, donors are far more able, and determined, to attach 
conditions to the provision of aid that may be tantamount to a clear infringement of state 
sovereignty. Rakner's (2003) penetrating study of the Zambian experience with aid over the 
past three decades is one striking example. South Africa could have afforded to dispense with 
foreign development aid ifit seemed too intrusive in domestic policy goals. Nevertheless, the 
country, and the public police specifically, have received quite generous assistance. This aid 
can be construed as a cause of policy changes (Stensen & Edwards, 2004), but also as a 
victim of domestic contingencies. 
In the South African case developmental assistance in aid for criminal justice refonn 
has been characterised by diversity, both in tenns of the types of projects funded, and the 
range of donors involved. Recent South African experiments in this regard serve as a 
reminder of the opportunities for foreign assistance in support of police refonn. An empirical 
178 
inquiry into the manner and scope of interchanges between local and foreign constituencies 
in agenda-setting and the implementation of organisational reforms reveals their complex 
nature. Such investigations also cast light on the role of international and transnational 
institutions in defining the principles of 'good' policing, and providing support for their 
institutionalisation in local settings. Aid agencies constitute important sources of policy 
innovation by bringing international rules and norms to bear on national settings. Since this 
influence is backed by the provision of material and technical resources, it may translate into 
discursive shifts in policing debates, cultural changes of police organisations, and changes in 
the technologies of operational policing (Vitale, 2005) . 
Conditionalities attached to the provision of developmental aid often result in the 
coercive imposition of (policing) ideas and practices from the outside. But even in the 
unequal context of aid relations, the interaction between external and internal role-players is 
more complex. Conditionality, it has been recognised, may well act as a constraint on policy 
transfer and change. Insofar as local ownership is critical to the sustainability of policy 
changes, consultative and persuasive strategies rather than coercive methodologies need to' 
inform attempts at policy transfer and change under the auspices of international aid 
agencies. 
In South Africa the influence of aid agencies has been tempered by the relative 
absence of conditionalities, as well as by the comparatively advanced nature of local policy 
expertise and capacity. Here external actors in policy innovation and change have had to 
contend with local ideas and traditions, and growing expertise about the form, content and 
priorities for police reform. Local capacity for an engagement with policy and practice, both 
outside and within the police organisation, has developed quite significantly over the past 
fifteen years. The evolution of such in-house capacity is likely to impact on the nature of the 
relationship between internal and external players in the policy innovation game. 
Development assistance to the police and to the field of security has been an evolving 
enterprise. The paradigms which have informed aid in the sphere of police reform have 
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evolved from ad hoc and piecemeal approaches to more ambitious sectoral interventions. The 
recent growth in practical experiments in donor-assisted police refonn has provided scope for 
conceptual analysis and practical lesson drawing on a much wider scale. Proof of greater 
reflexivity within key developmental networks is to be found in recent attempts to clarify the 
objectives of assistance to police abroad, and to define the principles that should guide such 
assistance. Clarification of the rules of the aid game is considered one step toward greater 
effectiveness in project support. These developments are clearly important. On the ground, 
however, the success of developmental assistance is far from guaranteed, as each ofthe case 
studies of donor-assisted police projects (discussed in chapter 5, 6 and 7) has illustrated - an 
issue to which the discussion will return below. 
The three case studies of donor assistance to the SAPS were selected from amongst the 
many possible candidates by virtue of their scale, their centrality in addressing basic policing 
issues, and, last but not least, in one case by virtue of the writer's own extensive involvement 
in its design and evaluation. These case studies capture shifts in the fonn and content of 
assistance in support of policy change over time. 
Reform of basic training, as pursued through the Basic Level Training Pilot Programme 
(BLTPP) between 1994 and 1995, has long been a traditional focus of foreign assistance to 
police abroad. Support for training has seemed on the face of it to provide for a relatively 
straightforward transfer of skills and capacity, characteristically underdeveloped in police 
agencies in fonner authoritarian settings. In the context ofthe latest wave of democratisation 
(Huntington, 1991), foreign investment in police training abroad also embraces the more 
ambitious objective of engendering change in the cultural disposition of public police 
agencies. With such goals in mind, training exchanges focus not only on basic policing 
education but also on human rights issues and diversity concerns. The latter were particularly 
prominent features of the restructuring oflocal police training through developmental aid in 
the BL TPP, as well as in a wider range of training exchanges at the levels of middle and 
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senior-management (Brown & Van der Spuy, 1999).162 The BLTPP combined both 
normative and more technical objectives. It embraced the philosophy of community policing 
and its political principles and aimed at modernising the training systems. 
We noted that a range of professional organisations participated in a process whereby the 
agenda for a substantive reform of basic and advanced training of the police was agreed upon 
and then implemented. In this endeavor, the Police Board played an instrumental role by 
mobilising both academic and professional police expertise from domestic, regional, and 
international quarters. This reform initiative was the first to fall squarely under the political 
authority of the newly established Ministry of Safety and Security. Close political alliances 
between the international team of policing experts (who acted as overarching project co-
ordinators) and the policy arm of the Ministry of Safety and Security (the Secretariat) proved 
pivotal in institutional ising new principles and practices for basic police training. Again, an 
appeal to international best practice served as a legitimating device in the face of bureaucratic 
intransigence and/or canteen resistance to the demilitarisation of training, for example. 
Assistance to Policing in the Eastern Cape (APEC) constituted a much more 
ambitious intervention than the Basic Training project. It aimed at re-building policing in the 
Eastern Cape over a four-year period. In targeting infrastructure, basic policing skills, 
management capacity, and police oversight, APEC represented a multi-faceted intervention 
based on a consultative engagement between the Ministry of Safety and Security, the police, 
NGOs, businesspeople, and social communities in the province. As in the case ofBLTPP, the 
philosophy of community policing informed the overall project framework. But compared to 
the Training initiative, APEC was also informed by a more expansive paradigm pre-figuring 
'problem-orientated' policing and 'inter-sectoral' approaches to police reform that became 
more prominent features of foreign assistance in later years. Much of APEC's success 
depended on the mobilisation of wider social networks involving NGOs, the research 
162 The difficulties involved in engineering a change in the canteen culture of police forces is well recognised in 
academic literature on the topic (Chan, 1997). Recently, ethnographic enquiries into cultural and behavioural 
change in the South African police organisation have begun to consider the challenges of measuring the impact 
of reform on organisational mindsets and habits (Marks, 1999; 2000 ; 2002). 
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community, local policy elites, and foreign aid workers (Bass, 2000). As such it depended on 
a network approach to police reform informed by the principles of the co-production of 
security. Again various unanticipated factors impinged on project implementation, and thus 
shaped the destiny of the programme in ways unforeseen by the planners. We return to such 
factors later in the discussion. 
In the third and final case study the focus shifted to developmental assistance aimed at 
the improvement of service delivery through institutional ising 'managerialist' ideas and 
practices. The Service Delivery Improvement Programme (SDIP) also comprised an 
ambitious project, if not quite at the scale of APEC. It aimed to penetrate through middle 
police management to the conduct of the rank-and-file at the country's very diverse police 
stations. In this instance policy innovation and change were driven by in-house agencies 
(police management in particular) in collaboration with external counterparts (police 
management of the Belgian Gendarmerie). In this project the police agency itself constituted 
a critical conduit for the diffusion of ideas and systems across time and space. SDIP 
illustrates the importance of bilateral (or multilateral) networks of police professionals in, 
policy innovation from one locale to another. In the new transnational context, police " 
networks constitute a growing source of policy entrepreneurship (Bigo, 2000; Gerspacher, 
2005). 
The approach adopted by SDIP exemplified the extent to which the paradigm of new 
public sector management has come to influence police organisations. Characterised by the 
use of business analogies such as 'value for money' and 'customer services,' managerialist 
approaches to police reform constitute one source of policy innovation. As the case study 
demonstrated, managerialist philosophies provide opportunities for more corporate players to 
become involved in policy debates within the public sector. The actual successes that could 
be attributed to the project's activities are hard to establish, and probably the whole 
Programme aimed too high. Experience derived from its activities, however, helped shape 
the strategic planning of top management at the tum of the century, In that sense, SDIP 
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enjoyed a considerable impact on the overall direction of policy at the highest level, itself an 
unanticipated achievement for which it deserves some credit. 
8.4 Contextual factors which impact on policy transfer and policy change 
At a very general level all three of the institutional conduits discussed in the 
preceding chapters emphasise the wide range of situational factors which may facilitate or 
inhibit the transfer of policy with the view to affecting changes in the structure, organisation, 
and legitimacy of police organisations in new democracies. In this regard two broad 
observations will suffice. The one touches on social receptivity and the political will to affect 
change. The other concerns the institutional capacity to follow through. Political transition 
opens up opportunities for policy exchanges and social re-engineering which are utilised by a 
wide range of social players, often with competing sets of interests in mind and varying 
levels of capacity in hand. The space for policy innovation may become curtailed by feelings 
of social uncertainty and dislocation in the wider society, and demoralisation within police 
ranks. Institutional capacity for conceptualising and implementing changes is of critical 
importance to the sustainability of policies. One critical lesson to be drawn from South . 
African experiments in criminal justice and police refonn is that the gap between policy 
innovation and policy implementation simply loomed far too large for comfort. 
All three of the case studies of donor assisted refonn projects underscored the 
importance of understanding local context in tenns of both social and institutional 
environment. For example, when APEC was under consideration, the Eastern Cape 
resembled, as one observer put it, 'the Wild West.,163 The province in the mid-1990s 
constituted a politically volatile environment with shadow fonnations engaging in low 
intensity war. Pursuing project objectives in this fractious environment turned out to be much 
more difficult than most participants had anticipated. Likewise, SDIP was conceived at a 
time when the domestic refonn process had hardly begun to take effect. By 1997, factors that 
had not been integrated into the original design were changing the character of the police 
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organisation - the continual restructuring of specialist units, and a bold affinnative action 
policy, to name but two of the most important. 
Development circles now stress the indispensability of thorough, country-based 
assessments before projects of this scale are launched. Patterns of socio-political conflict 
need to be properly appraised, and institutional audits of the recipient organisation are vital to 
strategic interventions. Such requisites have now become common (and crucial) in the case 
of humanitarian assistance in post-conflict reconstructions undertaken in collapsed or weak 
states. In this regard, Cliffe & Luckham (2000) insist that substantive political analysis must 
infonn policy design, for '(a)11 too often international agencies, donors and NGOs have 
plunged in on the basis of an inadequate understanding of what are, after all, profoundly 
political processes' (p.29 I ). Fulfilling this requirement would require much more 
collaboration between country-specific experts, policy analysts and the aid community. In 
this connection, the rise of global think tanks and their interaction with developmental 
networks is an encouraging sign (Stone, 2000b; 2001). 
There is a further dimension to the issue of context that underlines the necessity for .. 
evaluating institutional capacities. APEC targeted a weak police agency in a politically 
volatile and economically impoverished rural province of the country. The original planners 
simply underestimated the deplorable state of policing affairs in the province. As a 
consequence, project implementation had to confront the dire state of criminal justice and the 
extent of skills shortages amongst its practitioners. In turn, SDIP confronted a national 
organisation that overall was not in a dramatically better shape than that in the Eastern Cape. 
The sheer scale of the investment required to upgrade professional capacity across the police 
organisation in the country seems to have been underestimated in the conception of both aid 
projects. Thus, the histories of APEC and SDIP emphasise the importance of social scans 
and feasibility studies for project design and project implementation - again an ingredient 
that is currently considered crucial in project design. 
163 Interview lconducted with technical assistant deployed in support of APEC, May, 2004 . Further details 
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As the current wisdom would have it, 'local ownership' and political commitment at 
the recipient level are vital components for maximising the developmental spin-offs, and for 
ensuring the sustainability of aid interventions in policing reform (Saferworld, 2002). The 
experience of APEC and SDIP, however, points to a possible dilemma: is local ownership a 
viable option in the face oflimited institutional capacity? This was a relevant question that 
designers and implementers of the new curriculum in basic police training in 1994 had to 
confront. In the case of APEC, the situation was complicated by the failure of the national 
SAPS office to work smoothly with the province in the execution of the project. SDIP 
targeted police middle management but merely shifted the burden of rank-and-file 
demoralisation and underperforrnance to the shoulders of overworked and under-resourced 
Station Commanders. The result was all too predictable: police stations in middle class areas 
benefited most from the programme, as they enjoyed the personnel and resource basis to 
absorb at least some of the ideas that filtered downwards. 
The experience from all three projects suggests that none of these donor-funded 
initiatives actually came remotely near achieving their original goals . The failure offoreign· 
aid to bring about 'development,' however conceived, is hardly a novel observation. The 
academic literature on the subject - as opposed to the more optimistic pronouncements of 
agencies such as the World Bank and donor governments - is replete with tales offailed or 
underperforrning projects, particularly in Africa. What project designers rarely anticipate is 
the unintended and contingent character of projects in what is effectively social engineering. 
While it is perhaps asking the impossible that planners look more to unintended than 
intended consequences, and factor in 'contingency,' the possibility of project failure and the 
likelihood ofunderperforrnance need to be addressed from inception. 
The findings emerging from the projects as discussed in this thesis - selective as it 
may be - may also be put to more radical use in contemplating the potential for, and 
limitations associated with, building state capacity in the face of institutional 
underdevelopment on the scale witnessed in the Eastern Cape in particular, but also affecting 
in chapter 6. 
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the police nation-wide. Investment in police agencies is a costly affair, all the more so in 
developing contexts. One conclusion is that future pragmatic engagements with public police 
agencies in contexts such as the South African one may not be able to bracket out the work of 
other agencies lnvolved in the provision of security. This raises a difficult question 
concerning the institutional parameters within which police reform is to be pursued. This 
issue, too, has been at the forefront of recent conceptual deliberations amongst governance 
and policing scholars as highlighted in chapter 2 of the dissertation. 
All three case studies of donor aid suggest that sectoral and programmatic 
interventions need to stretch over a longer period and require more material resources. The 
collapse of the Basic Level Training initiative when Treasury instituted harsh budgetary 
constraints could hardly have been foreseen. Against the expectations of all concerned, it 
constituted merely a once-off intervention whose fruits were largely squandered in the 
following years when the moratorium on recruitment led to the dissipation of the reformed 
training institutions. But the fact remains that the project planners had not even considered 
the necessity of some follow-up support when the original training programme was 
completed. In recent years, the realisation that short-term interventions may do as much harm ... 
as good has become embodied in the shift from project to programme assistance, and the call 
for a 'joined-up' and 'whole-of-government' approaches (DFID, 2002: 10). Reform of the 
police, as is currently understood, needs to be embedded in a wider sectoral initiative to 
reform the criminal justice system. 'Justice and Security Sector Reform' (Lala, 2004) has 
become the new label that signifies an intersectoral sensitivity, at least on paper, to the 
challenges at stake. A principled insistence on 'joined-up' approaches must also engage with 
the practical difficulties involved. Such interventions are both complex and costly. They also 
require long-term investment, often with few short-term returns to appease constituencies 
that demand quick returns and tangible demonstrations of remedial impact, particularly in 
high crime contexts. 
If 'joined-up' approaches and partnerships are to become a reality in the domain of 
safety and security, then they will of necessity have to target a much wider range of agencies 
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(other than the public police) involved in the co-production of security (Cliffe & Luckham, 
1999). Tentative arguments in support of such a broader engagement have crept into recent 
attempts at a demarcation of the security sector. Minimalist discussions on security sector 
reform take a state-centered approach to the matter. In contrast, 'maximalist' approaches also 
include non-state organs of justice and policing that routinely breed in the gap left by 
illegitimate and weak states in troubled zones (Ball, 2000; 2002). Whatever the desirability 
of a more inclusive strategy to security sector reform in developmental interventions, its 
feasibility has hardly been tested. It remains, however, a key theme in recent academic 
engagements with the challenges confronting the governance of security, both globally, and 
in developing contexts more particularly (Bayley & Shearing, 200 l). If, under current 
conditions, public police agencies constitute only one resource in a wider network of safety 
providers, developmental aid needs to build capacity on a much wider front than 
conventional practices have hitherto done. This may lead to the broadening of the scope of 
informal justice and security mechanisms in developmental assistance (Biddle, Clegg & 
Whetton, 1999). The need to involve agencies other than the police in developmental 
assistance constitutes one lesson that seems to have been drawn from the APEC experience.' 
Beyond this principled stance, however, experimental interventions on a wider front have 
been slow in the making, and their impact on the wider quest for community safety and 
justice still remains to be seen. 
8.5 From policy transfer to policy convergence 
This excursion into aspects of South African police reform was informed and guided 
by recent debates on policy transfer, convergence, emulation and modelling (Karstedt, 2002). 
In the contemporary era, the normative and operational parameters of' good policing' are no 
longer crafted primarily at the national level. Ideas, mechanisms and practices are 
manufactured in settings and contexts that are increasingly located beyond the national level. 
Complex structural processes provide an engine for change, as do the conscious or 
unconscious actions of a wide range of social agencies. The motivations driving such 
exchanges may vary greatly. These motivations, and the processes and consequences of 
exports and transfers, deserve much more examination than has so far been the case. In 
187 
addition, as policing paradigms proliferate in the minds of policing scholars, 'best practice' 
thinking in development agencies also undergoes shifts and reversals. 
We have noted in earlier discussions that the process of transfer may exhibit 
qualitatively different features, ranging from deliberate and conscious efforts to more 
unconscious processes of absorption and osmosis. Ideas may be imposed on the public police 
agency in an almost coercive fashion by transnational institutions or adopted in a more 
consensual manner. Depending on circumstances and power inequalities, both imposition 
and voluntary import may yield positive effects for purposes of adopting' good' practices. As 
for the outcome - good, bad or mediocre - much depends on the configuration of forces at the 
local level and their interaction with transnational loci of power. 
Scholarly debates on the need to frame discussions on police refonn in a wider 
governance-of-security framework, so as to avoid the pitfalls of a state-dependent approach, 
have achieved some prominence. Indeed, in principle, the transfer of policy ideas could 
become a two-way process, as lessons from developing contexts suggest reforms at the 
developed centre. The most important contributions in this regard emanate from scholars . 
working under the broad rubric of'nodai governance.' Shearing and like-minded academics 
have considered how a nodal network approach may be put to strategic use in the difficult 
policy context of 'weak' or 'failing' states where a 'security vacuum' exists (Dupont et ai, 
2003:340). When the state suffers from legitimacy or capacity deficits, the role of non-state 
agencies and non-domestic actors becomes all the more crucial. 164 The notion of nodal 
networks can itself be put to analytical use in conceptualising the ways in which policy 
transfers and policy exchanges are enacted in the contemporary era. 
164 Shearing has for some years been involved in directing an experiment in bottom-up 'micro-governance' in 
the township of Zwelethemba, Worcester, in the Western Cape. This initiative has been extended to other 
townships in the Western Cape. For some scholars this particular 'model' has provided a social laboratory for 
the conceptual ideas now being inserted into international circles. Shearing himself drew on his experience in 
South Africa to propose similar ideas while a member of the Patten Commission on the reform of the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (Shearing, 200 I a). 
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Critical questions regarding the content and the transfer of policing paradigms are 
clearly in order. Mike Brogden's (2004) engagement with the export-import of Community 
Orientated Policing (COP), which he describes as the 'central thrust of a drive to export 
policing techniques' (p.637), raises some vital issues . COP, as he notes, is attractive to 
various constituencies. As he puts it (Brogden, 2004:642): 'It is seen as both a band aid for 
transitional government as well as a panacea for all crime ills, and the building block of the 
new democratic state.' He laments the fact that far too little empirical analysis exists of the 
motives underlying the exchange dynamics, the processes of installation, and the outcomes. 
Ellison (forthcoming) also concurs that COP has emerged as a global paradigm packaged for 
export to transitional societies. Both insist that a more critical appraisal of the efficacy of 
COP as a reformist strategy is required. Empirical enquiries, such as that provided by Ruteere 
& Pommerolle (2003), suggest that in certain contexts COP may be put to repressive rather 
than benign use. In the context of aid conditionality, transfer is shaped by power inequalities 
between centre and periphery. The specific contexts of weak states may render COP 
misplaced. Bland description of policy transfer as a voluntary exchange between equals in 
pursuit of the noble ideas of accountable and efficient policing simply cannot do justice to 
the dynamics under which community policing has become commodified and is traded in a 
global marketplace. Policy content, ideas and instruments may well be transferred but with 
little guarantee that they will be put to good effect. Policy may travel with few guarantees 
that it is for the better. 
In the current era there is a truly wide range of actors involved in the production of 
knowledge and its utilisation for policy changes. On the available evidence it seems fair to 
suggest that policing ideas and practices are no longer simply diffused from some core centre 
to a distant periphery. Policy ideas seem to circulate Within, and between, knowledge-based 
and practitioner networks populated by a variety of actors (Nigel & Winter, 2000). A neo-
colonial depiction of policy transfer, as a one-way process whereby western hegemonic ideas 
are superimposed on local settings, fails to appreciate the diversity of policy exchanges in the 
contemporary era. Epistemic communities and knowledge networks situated at local, regional 
and transnational levels interact with policy elites and a wide range of international and local 
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constituencies with an interest in the reform of police agencies. Such exchanges seem to 
provide proof of' interactive globalization' on a scale not sufficiently appreciated in earlier 
discussions on policy transfer (Cain, 2000). 
Furthermore, recent reform activity aimed at the South African Police illustrates the 
extent to which 'policy communities' do not exist in isolation, but stand in an interactive' 
relationship to one another. The boundaries are fluid between knowledge-based 
communities, domestic policy actors, corporate players and donor communities. There is 
considerable interchange across these communities, contributing to a cross fertilisation of 
ideas between researchers, policy makers, the political elite, and police professionals . As 
individuals move across the borders of these communities, so do their ideas. This spatial 
mobility of influential people and their ideas across institutions has been a particularly 
prominent feature of early reform developments in South Africa as the trajectory of 
individual careers criss-crossed the boundaries between private and public sector, state and 
civil society. Over time, the scope and space for interaction may have contracted as the 
overall reformist momentum slows down, policy fatigue sets in amongst players, systems' 
solidify, or the democracy becomes more mature (Van Zyl Smit & Van der Spuy, 2004). 
The interplay between local context and international ideas is, by all informed 
accounts, highly complex. It is against this background that the literature on policy transfer 
would do well to engage with the difficulties, discrepancies and gaps between policy design 
and policy implementation. The latter has been a critical shortcoming confronting the policy 
revolution that has been taking place in South Africa. Furthermore, it is probably wise not to 
conflate policy transfer and policy convergence, or to see the former as a cause ofthe latter. 
Local evidence suggests that the link between transfer and convergence of policy is more 
fraught with tension than optimists would like us to believe. Policy transfers may lead to 
policy confusion instead of policy diffusion. Here various factors may play a role: 
inappropriate transfer, weak political will, ineptitude on the part of those involved, cultural 
resistance, transformation fatigue, or sheer confusion as local actors confront the 'paradox of 
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the plenty' (Karstedt, 2002). In the South African, case policy overload has been one critical 
factor that has shaped the trajectories of policy changes in the SAPS. 
Finally, at the most general oflevels, this inquiry supports the conclusion that there is 
ample evidence of growing convergence in the rhetoric, if to a lesser extent in the practice, 
associated with democratic police reform. In the current decade there is a widespread desire 
for effective and humane policing. But there is an equally common awareness of the 
obstacles in the way of achieving just that. Most South Africans would agree that the police 
should act with professionalism and according to the ideals of due constitutional process. But 
few view this goal as readily attainable under current social conditions. In this sense, the 
debate is no longer about what, but about how. Critical engagement with the means rather 
than the goals of policing refonns is a necessary pre-condition for a police future that will 
consolidate the advances that have been made thus far . 
Empirical enqmnes into the contexts, processes, mechanisms and outcomes 
associated with reformist interventions could contribute to our appreciation of how exactly 
police policies travel and to what local effect. In the end it is the path dependent nature of 
the process whereby policing policy ideas and instruments become internationalised that we 
need to confront. 
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